Hector X Monsegur
90 Avenue D #6F
New York, NY 10009 (646) 449-0117
Hector Xavier 'Sabu' Monsegur 90 Paladino Ave New York, NY 10035 +1-212-534-7516 Voter ID: 305168466 DOB: October 13th 1983
Hector J Monsegur
3940 Carpenter Ave
Bronx, NY 10466 (718) 994-5465
Hacker – real name Hector Xavier Monsegur – helped US authorities bring charges against five others
The world's most notorious computer hacker has been working as an informer for the FBI for at least the last six months, it emerged on Tuesday, providing information that has helped contribute to the charging of five others, including two Britons, for computer hacking offences.
Hector Xavier Monsegur, an unemployed 28-year-old Puerto Rican living in New York, was unmasked as "Sabu", the leader of the LulzSec hacking group that has been behind a wave of cyber raids against American corporations including Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, the intelligence consultancy Stratfor, British and American law enforcement bodies, and the Irish political party Fine Gael.
It was revealed that he had been charged with 12 criminal counts of conspiracy to engage in computer hacking and other crimes last summer, crimes which carry a maximum sentence of 124 years and six months in prison. According to indictments filed in a Manhattan federal court, he secretly pleaded guilty on 15 August last year.
Despite that, Sabu carried on with his aggressive online persona as the LulzSec "leader", with the father of two going so far as to deny online – the day after his secret guilty plea – that he had "snitched" on his friends.
His online "hacker" activity continued until very recently, with a tweet sent by him in the last 24 hours saying: "The feds at this moment are scouring our lives without warrants. Without judges approval. This needs to change. Asap."
In a US court document, the FBI's informant – there described as CW – "acting under the direction of the FBI" helped facilitate the publication of what was thought to be an embarrassing leak of conference call between the FBI and the UK's Serious and Organised Crime Agency in February.
Officers from both sides of the Atlantic were heard discussing the progress of various hacking investigations in the call.
A second document shows that Monsegur – styled this time as CW-1 – provided an FBI-owned computer to facilitate the release of 5m emails taken from US security consultancy Stratfor and which are now being published by WikiLeaks. That suggests the FBI may have had an inside track on discussions between Julian Assange of WikiLeaks, and Anonymous, another hacking group, about the leaking of thousands of confidential emails and documents.
The indictments mark the most significant strike by law enforcement officials against the amateur hacker groups that have sprung out of Anonymous. These groups, which include LulzSec, have cost businesses millions of pounds and exposed the credit card details and passwords of nearly 1 million people.
An FBI official told Fox News, which broke the story: "This is devastating to the organisation … we're chopping off the head of LulzSec."
But Graham Cluley, a consultant with the security company Sophos, warned news of the arrests, and of Monsegur's betrayal, could trigger a wave of fresh attacks by furious hackers.
"There are plenty of Anonymous sympathisers out there who will continue to steal information and pass it to Anonymous and WikiLeaks. LulzSec were more sophisticated than most, knew more about computer hacking. But that doesn't mean that there aren't others out there with those skills too."
The five charged by US authorities on Tuesday – two in the UK, two in Ireland and one in Chicago – amounted to a sweep of names who are alleged to have carried out all of the most public hacking attacks in the past year.
One of the people named in the indictment, Jake Davis, already faces a number of charges in the UK relating to alleged hacking by LulzSec. Davis, of Lerwick, Shetland, was on Tuesday charged in the US with two counts of computer hacking conspiracy.
Ryan Ackroyd – a 25-year-old from Doncaster who is said to have used the names "kayla", "lol" and "lolspoon" – was also charged on two counts of alleged computer hacking conspiracy. A statement from the US Attorney's office in New York said that Ackroyd was being interviewed on Tuesday by the Metropolitan police. Each count of computer hacking conspiracy carries a sentence of up to 10 years in jail.
Scotland Yard is also running parallel inquiries. One inquiry involves Ackroyd, Jake Davis, and two other people including a 17-year-old boy in connection with their alleged activities within LulzSec.
Ackroyd was charged in the UK on Tuesday night with two counts of conspiracy to "do an unauthorised act with intent to impair or with recklessness impairing of an operation of a computer", police said.
The 17-year-old boy has been charged with two computer conspiracy offences. It is understood that it is unlikely anyone would be extradited before UK trials had concluded.
Four people have now been charged by Scotland Yard in connection with hacking into a number of websites including that of the Serious Organised Crime Agency.
LulzSec was a hacker "crew" of about 10 people whose infamous run began with an attack in May 2011 on the Fox.com site, and then on the US X-Factor competition for which they released passwords and profiles of 73,000 contestants. It quickly escalated to an attack against Sony Pictures, followed by a security company and a number of online games companies.
But their downfall came after they hacked into InfraGard, a non-profit organisation affiliated with the FBI, and then attacked the websites of the CIA, the US Congress and the UK's Serious Organised Crime Agency.
LulzSec's existing members began to worry about government retribution. Although they hacked into the News International systems on 18 July, changing the front page of The Sun's website, the police and other hackers were on their tail. One called The Jester – believed to be a former member of the US military – who normally attacks jihadist websites, suggested on 24 June that Sabu was an IT consultant based in New York.
The two Irish individuals charged are Darren Martyn, 25, of Galway, Ireland, on two charges of computer hacking conspiracy, Donncha O'Cearrbhail, 19, of Birr, Ireland, on one charge of computer hacking conspiracy and one charge of unlawfully intercepted wire communication, which carries a sentence of up to five years. O'Cearrbhail was arrested by Irish police on Tuesday.
The fifth person charged is Jeremy Hammond, 27, of Chicago, US, who was arrested and charged on Monday for alleged offences relating to the December 2011 hacking of global intelligence firm Strategic Forecasting. He is charged with one count of computer hacking conspiracy, one count of computer hacking, and one count of conspiracy to commit access device fraud.
"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm
As reported by Fox News yesterday, LulzSec “mastermind” and Anonymous hacker Sabu (real name: Hector Xavier Monsegur) was flipped by the FBI. Big surprise. Give the FBI a cookie.
There has been a widespread belief that Sabu was a rat for quite some time within the hacking community—an August 2011 chat between Sabu and Virus, for instance. Virus quite prophetically wrote in that infamous chat: “I’m absolutely positive, you already got raided, and are setting your friends up and when they’re done draining you for information and arrests they’ll sentence you and it’ll make nose.”
Beyond that, in a community wherein anyone can have a voice, it stands to reason that subversive government influences are present, whether passively watching or actively suggesting. Disinformation, false flag operations, and immunity: these are the human intelligence gathering techniques that spy agencies use to infiltrate movements.
With that in mind, one of two possibilities exist: The FBI has transformed Anonymous into one monolithic false-flag operation, or agents take down hackers the way they take down other targets—with one or multiple informants. Judging the FBI’s efforts purely on the frequency of Anonymous’ activities throughout the last year, it’s probably safe to say that the FBI hasn’t accomplished the former.
If this conclusion is wildly off-base, and the former is true, then one has to entertain the following possibilities: the Stratfor hack was socially engineered by the FBI; Stratfor maybe even allowed it; and the FBI manipulated Anonymous into a partnership with WikiLeaks in the publication of the Global Intelligence Files. Then, of course, one must wonder if WikiLeaks itself is not a false-flag operation. This scenario seems rather unlikely, especially in a world where those who attempt to regulate the Internet are always one step behind.
Where then does this leave Anonymous and its supporters?
Again, judging from Anonymous’ efforts in the last year, which included a hybridization with Occupy Wall Street, the Stratfor hack, a partnership with WikiLeaks, an infiltration of the FBI and Scotland Yard’s conference call on Anonymous, Operation ANTI-ACTA (which struck the Polish government), and the CIAPC hack (following Elisa’s blockade of The Pirate Bay), amongst other projects; it would seem that Anonymous, as a global collective, has grown far beyond LulzSec and Sabu’s influence—that it has indeed shed Sabu’s influence.
Anonymous’ efforts are truly global now and ever-shifting. Unless people believe that stool pigeon Sabu’s opera singing is evidence of some international, multi-state false flag conspiracy to nab radical hackers, Anonymous likely won’t be slowing down anytime soon.
Here’s a suggestion to the FBI: Maybe you should spend a little less time pursuing Anonymous and put more effort into bringing to justice the white-collar criminals who crashed the economy in 2008, thereby pocketing billions and evaporating middle class savings, delaying retirement, and sending families into the grip of poverty; driving individuals to suicide, or illegal and prescription drug use to numb the pain; to theft, alcoholism, and welfare that the GOP hates so much; and saddling college graduates with hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt from which they won’t soon liberate themselves.
Yes, one can see how a DDoS attack launched against Sony Pictures would be a priority. The FBI does work for politicians after all, who are kept in office by the campaign donations of corporations.
Indeed, the FBI, like Sabu himself, knows the following maxim all too well: you’re always somebody’s bitch.
With the news of the unsealed LulzSec indictment of alleged hacktivists Sabu, Topiary, Anarchaos, pwnsauce, kayla and palladium, we now know that Sabu found his apartment raided in June of 2011.
Roughly eight months have passed since then, during which time Sabu helped inspire or otherwise lead several attacks against businesses and governments. On March 6th, news broke that Sabu had been colluding with the FBI in recent months as an informant.
Indeed, since Sabu flipped and decided to work under the boot heel of the FBI, Anonymous has been quite active. Does this then implicate the FBI in Anonymous’ “crimes”? Anything goes in the “Land of the Free” when it comes to law enforcement, folks; especially when corporations are under attack (or, rather, being subjected to digital protests).
Anonymous, being the amorphous, many-tentacled digital organism that it is, very possibly executed some attacks without the help of the indicted LulzSec members. As I argued yesterday, Anonymous has grown beyond LulzSec. The recent Stratfor hack, however—the documents of which were published by WikiLeaks—was executed by LulzSec members.
The FBI’s press release states that in December of 2011 Chicago-based hacker Jeremy Hammond, or “Anarchaos,” messaged Sabu (Hector Xavier Monsegur) about vulnerabilities in Stratfor’s servers. The FBI then instructed Sabu to offer Hammond a server on which to store the Stratfor data. We know the rest of the story: Anonymous announces the Stratfor hack, and two weeks ago WikiLeaks began publishing the emails as the Global Intelligence Files.
Did the FBI encourage the hack? Only a look at Hammond and Monsegur’s chat logs would tell us what Sabu, or the FBI, was recommending. Hammond very well might have hacked Stratfor on his own, even without the FBI whispering in his ear via Sabu. At the very least, it can be stated that the FBI stood by as a private entity was hacked, then did nothing to stop the leak to WikiLeaks. There may not have been entrapment, but there certainly was a laissez-faire FBI attitude running through the Stratfor chain of events. Agents could have stepped in at any point before Stratfor’s emails were lifted and published on the Internet.
There is a logic to the FBI’s inaction, though: Let the hack and leaks unfold to the fullest extent, with possible prison time increasing in direct proportion.
The FBI’s lawyers most likely approved every action taken by agents via Sabu. The investigation was far too big to bungle, and, obviously, far more important to the nation than bringing Wall Street banks and investors to justice for selling fraudulent mortgage securities that triggered a recession. How could any of us have believed that Anonymous did less damage than white collar criminals and politicians? What idiocy!
On a slightly different note, the LulzSec indictment raises a very real possibility: That the FBI is running a monolithic false flag operation, not only to corral dissidents, but to lay the ground work for future internet regulation. Unlikely, but not impossible. The FBI is, of course, the stillborn of J. Edgar Hoover, a man who behaved as if the Constitution did not apply to him.
Maybe there still is some purpose for the symbolic power of Anonymous even after the indictment. Clearly, IRCs aren’t exactly the best place to discuss matters of digital protest and free information—Hammond was betrayed by Sabu in this way. As many critics of Anonymous often claim, the best hackers operate in the shadows. They aren’t interested in publicity. And many of the best often go into the security business or work for US intelligence agencies. Well, one has to pick a side after all, no? When money can be made, ethics and morality go right out the window.
Perhaps any would-be hacktivists inspired by Anonymous and LulzSec will learn something from the latter’s downfall and the uncertainty now surrounding the former. Perhaps those with the talent to hack the private communications and files of those corporations and government officials devoid of ethics and morality will do so either on their own, or with the help of those whom they can trust. And perhaps they will learn something about their covering tracks after seeing what has become of LulzSec.
Hacktivism need not be limited to Anonymous. Like everything, it will evolve.
Sabu (real name Hector Xavier Monsegur), LulzSec’s former head honcho and eventual Benedict Arnold (or the “Milli Vanilli of Anonymous” as one Twitter user suggested), signed off on U.S. district attorney Preet Bharara’s court filing asking for a six-month sentencing delay. By July of 2011, Sabu had been flipped by the feds and set about bringing down LulzSec and Anonymous members in the UK and the US.
“The Government respectfully submits this letter to request a six-month adjournment of the August 22, 2012 sentencing control date set in the above-captioned matter in light of the defendant’s ongoing cooperation,” the court document reads.
This can only mean that Monsegur is still cooperating with authorities, perhaps infiltrating Anonymous IRCs under aliases in order to coax members into actions that will land them in prison.
Entrapment is, of course, illegal. “Government agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government may prosecute.” See Jacobson v. US, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992). However, federal authorities are quite adept at leading those who haven’t committed a crime into doing so without actually suggesting the crime.
According to federal criminal lawyer Lewis Gainor:
“Inducement is at least persuasion or mild coercion. See US v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1985). It may also be based on pleas of need, sympathy or friendship… The fact that federal investigators [engage] in deception, lies, subterfuge, or misrepresentation, does not, by itself, establish inducement.”
Meaning, the federal agents puppeteering Sabu are allowed to deceive other Anonymous members, tell lies, use subterfuge and misrepresentation because a defendant will not likely be able to establish “inducement” on those deceptions alone. The defendant also has to prove that he or she was not predisposed to committing a crime—which, with the public perception of Anonymous being what it is (via the framing and messaging crafted by the federal government and the media), would be hard to argue, though not impossible.
Anonymous has shown in a number of instances that there is value to what they do: when a government is paralyzed by corporate donations, corrupt to the core, and largely unwilling to create an open forum for real democracy, then it is up to citizens to unleash information. Thanks to Anonymous, particularly its member Anarchaos (Jeremy Hammond), we now know that Stratfor—a corporation with funding from former Goldman Sachs employee Shea Morenz—was gathering government intelligence to profit globally from insider trading.
Sabu was of course working as an informant and regularly communicating with Hammond before, during and after the Stratfor hack. Does this mean Hammond was a victim of entrapment? Not necessarily, but Sabu’s online presence at the time must have in and of itself acted as a means of encouragement to hack Strafor.
Which is to say that our government is more interested in going after hacktivists than it is in prosecuting the Wall Street criminals who systematically, over the course of two decades and through the dot com and real estate bubbles, tanked the economy in 2007. Obama’s Attorney General Eric Holder has done absolutely nothing in the way of bringing these men to justice, but his Justice Department is exceptionally energetic when it comes to Anonymous.
This is the democracy that we live in. It is the dark reward for our lack of vigilance.
Monsegur, who pleaded guilty to 12 federal offenses in March, faces a possible 124-year sentence for amongst other things conspiracy to commit both computer hacking and bank fraud. His cooperation will no doubt whittle the penalty down, though authorities have not yet released the plea deal details.
Summary: A prominent member of the LulzSec hacking group was an FBI informant, ZDNet UK understands.'Sabu', whose real name is Hector Xavier Monsegur, began working for the FBI after being arrested in June last year, Fox News said on Tuesday.
By Tom Espiner for Security Bulletin | March 6, 2012 -- 19:24 GMT (11:24 PST)
A prominent member of the LulzSec hacking group was an FBI informant, ZDNet UK understands.
'Sabu', whose real name is Hector Xavier Monsegur, began working for the FBI after being arrested in June last year, Fox News said on Tuesday. A law enforcement source confirmed that Monsegur had been a "human source" for the FBI.
CloudFlare: How we got caught in LulzSec-CIA crossfire
The Fox hack exposed over 70,000 confidential details of potential 'X Factor' contestants, said the FBI. The Sony hack exposed confidential data on 100,000 users of Sony's website.
Monsegur pleaded guilty to hacking charges on 15 August 2011, according to the document unsealed in the District Court of the Southern District of New York. ZDNet UK understands he was instrumental in helping the FBI and international law enforcement track down members of the LulzSec, Internet Feds, and Anonymous hacking groups.
Twitter accounts associated with Anonymous distanced Sabu from Anonymous operations on Tuesday.
"#Anonymous has grown beyond #LulzSec and @anonymouSabu," said one Tweet from AnonymousIRC.
Monsegur was accused of being an FBI informant in a chatlog posted to Pastebin on August 16, the day after Monsegur pleaded guilty to LulzSec hacking charges. A person with the hacker handle 'Virus' said Sabu had offered money for information on members of Anonymous.
Privacy campaigner Alex Hanff, who is not involved in any of the hacking groups, told ZDNet UK on Tuesday that he had been invited to a chatroom in late January to talk to members of LulzSec about responsible disclosure of documents, including one claiming to be Sabu. Hanff said since January 'Sabu' had become increasingly strident, and had acted like an agent provocateur.
"'Sabu' was talking about literally starting physical attacks," said Hanff. "The agenda was to move to more physical attacks on political targets."
Hanff said that the 'Sabu' from the chat room had endeavoured to agitate impressionable young people into performing acts of real damage over the past months.
"Every time I tried to get Anonymous members to calm down, I was attacked by 'Sabu'," said Hanff. "He was actively pushing the group to become more and more aggressive."
'Sabu' launched an attack against Privacy International servers in response to Hanff trying to calm the situation, Hanff said.
On Tuesday the FBI named five people suspected of involvement in LulzSec, Anonymous, and Internet Feds operations. UK suspect Jake Davis, who is alleged to be LulzSec spokesperson 'Topiary', was named in the indictment unsealed on Tuesday. Davis, from Lerwick in the Shetland Islands, was arrested by UK police in September 2011, and is due to appear at Southwark Crown Court on 11 May for a plea and case management hearing.
Ryan Ackroyd, from Doncaster, who is suspected of being 'Kayla', was interviewed by police from the Metropolitan Police Central eCrime Unit on Tuesday, said the FBI statement.
ZDNet UK understands that UK police interviewed a teenager in July 2011 and Davis in September 2011 on suspicion of being connected with the LulzSec attacks.
FBI conference call hack
One Irishman was arrested on suspicion of being involved in LulzSec hacks on Tuesday, including a hack which recorded a conference call by law enforcement to discuss ongoing LulzSec investigations.
AVG: Hacktivism is slowing down business
"We arrested one male today in relation to hacking," said the spokesman.
O'Cearrbhail is suspected of being behind the publication of a conference call between the FBI, the Metropolitan Police Central e-Crime Unit, and other law enforcement agencies to discuss LulzSec and Anonymous hacking activities. O'Cearrbhail allegedly hacked into the personal email account of a Garda officer, who had been forwarding work emails to a personal account, and recorded the call.
"O'Cearrbhail learned information about how to access a conference call that the Garda, the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies were planning to hold on January 17, 2012 regarding international investigations of Anonymous and other hacking groups," the FBI said in its statement. "O'Cearrbhail then accessed and secretly recorded the January 17 international law enforcement conference call, and then disseminated the illegally-obtained recording to others."
O'Cearrbhail is also suspected of being involved in a hack of the Irish Fine Gael political party.
Darren Martyn, of Galway, was accused in the indictment of being involved as 'pwnsauce' in hacks on Sony, the Bethseda Softworks video game company, and PBS.
Stratfor hack 'netted $700,000'
Late on Monday, Jeremy Hammond was arrested in Chicago on suspicion of being 'Anarchaos' and taking part in a hack on Strafor that may have affected up to 860,000 people, said the FBI. Hammond and other hackers are alleged to have stolen credit card information of 60,000 users of the intelligence company, and is accused of using the data to steal $700,000 (£445,000).
"In publicising the Stratfor hack, members of AntiSec reaffirmed their connection to Anonymous and other related groups, including LulzSec," said the FBI. "For example, AntiSec members published a document with links to the stolen Stratfor data entitled, 'Anonymous Lulzxmas rooting you proud' on a file-sharing website."
Tom is a technology reporter for ZDNet.com. He covers the security beat, writing about everything from hacking and cybercrime to threats and mitigation. He also focuses on open source and emerging technologies, all the while trying to cut through greenwash.
Photo: Newton Grafitti/Flickr
Sabu, the hacker who turned informant on the rampaging Anonymous offshoots Antisec and LulzSec, is getting a six-month reprieve from being sentenced on 12 counts of violating federal law, due to his continued cooperation with the feds, prosecutors told a court Tuesday.
Hector Xavier Monsegur, a 28-year-old New Yorker who used the online name “Sabu,” has been working undercover for the feds since the FBI arrested him without fanfare last June. Monsegur provided agents with information that helped them arrest several suspected members of LulzSec and Antisec, including two men from Great Britain, two from Ireland and an American in Chicago.
LulzSec, an offshoot of the Anonymous collective, rampaged across the internet in 2011, in a 50-day series of attacks on news organizations, government websites and corporations. The hacking spree was accompanied by a lively Twitter feed and clever, taunting public pronouncements.
It’s not clear from the court filing Tuesday whether Monsegur continues to be active online or is simply aiding the government in its prosecutions of those already arrested.
Monsegur, an unemployed father of two, led the loosely organized group of hackers from his apartment in a public housing project in New York. He pleaded guilty in March to various hacking-related charges, following arrests of alleged members of the LulzSec and Antisec crew earlier this year.
The government did not say what type of plea deal was made with Monsegur, who theoretically faces a maximum 124-year sentence after he pleaded guilty to 12 federal offenses, including conspiracy to commit computer hacking, and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, among other charges.
The information from Monsegur led to further charges for Ryan Ackroyd and Jake Davis, who were previously charged for alleged participation in a hacking spree last spring. His cooperation also led to the arrest and indictment of Darren Martyn, and Donncha O’Cearrbhail in connection with Lulzsec, and Jeremy Hammond in connection with Antisec. In particular, Hammond is being prosecuted for the high-profile hack of Stratfor, a private intelligence firm relied on by major corporations, which led to the distribution of Stratfor’s internal e-mail by Wikileaks.
Jeremy Hammond of Chicago appears to be a noted activist and hacker who has had previous brushes with the law, who has given a defcon talk on electronic civil disobedience, and even been profiled by Chicago Magazine.
SABU, the leader of Lulzsec who was unmasked as an FBI informant this week, has made many enemies in the hacking community. But it seems one of his greatest foes was actually an old woman living in the flat below him in a dilapidated housing project on New York's East Side.
Gizmodo has published an email from Sabu's neighbour to the Manhattan Community board, which oversees the block. Sabu - real name Hector Xavier Monsegur - is accused of wrestling, rapping and "pounding" between 7pm and 4am, seven days a week.
Monsegur, who led Lulzsec - an offshoot of the 'hacktivist' collective Anonymous - was arrested in June 2011 and soon afterwards became an FBI informant. How valuable an asset he was to the FBI is questionable, since Sabu's brash style annoyed many fellow hackers who took revenge on him by posting his real name and personal details online. Nevertheless, Monsegur's work for the FBI was not officially confirmed until this week.
The complaint by the harassed neighbour confirms that 'Sabu', an unemployed 28-year-old, was just as annoying in real life as online. She writes: "[Monsegur] engaged in wrestling on the floor, pounding, rapping and screaming to loud music - not to mention chasing a pitbull around the apartment..."
"I have tried to reason with Monsegur only to be told you're bugging... Get the f**k out of here," the neighbour said. "I am often wakened in the wee hours of the morning to the chaos, I tap on the ceiling with a broom for them to cease the nonsense only to have all parties involved stomp their feet simultaneously and laugh."
It is not clear when Monsegur's neighbour sent her complaint, but it is possible that the FBI's intervention might have solved her problem.
As soon as agents came knocking in June, The San Francisco Chronicle reports, Monsegur immediately sang like a canary.
Assistant US Attorney James Pastore told a judge at a secret court appearance in New York on August 5: "Since literally the day [Monsegur] was arrested, the defendant has been cooperating with the government proactively... The defendant has literally worked around the clock with federal agents.
"He has been staying up sometimes all night engaging in conversations with co-conspirators that are helping the government to build cases against those co-conspirators."
With all that time spent betraying his alleged co-conspirators, there was probably little time left for rapping or "pounding". ·
More on Lulzsec traitor Sabu was neighbour from hell
In late 2010, Anonymous declared their unconditional support for WikiLeaks and Julian Assange. To that end, they announced Operation Avenge Assange and launched distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) on businesses and government organizations that attempted to blockade WikiLeaks. PayPal, Visa, Mastercard, BankAmerica and Post Finance all had their sites shut down with the DDoS attack, which is a form of digital protest.
Julian Assange, for his part, donned a Guy Fawkes mask at a 2011 London Occupy protest, and made reference to Anonymous in an interview with Rolling Stone:
This was a very apolitical group that had absolutely no understanding about the military-industrial complex whatsoever, and no understanding about international finance. As a result of joining our battle and trying to protect themselves, they have come to see that the threats related to Internet freedom come from the military-industrial complex, the banking system and the media.
While most of WikiLeaks’ published work has its origins in leaked diplomatic cables, alleged to have come from Bradley Manning, it is a wonder that hacked documents haven’t made their way from Anonymous to WikiLeaks sooner. Now, with WikiLeaks’ announcement of the Global Intelligence Files, it seems that Anonymous have transformed from WikiLeaks’ avengers to associates.
Earlier this year Anonymous announced it had obtained a treasure trove of emails from Stratfor, a Texas-based global security firm. One might best describe Stratford as a for-profit intelligence agency. Indeed, why should intelligence be limited to domestic and international government affairs? Sunday night, WikiLeaks announced that it would be publishing 5.5 million Stratford emails. This morning WikiLeaks began publishing the Global Intelligence Files.
The WikiLeaks press release states that Stratford’s clients include: “Bhopal’s Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defense Intelligence Agency.” Not a bad racket, to be sure.
Included in the press release was an email sent from CEO George Friedman to Reva Bhalla on December 6, 2011, reading, “”[Y]ou have to take control of him. Control means financial, sexual or psychological control… This is intended to start our conversation on your next phase.” The subject of the email was Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez’s medical condition.
WikiLeaks also makes mention of Stratfor’s involvement in the subversion of WikiLeaks, as well as the “revolving door” policy between private intelligence firms and government intelligence. “The Global Intelligence Files exposes how Stratfor has recruited a global network of informants who are paid via Swiss banks accounts and pre-paid credit cards. Stratfor has a mix of covert and overt informants, which includes government employees, embassy staff and journalists around the world,” states WikiLeaks.
The synthesis of government and corporate espionage shouldn’t come as any surprise. Nonetheless, emails outlining the web of espionage should prove enlightening.
WikiLeaks also claims that emails between Stratfor’s Friedman and then-Goldman Sachs Managing Director Shea Morenz detail a scheme to “utilise the intelligence” Stratfor was accumulating from its insider networks to create a “captive strategic investment fund.” Again, no surprise that Goldman Sachs has been implicated in shady dealings.
Stratfor, for its part, issued a response in which they state that some of the emails “may be forged or altered to include inaccuracies; some may be authentic.” Stratfor should know something about disinformation and forged documents, which are part and parcel of intelligence work.
On a more humorous note, one Stratfor analyst mused about the firm’s “bitchy” attitude, while another detailed Coca-Cola’s concern with Vancouver PETA activists. In another email, a Stratfor employee stressed that the CIA model has been “invalidated,” and that the agency has come to Stratfor for an education of sorts.
WikiLeaks is teaming with various publications to release the Global Intelligence Files, including: Rolling Stone, L’espresso, The Yes Men, La Nacion and La Republica, amongst others.
Read the press release at the WikiLeaks website, and check out out some of the published Global Intelligence Files here.
When news broke that Anonymous had supposedly released a Linux-based operating system, Anonymous-OS, red flags began flapping in the wind.
Anonymous almost immediately advised internet users not to download the Ubuntu-based OS. YourAnonNews tweeted, “Seeing lots of news about just-released purported ‘Anonymous OS.’ BE CAREFUL! Remember the Zeus Trojan incident w/Slowloris recently!” A day later the OS was said to be riddled with malware.
The headline of this article is provocative, to be sure. But when I posed the question to a fellow D+T writer, the response was, “I’ve learned to never put anything past our government.” At the very least we must entertain the possibility of a false flag operation following the FBI’s infiltration of Antisec through Sabu.
Anonymous-OS, which comes loaded with hacking tools, was uploaded to Sourceforge and then downloaded over 26,000 times. Sourceforge took the OS down yesterday and issued an official statement:
“By taking an intentionally misleading name, this project has attempted to capitalize on the press surrounding a well-known movement in order to push downloads of a project that is less than a week old,” said Sourceforge’s spokesperson. “We have therefore decided to take this download offline and suspend this project until we have more information that might lead us to think differently. We’ll be in touch with the project admin, and let you know if and when we find out anything to contrary, but for now, that’s what we’re doing.”
Ars Technica’s Sean Gallagher believes it’s just a shoddily-designed variant of Ubuntu and, as such, not much of a worry unless the system is booby-trapped. That may well be the simple truth, but we might also consider the possibility that it was a bit of government-issued social engineering. That is, a false flag operation to paint Anonymous as malicious criminals who are more interested in corrupting personal computers than fighting economic, social or political injustice.
Consider the fact that the OS’s supposed malware was being discussed soon after it was posted to Sourceforge. The chatter is significant because government spooks know what advertisers, public relations gurus, or anyone with half a mind knows: to create a certain outcome, any message must be controlled and shaped at its inception. If you want to convince the public that Anonymous is not a digital protest movement but a “criminal” network, then you create the conditions to communicate that idea.
Anonymous can claim the OS was not their creation, and the OS itself might not be a real threat at all, but the symbolic association between Anonymous, the operating system, and malware has already bloomed in many people’s minds.
As Graham Cluley of Sophos Naked Security wrote, “If I were writing a cybercrime thriller, I might dream up a plot where the computer cops – desperate to know the identities of the hacktivists – concocted a plot where they made available software that promised to hide hackers’ identities.. but in fact secretly passed information back to the cops.”
Cluley doesn’t claim this is the case, but adds, “stranger things have happened.. (like the prominent leader of LulzSec turning out to have been secretly working for the FBI since the middle of last year..).”
In the final analysis, the truth may very well be that someone simply wanted to use the Anonymous name to publicize their Linux-based operating system, or deliver malware to dumb victims. I’m inclined to believe the former possibility myself, because infecting computers through a Linux-based OS (which is little known to the masses) isn’t exactly the most efficient means of creating bad press for Anonymous.
Never put anything past our government, though.
with 7 comments
The Sabu Connection
Handle: Sabu Aliases: Xavier De Leon, Xavier Kaotico, Xavier Monsegur, Sabu Real Name: Hector Xavier Monsegur Race: Puetro Rican Last Known Location:
Hector X Monsegur
90 Avenue D #6F (American flag bumper sticker on the front door)
Email Addresses: (past and present) Xavier@tigerteam.se Xavier@sentinix.org Sabu@sentinix.org Xavier@nycpug.net Xavier@Intifadah.org R.Ahmed@safe-mail.net Xavier@pure-elite.org Sabu@pure-elite.org Xavier@sabu.net Sabu@mad.scientist.com Monsegur@mad.scientist.com Sabu@prvt.org Compromise@gmail.com X*************R@gmail.com (exact address unknown but Xavier[ ]Monsegur fits perfectly)
Websites: (past and present) Twitter.com/anonymouSabu Tigerteam.se Sentinix.berlios.de Sentinix.org Nycpug.net Intifadah.org Myspace.com/Intifada Sabu.net Pure-Elite.org Gfy.com (Member of forum) XavSec.Blogspot.com Flickr.com/photos/38442511@N00 Several Google Profiles Prvt.org
Website Screenshots: (some images credited to Sabu.pdf by @Le_Researcher, validated and reused to save time) Pure-elite.org | Notice the poster named ‘erika’ ‘Erika’ comments on myspace
Sabu offers python help
NY Giants fan
Went by Sabu during aol days Politically motivated defacement referencing Puerto Rico
Xavier starting NYC group
There are many more connections made that were taken down in hand written notes, which will not be scanned and uploaded. The complete set of all digital research, notes and images is available in the Research section of this website. Specific personal information has been withheld to avoid harm to non-involved family members and others. The majority of this information was found using open source intelligence methods. Some specific details and key parts were obtained through insider information, privately leaked chat logs and other methods that will not be disclosed or published for privacy and security reasons.
Sabu's dad was a trashmanhttps://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/nyregion/01banned.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www
Hector Monsegur, 40, was barred from visiting his mother, Irma, 65, at the Jacob Riis Houses after his drug conviction. “It’s one strike and they give me life,” he says.
Nobody covers public housing quite like The Journal, the New York City Housing Authority’s monthly tabloid newspaper, delivered to 178,000 apartments.
Irma Monsegur looking at old photographs of her children.
There are colorful photographs and cheerful stories about the agency’s youth chorus, community center ribbon-cuttings and teenage tenants headed to college.
But there is one widely read feature that residents hope they never appear in: the Not Wanted List.
It names former residents who are “permanently excluded” from Housing Authority buildings — and barred from even an afternoon’s visit to a family member. The Not Wanted are barred for a wide variety of reasons, some of them for criminal arrests and others for being nuisances.
In The Journal’s September issue, Peter Kilpatrick from Hammel Houses in Queens — “formerly associated with the second floor,” the newspaper noted — is first on the list. Next is Tyrone Taylor, “formerly associated” with the fourth floor of Lincoln Houses in Manhattan, followed by more than a dozen others.
Anyone who sees a barred person on the premises is urged to contact the complex management or Housing Authority investigators. Last year, 864 men and women were permanently excluded from Housing Authority properties, and this year, the number is at 772.
Public housing authorities around the country use similar policies, including the agencies in Philadelphia and Portland, Ore. In Chicago, exclusion from public housing is called an “order to bar.”
The practice, public housing advocates and some tenants said, splinters families, preventing the barred from seeing their parents, siblings or grandparents. And in the close-knit world of public housing buildings, they said, the public list is a kind of scarlet letter for struggling families.
“It’s degrading not only for the people on that list but for the family members of those people,” said Damaris Reyes, a resident of Baruch Houses in Manhattan and the executive director of Good Old Lower East Side, a community and tenants’ rights group. “You’re trying to keep your business private, and now the whole neighborhood knows that your son or daughter was arrested.”
New York City Housing Authority officials said the exclusions rid their buildings of disruptive and violent tenants, ensure that they stay away and prevent an entire household from being evicted for crimes committed by one occupant. The Not Wanted List, which became a fixture in The Journal in 1995 and has since published hundreds of names, is an effective way to let tenants know who does not belong in their buildings, officials said.
Exclusions are handled in an administrative hearing led by an officer designated by the Housing Authority. Tenants can apply to have their exclusion lifted “any time a substantial change has occurred,” according to Housing Authority rules.
For decades, crime has been a grim fact of life for public housing tenants, some of whom say they have no sympathy for neighbors who are barred for breaking the law. In recent years, the police and city officials have cracked down on crime with “vertical patrols” in residential towers and other measures, but violence and drugs remain a problem. In 2003, 11 percent of the homicides and 16 percent of the shootings in New York were committed on Housing Authority property, home to 5.1 percent of the city’s population.
“When you get the rotten apples out of the projects, you make it a better place to live,” said Ray Maldonado, 28, a high school baseball coach who has lived in the Wald Houses in Manhattan all his life. “When I was growing up here, there were so many opportunities to do the wrong thing. I’ve always said you got to make choices, and whether it’s a good one or a bad one, you suffer the repercussions.”
The number of people excluded each year is a fraction of the city’s total public housing population, which numbers roughly 400,000, said Howard Marder, a Housing Authority spokesman. “The overwhelming majority are law-abiding, good citizens who pay their rent, don’t commit crimes,” Mr. Marder said. “And there’s no reason why they should be forced to live next to people who do commit crimes.”
In some cases, the bans are based on an arrest or conviction for felonies like sexual or drug-related offenses. But the Housing Authority also has excluded people for “nondesirability,” which it said included “common-law nuisances” like keeping an excessive number of pets or an extreme amount of trash. “Moral offenses” like prostitution and gambling also fall under the agency’s definition of nondesirability, whether there is an arrest or not.
Judith Goldiner, a supervising attorney at the Legal Aid Society, which has represented tenants facing exclusion, said those who are barred are often not dangerous, or even convicted felons, but instead fall into the broad category of nondesirability.
“We’re not talking major drug dealers in the slightest bit,” she said.
Ms. Goldiner recalled one case in 2005 in which Housing Authority investigators inspected the Brooklyn apartment of a woman around Thanksgiving and found her 15-year-old son, who had been excluded because of an arrest for marijuana possession. Now, the woman and her family are threatened with eviction for violating the exclusion order, a process that is often long and drawn out.
Mr. Marder said the agency did not have figures available detailing the exact offenses committed by those excluded. He said bans for nondesirability are taken up on a case-by-case basis. “We believe strongly that there is a balance that needs to be reached,” he said. “Sometimes the actions lead to evictions, and sometimes they don’t.”
Housing Authority officials say they regularly conduct inspections. But it is not difficult for someone to slip in undetected.
Alton Gardner III, 23, appeared on the Not Wanted List twice, once in The Journal’s June issue and again in July.
But one recent afternoon, Mr. Gardner was watching television at a place he was not supposed to be: his father’s apartment in the Bronxdale Houses in the Bronx.
He said he had been excluded for drug possession, but had since turned his life around. Both he and his father said it was unfair for the Housing Authority to restrict Mr. Gardner’s visits.
“It’s unbelievable that they worry about something so little instead of being worried about the people raping and murdering people,” Mr. Gardner said.
Iris and Hector Monsegur worry about their mother’s diabetes, but they are not allowed to visit her at the Jacob Riis Houses in Manhattan. They were caught selling heroin in 1997 and sent to prison for seven years each, they said. Ms. Monsegur now runs a credit repair company out of her home on Staten Island, and her brother works for a sanitation company in New Jersey and lives in the Bronx.
“The courts let me do seven, but with them, it’s one strike and they give me life,” Mr. Monsegur, 40, said of the Housing Authority. “I want to be able to go see my mom, help with her groceries and say hello.”
Federal law allows public housing agencies to terminate the tenancy of any resident who engages in criminal or drug-related activity on or off the premises, and the United States Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that housing officials were allowed to evict entire households because of one tenant’s crimes.
Bryan Zises, a spokesman for the Chicago Housing Authority, said the exclusions helped the agency provide a safe environment for residents. “At the end of the day, we’re landlords, and we need to be as good a landlord as we can for the people who live there,” Mr. Zises said.
Because of the number of exclusion cases and limited space in The Journal, it often takes months before a barred occupant’s name appears on the Not Wanted List. One Bronx man’s name was published in the February issue, though he had died from a drug overdose a year earlier.
To many residents, the list is a reminder that criminal behavior is not tolerated.
“You’re aware of who has done what in your development and that they’re no longer wanted in the development,” said Nina Adams, 63, president of the tenants’ association at Queensbridge Houses in Queens.
For Demora Gilmer, it seems unlikely that her older brother’s exclusion will be lifted. She, like other family members of excluded tenants, was not aware that there was an appeals process. Her brother lived with her in an apartment in the Johnson Houses in Manhattan until 2005, when he was barred for selling drugs.
Most family gatherings moved from Manhattan to her mother’s place in New Jersey. “He’s always watching his back,” said Ms. Gilmer, 27, a cashier. “Me and my brother’s close, so it doesn’t feel right. It ain’t fair.”
Kate Hammer contributed reporting.
On the day that he joined forces with the hacker collective Anonymous, Hector Xavier Monsegur walked his two little girls half a dozen blocks to their elementary school. “My girls,” he called them, although they weren’t actually his children. Monsegur, then 27, had stepped in after their mother—his aunt—returned to prison for heroin dealing.
After he dropped off the girls, he walked to his apartment at 90 Avenue D, in the Jacob Riis projects, where he’d lived virtually his entire life. He passed through the dimly lit lobby, took the beat-up elevator to his floor, and went into apartment 6F. Monsegur’s prized possession was a computer, dilapidated but serviceable, its keyboard missing the shift, 7, and L keys. He sat down and went to work.
In the projects, Hector Monsegur was far from a tough guy. He was a bit of a nerd, in fact. But online he became an entirely different person—Sabu, he’d christened himself. “I’m a wild nigga,” he typed in a December 2010 chat. “Everyone knows me for my behavior … and I’m here like a pit bull wanting to own,” which is to take over other people’s computers and, sometimes, their entire identities.
The same month Monsegur typed those words, Anonymous, which had been up and running for a couple of years, was planning what hackers hoped would be its most dramatic attack yet, on PayPal and certain credit-card companies, in retaliation for their suspending services to WikiLeaks. Sabu, along with 4,500 other hackers and volunteers from around the world, activated a simple program that, when launched, would bombard PayPal’s site with requests—“packeting,” Sabu called it—overloading its servers.
The PayPal attack was not a rousing success—the site slowed for a couple of hours on December 8, 2010, but Monsegur was inspired and pushed ahead with other attacks. Within six months, he became perhaps the most influential hacker in the world, leading hacker actions against multinational companies and governments, helping turn Anonymous into a cross between an outlaw gang and a worldwide protest movement. And then, after he was arrested, he became an FBI informant—and he was gifted at that, too.
That one of the world’s most influential hackers was the denizen of a New York City housing project struck many as cognitively dissonant. It shouldn’t have. In many ways, he’s a product of the culture of poverty he was brought up in. It’s a culture that produces outlaws of many different stripes. Monsegur was born in 1983, when his father was 16. His mother deserted the family, and his father entrusted his son to Monsegur’s grandmother Irma, 40 at the time. Irma, born in Puerto Rico, never mastered English, but she was devoted to her grandson, a quiet, well-behaved child whom everyone called Bubi. But child care was not his grandmother’s only vocation. She was “a player,” as a family lawyer said, and her apartment was a stash house for the family’s heroin business. Sabu’s father was a lead distributor, as was his aunt, a long-haired beauty; Monsegur was described as a delivery boy. Heroin was good business, and for a time, “the family was really powerful in the hood,” said a neighbor. Sabu’s father led the life of a successful entrepreneur, seeming to change cars and women monthly. He liked to peel bills from a wad of cash and treat all the neighborhood kids to ice cream.
In 1997, the high life abruptly ended when the family was busted. Monsegur’s grandmother escaped with probation. But his father, then 30, was sentenced to at least seven years in state prison, as was his aunt, 27. Monsegur was 13 years old. He was a big kid—as an adult, he’d be six feet tall and heavy, pushing 250 pounds. He could hold his own in the projects, but he didn’t quite fit in. “He didn’t play sports with the rest of us,” said a neighbor who grew up with him. “He wasn’t a hood kid. He was a brain. If you talk to him, he don’t talk like us. He talk educated.”
For Monsegur, the computer was his refuge. “When he closed his eyes, he could see Sweden and Tunisia,” said Stanley Cohen, a lawyer who’s known him for years. Even as a teenager, Monsegur had awesome computer skills—at 14, he taught himself to program in Linux, the open-source operating system, and hacked his way to a free Internet connection. His hacking life began in earnest the next year, 1999, after a Puerto Rican was accidentally killed during a botched bombing run by a Marine Corps plane near a test range on the island of Vieques. The incident spurred protests in Vieques as well as in some Puerto Rican neighborhoods, and Monsegur joined in online. It was, he later wrote, his political awakening. He went on a defacing spree, substituting his own homepage for those of random sites—he became a kind of online graffiti artist. On one defaced site, he announced, “I’ll be your Puerto Rican defacer.” He continued tentatively. “Hello, I am ‘Sabu,’ no one special for now,” he wrote on one site. But then he shifted into another gear. “The U.S.A. has treated Puerto Rico and it’s citicenz like shit.” The message concluded with a plea: “all I want is the respect that I deserve,” he wrote, then threatened: “Or should I take it by force?”
The Jacob Riis projects offered stunning views of the East River, but from inside the scenery looked different. Shit occasionally festered in the halls. Residents tended to be suspicious of the world outside it. “People think we in the projects are grimy,” one of his neighbors told me. And Monsegur, no matter his online prowess, had shared that sense of feeling small in the world’s eyes. “He thought others were constantly judging him,” said Michel Blomgren, a Swedish friend with whom he chatted online for hours. “To him, they were making assumptions based on how he looked and where he lived.”
Monsegur attended Washington Irving High School near East 16th Street, a school where, in his era, only 55 percent graduated with their class. Monsegur was one of the bright kids, with seemingly few limits on his future. Then one day he walked through the school’s metal detector and was stopped by the chief of security, who found Monsegur’s screwdriver, according to an essay he posted online.
“Why are you carrying a screwdriver with you?” the security guard demanded.
“I am the geek that fixes your [computer] system,” Monsegur replied with apparent irritation.
“Hey, don’t give me attitude, boy,” he said.
“I am not giving you an attitude, I am telling you that … I am a student and I work on the school’s nonfunctioning computers.”
The guard stared him down.
“Fellow students watched the incident and witnessed this man … treat me like I was inferior, [and] totally disrespect me as well,” he wrote.
Monsegur, according to his own account, complained in a letter to school administrators—which didn’t work out as desired. They found the letter “threatfull,” as Monsegur put it, and a teacher phoned to tell him he was “temporarily expelled.”
Monsegur responded that “it is such a shame that one … such as myself would have to be deprived of my education because of my writing.” He called the security guards “abnormal subhuman arrogant dropped-at-birth gene defective infidels.”
Meanwhile, on the Internet, Monsegur was racking up successes. He had a gift for organization, and in May 2002, when he was 18, he announced with “ecstasy”—and, he suggested, on ecstasy—that he’d launched a club for programmers. “I am calling out to all the New York City Python hackers out there to come, integrate their knowledge into one big mass of hairy information.” The programmers’ club was added to another project, this one closer to his heart: pure-elite.org, which he referred to as “My child; My birth; My manifestation.” It was essentially a clubhouse for teenage rebels to chill, play online games, and, in a similar spirit of adventure, penetrate powerful computers. He was soon working on “a full-fledge IDS [intrusion-detection system],” wrote Monsegur. Pure-elite even helped Monsegur meet a girl—from Oklahoma. “I love you because you are awesome,” he wrote on her MySpace page. She responded: “my relationship fucking rocks.” The two probably never met in person.
For Monsegur, the Internet was a place where he could aspire. To his friend Blomgren, he wrote about his determination to escape the “ghetto mentality with everyone talking shit and angry at society.” And he took steps in the real world to make it happen, landing a spot at NPower NY’s Technology Service Corps, which prepares disadvantaged young adults to become IT professionals; then in 2002 he worked as a technology intern at iMentor, which “improve[s] the lives of high-school students from underserved communities.”
In 2004, from Sweden, Blomgren launched an Internet-security firm called Tiger Team and recruited his clever young friend, but Tiger Team never took off. Afterward, Monsegur worked sporadically. He landed a job at Openplans.org, a nonprofit trying to improve transportation systems, but was reportedly fired after a few months. He’d earned as much as $6,000 a month at one point, but the jobs never quite added up to a career, and after April 2010, he was unemployed.
Monsegur still lived with his grandmother in her two-bedroom apartment, which soon received two more residents. In 2009, his aunt was arrested again for heroin dealing, and her two little girls were passed to Grandma Irma. (Monsegur’s father, released from prison, had been banned from even visiting Jacob Riis because of his conviction.) Then, on June 7, 2010, his grandmother, who had long suffered from diabetes, died at age 66 at Beth Israel Medical Center. Monsegur’s father didn’t show up at the hospital; his aunt was escorted under guard and permitted to stay for an hour, before she was returned to Rikers Island. Monsegur, alone with his grief, was inconsolable. His grandmother had been the most dependably loving figure in his life. “She’d raised him since he was a baby,” said his mother’s sister, who lives in Brooklyn. “He was a grandma’s boy.” She remembered that he cried and cried.
With her death, Monsegur’s life tilted on its axis. At 26, he became head of a household, taking over as parent to his aunt’s two children, both under 7 at the time. It wasn’t a job he wanted. “I took up the responsibility out of consequence,” he wrote in one chat log. “My family is small. I did not want the girls to go through the system.” If he didn’t take them, the city might. One neighbor told me, “He sacrificed his life for those girls.”
Still, Monsegur was a proud parent, even if the job overwhelmed him. “Being a parent ain’t easy,” he wrote to an online friend. “… So much shit going on at the same fucking time.”
And with the two girls to support, Monsegur’s tenuous financial condition became a crisis. He’d been living on unemployment benefits of $400 a week. By December 2010, six months after his grandmother’s death, and the disappearance of her Social Security check, he was desperate. “He was angry and frustrated about losing his job,” said a person who talked to him at the time. “That’s what threw him into the hacker scene.” Monsegur began to lead a double life. In the physical world, he wanted to be a responsible parent, even if he dabbled in crime, trying to move a pound of marijuana in that period. But his online persona was increasingly out of control. He didn’t seem to recognize limits or laws. In December, 2010, Sabu went on a crime spree. “I only hack for profit now … gotta make that money,” he wrote to Kelly Hallissey, an online interlocutor, that month.
On December 6, he sent a message from his Facebook account: “Yo papi I just got a corporate account that has at least 400k in it,” then supplied apparent account information, presumably so the account could be looted. On December 13, he sent the same person the credit-card and Social Security numbers for a couple of dozen people. He claimed to have gotten some information by downloading PDFs of TurboTax returns via Google. He obtained stolen credit-card numbers. “I used these [cards] … to pay my own bills,” he later admitted. He got ahold of a former employer’s credit-card information, and hacked into an auto-parts company’s computer system and had four engines worth $3,450 shipped to him. Monsegur turned himself into a kind of comic-book supercriminal. “You clearly don’t know anything about me,” he wrote to a friend in late December 2010. “How about you ask who sabu is first before you talk shit before you get owned into next year.”
But crime-for-profit quickly became a sideline to Monsegur’s real business on the web, which was attacking powerful institutions. Monsegur later said that Anonymous was the movement he’d been waiting for all his life. “It lives, it thinks, it breathes,” he said. “We give police officers in the United States the power to shoot us and get away with it. Anonymous can now stand up to that threat.”
As a movement, Anonymous had its roots in the online adolescent playpen 4chan, and many hackers joined up for the “lulz,” which included goofy and inconsequential schoolboy pranks, like having pizzas sent to a target’s home. Some Anonymous hackers wanted to do little more than sow mayhem—to “fuck shit up,” as one explained. Or, to use a favorite word, perpetrate “motherfuckery.” Sabu distinguished himself by being deadly serious. His rhetoric, redolent of the most radical of sixties activists, thrilled and inspired his online comrades. “He played the principled warrior,” said Samantha Murphy, a journalist who followed the chat rooms. “He gave them a reason to be angry and made it into a real rebellion.” And he embraced his roots. Once he had hoped to trade a life in the projects for a career. Now he was “talking shit and angry at society,” like the people he’d grown up with. “My nigga” and “my brother,” he called fellow hackers, most of them young white kids. Anonymous was said to be leaderless, but strong personalities dominated, and Sabu’s was one. He issued commands: “Use your skills to disrupt the governments communications for the cause,” he tweeted. He scoped out targets, mentioning one law firm. “I see some potential openings … we could rape these niggers,” he wrote. He bullied people into line and at the suggestion of insubordination meted out discipline. “I’m about to start owning nigg3rs,” he wrote.
Sabu’s online fame grew along with Anonymous’s notoriety, and his anger helped shape Anonymous’s identity. He sympathized with the marginalized. And if the lulz were a driving force, Sabu helped make fighting oppression another. By January 2011, the Middle East was erupting—in part owing to WikiLeaks’ revelations. From his apartment in the projects, Sabu took control of a local Tunisian’s computer and, as he’d done after Vieques, defaced the website of Tunisia’s president—he posted an Anonymous logo. For Sabu, it was a peak experience. “You don’t know the feeling of using this guy’s Internet to hack the president’s website,” he later told Parmy Olson, author of the just-published We Are Anonymous, a remarkable inside account of the hacker movement. “It was fucking amazing.”
Meanwhile, Monsegur’s real-world life was coming apart. Monsegur was devoted to his girls and wanted to do well by them. But he seemed to have given up on maintaining any semblance of normal home life. His apartment became a kind of frat house where Monsegur, his relatives, and his friends partied into the night. One neighbor complained repeatedly—and others joined in—claiming that he and others were “pounding, rapping, and screaming to loud music,” sometimes until 4 a.m. When the neighbor knocked on his door, he told her, “Get the fuck out of here,” she said.
Then in January 2011, the NYC Housing Authority informed him that because his name wasn’t on his grandmother’s lease, he was subject to eviction. But Monsegur missed five consecutive appearances at landlord-tenant court just a few blocks away. Finally, an indulgent judge offered him a second chance. He could take over his grandmother’s lease, and her $517-a-month rent, if he paid the back rent owed—$5,146 as of February 2011. But Monsegur never came up with the money. “I don’t think he cared anymore,” said a Housing official who spoke to him.
Online, Sabu had joined a small, ultraskilled group of Anonymous hackers—its SEAL Team Six. He’d been involved in cyber attacks against government systems in Tunisia and Algeria, but this elite group’s hack of computer-security company HBGary Federal burnished the Anonymous brand—skilled, dangerous, vindictive, and capable of anything. “I’m the one that did the [HBGary Federal] op,” Sabu later bragged, though it wasn’t entirely true.
After HBGary Federal’s CEO, Aaron Barr, claimed he knew the real identities of certain Anonymous leaders, a boast to promote business, a hacker called Kayla helped break into the company’s computer system. And Sabu conned the company’s security systems administrator—“social engineering,” it’s called in the hacker world—e-mailing him from what appeared to be an HBGary account and getting him to give up an administrative password. They stole and posted roughly 50,000 of CEO Barr’s e-mails, which inadvertently revealed that the supposed good guys were proposing some shady business—like discrediting Salon’s Glenn Greenwald, a very vocal supporter of WikiLeaks. HBGary Federal suggested infiltrating groups and spread disinformation, tactics that disturbed some members of Congress enough to call for an investigation.
For Sabu, the stakes were rising quickly. The FBI had been trying to track him for months. And now, so were other hackers who viewed themselves as patriots. First, Hallissey revealed his real name. Then Jennifer Emick, a Michigan housewife, who had once been sympathetic to Anonymous, released a spreadsheet of roughly 70 supposed real names of Anons in March 2011, taking up where Barr had failed. Most were wrong, but she had Sabu right (though she misspelled his name). Sabu had slipped up, once posting the address of his private server, which led her to pictures of a favorite vintage car, which was traceable.
Sabu denied Hallissey’s and Emick’s claims—“It’s jeremy,” he wrote—but being named weighed on Sabu. And so did the prospect of getting caught. The past summer, the FBI arrested fourteen purported hackers across the country for allegedly attacking PayPal. By April, Sabu talked of quitting. But then hackers from the HBGary Federal team suggested getting the old crew back together—reuniting the band. Sabu had missed the camaraderie and the intensity of a daring mission. By May, the group had reassembled and launched an offshoot of Anonymous, LulzSec—which, over 50 days, conducted a reign of Internet terror like few before it. Sabu had once viewed himself as a principled warrior, but now he joined in wreaking havoc—indiscriminate havoc. Sabu and LulzSec hacked Fox.com, Sony Corps, the U.S. Senate, in some cases posting personal information and e-mails. They hacked PBS, where they posted a fabricated story claiming that Tupac Shakur was alive. Sabu found a weakness in the FBI-affiliated InfraGuard. On June 3, 2011, dubbed Fuck FBI Friday, they defaced InfraGard’s Atlanta website and released personal information. The Wall Street Journal published an article about LulzSec: Almost anyone is a target, it reported.
LulzSec was the new star of the hacker scene, and in chat rooms random hackers passed along computer vulnerabilities or even stolen information. Pointless internecine feuds escalated. Under the banner of LulzSec, one kid “packeted” cia.gov—“for the lulz,” tweeted LulzSec. Others packeted each other. LulzSec had become chaotic, and some core members soon wondered if it was worth continuing. Then Sabu disappeared for almost two days, which was a worrying occurrence.
After nine on the warm night of June 7, 2011, the anniversary of Monsegur’s grandmother’s death, tall, balding FBI special agent Christopher Tarbell and a second agent, wearing bulletproof vests, entered the gloomy lobby of 90 Avenue D, walked to the sixth floor, and knocked on Monsegur’s brown door, to which is affixed a torn bumper sticker with an American flag.
CONTINUED)))Monsegur answered. In photos, he sported two shiny earrings, short hair, and a well-tended goatee. That night, he wore jeans and a T-shirt. “I don’t have a computer,” he protested, though the cables were in plain view. The FBI had known Sabu’s true identity for weeks—Emick told me she’d been contacted by the FBI soon after she released details of his identity. On June 7, they subpoenaed Monsegur’s Facebook account and discovered the messages to “papi” that implicated him in aggravated identity theft, enough to move against him. If convicted, he faced a minimum of two years.
The agents reminded him of his two girls—who must have been asleep in the apartment at the time. “He was terrified for his kids,” said an attorney briefed on the arrest. The agents let him know that if he proved a productive informant, he might receive a lighter sentence—how light depended on his productivity. Sabu the revolutionary had often vowed to go down honorably. “I’m the martyr type I grew up in the streets. I’d rather go down for my own shit than take down my own niggas,” he boasted. But that was bluster. When an agent shouted that the deal was off, Sabu quickly agreed to cooperate.
The next day, June 8, Monsegur was secretly arraigned in a federal courtroom in lower Manhattan and released on his own signature. In a form filed with the court, Sabu stated that he had $100 in available funds at the time and owned nothing of value.
It was as an informant that Sabu signed into a LulzSec chat room on June 24 and learned that his comrades were dropping out of the movement. He needed them to commit crimes, so he could help the FBI bust them, but Sabu also seemed truly hurt. “You guys can go,” he wrote, resigned. “I’m fucked sooner or later, so I got no choice but to continue.” He told them he’d reached “the point of no return,” a phrase he’d often repeat.
Once he became an informant, the authorities finally accorded Monsegur the respect he felt he deserved, praising his work ethic and his savvy. And Sabu overachieved for the FBI, working diligently “since literally the day he was arrested,” an assistant U.S. Attorney said. He was “staying up sometimes all night … helping the government build cases” against friends who the US government later called his “co-conspirators.”
The FBI replaced his computer and installed key-logging software on a new one. They rigged his apartment with video-monitoring equipment. He sometimes worked out of FBI offices, but even when home, agents monitored every letter he typed and every move he made.
Sabu found that he enjoyed his new role, and the power that came with it. Once he identified with the marginalized; now he favored the special agents in coats and ties. “Informants want to be liked,” explained a former top prosecutor. “And they want to do something they feel is successful.” Indeed, Sabu assumed this new identity with a little too much ease. On February 3, 2012, an NYPD officer stopped Monsegur in his building in the projects. Monsegur was asked for his I.D. “Relax, I am a federal agent,” he said. After Milan Patel, an FBI special agent, refuted his story, Monsegur was charged for impersonating an officer.
He didn’t let the snub bother him. “Once he’d been caught, it was like he thought, Why not just enjoy it?” said Olson. Two weeks after his arrest, Sabu tweeted: “Operation Anti-Security—The biggest, unified operation among hackers in history. All factions welcome. We are one.” AntiSec was the movement that succeeded LulzSec, and it was Sabu’s baby as well as an FBI front. Sabu urged on hackers, inciting them to commit crimes, with the apparent approval of the FBI. (The FBI wouldn’t comment.) On January 30, 2012, under the watchful eye of federal agents, he tweeted: “Hackers around the world unite. Help your brothers and sisters. Use your skills to disrupt the governments communications for the cause.” On January 20, 2012, he tweeted: “We need to hit their pockets.”
As a double agent, Sabu needed to stay in role, but there were times when he let his guard down, Sabu became friends with Kieshu Zykova, as she was known online—her real name is Bethany Woolridge. She was an Anonymous groupie. “I was obsessed with Sabu,” she told me. “I was overjoyed he was interested in me.” At first, Sabu dutifully worked her for information, but soon the talk turned intimate. Zykova talked of coming to New York to be with him. Sabu put her off. He knew what the future held. “Now that I look back … many times he tried to protect me and get me out of that scene.”
With others, though, Sabu was ruthless. Mike Nieves, a legendary hacker who online goes by the name Virus, believes that Monsegur targeted him, trying to maneuver him into doing something illegal. In person, Nieves, 22, is not much over five four, with a habit of looking away when speaking, as if checking for exits, but he’s a tough kid. He told me he’d dropped out of school in the ninth grade rather than get booted for fighting. “It was fun,” he said of his post-school days. “I hung out, got drunk, and hacked AOL.” When he was 17, he was arrested for that last bit of fun. Afterward, he occasionally checked into chat rooms, and on August 11, 2011, he chatted with Sabu, who, in an apparent diversionary tactic, accused him of snitching for the NYPD: “my nigga jesus. at least inform for the FBI or secret service not the NYPD LOL thats like lowest of the lowest form. ya smell me?” Sabu wrote without irony.
“you’re a faggot bro,” Virus responded. “don’t start accusing me of shit.” He pointed out that Sabu had offered him money for some stolen information. Nieves sensed something was wrong, and told Monsegur so—“you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit—that’s fed tactics.” Sabu retreated, assuring Virus that he loved him like a brother, but a cynical Virus couldn’t be had. “It’s the internet,” he wrote back to Sabu. “There’s no love on the internet.”
But that wasn’t always true—Sabu inspired loyalty. Even though Monsegur had retired (as part of his plea agreement) from active hacking, he continued to be a revered leader in the movement. “You just get me,” wrote one young hacker. When this hacker thought of quitting, Sabu talked him down, explaining, “You can’t quit an idea, my love.”
What many didn’t suspect was that at that moment, the unquittable idea was a federal investigation. Hackers passed Sabu computer vulnerabilities, as many as a couple of dozen a day, which he fed to the FBI, which hurriedly contacted the vulnerable companies. Sabu was finally the security expert he’d once hoped to be. By the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s account, he helped plug 150 holes in computer systems. Sabu also thwarted ops by force of personality—when hackers wanted to attack Wall Street at the time of the Occupy Wall Street movement, the FBI told him to shut it down and he did, according to Olson.
On March 6 of this year, Sabu’s run finally ended. Authorities in Europe insisted on rounding up suspects produced by their own investigations of Anonymous, so the U.S. Attorney’s office had no choice but to reveal Sabu’s role. As part of a coordinated worldwide sweep, Kayla and other alleged members of LulzSec who had been said to have collaborated closely with Sabu were among those charged.
In the space of a few weeks, Monsegur’s life changed completely. Sabu the revolutionary warrior disappeared from the Internet without a trace. And by then, Monsegur had also vanished from the projects. A month before his outing by the FBI, a city marshal had shown up at apartment 6F, a locksmith in tow. Monsegur was already gone. The marshal found nothing but a few boxes of children’s clothes and toys. Monsegur is said to be somewhere in the neighborhood, awaiting sentencing. His girls, for whom he’d become a snitch, are no longer his charges. Child Protective Services was said to have taken them to their mother, Sabu’s aunt, who’d been released from prison.
On the Internet, Monsegur was now a reviled figure. At Jacob Riis, it was a different story. Those who knew him growing up were shocked—he was always “respectful,” they said. But also, they were a little proud. In their eyes, he was a kid from the projects who’d achieved a certain success. He’d gotten out, finally. “The government wanted him. That’s how good he is. He’s like the greatest hacker in the world. To me, I look up to him,” said one of his boyhood friends. This story appeared in the June, 11, 2012 issue of New York Magazine.
Name: BARRETT LANCASTE[R] BROWN Register #: 45047-177 Age-Race-Sex: 31-White-M Release date: UNKNOWN Location: IN TRANSIT Letter from Barrett
http://pastebin.com/TDY5gUS4Anon NYT leak doc
September 1, 2012
LA prosecutor chat with Barretthttp://pastebin.com/6JU0YmgRhttps://www.pcworld.com/article/2010340/anonymous-spokesmans-youtube-meltdown-led-to-arrest.html
If anybody was surprised at the arrest in Dallas last week of Barrett Brown, self-described sometime spokesman for the hacktivist group Anonymous, it should not have been Brown himself.
He practically invited it. A three-part, 43-plus minute rant posted on YouTube on Sept. 11 and 12 included a threat to "shoot ... and kill" any armed government officials who sought to arrest him -- "especially the FBI."
"Dallas Sheriff's Department spokeswoman Carmen Castro told The Dallas Morning News Brown was arrested Wednesday night and 'released over to the FBI' in the morning," UPI.com reported last week.
Very few in the security community would comment on the arrest for the record, most saying they did not want the headache of becoming a target of Anonymous.
One of the few who did was Robert Stacy McCain, who wrote on his website, The Other McCain, that "a lot of the Anonymous people never trusted Barrett Brown, regarding him as an untrustworthy egomaniacal fame-seeker trying to cash in."
"He did a TV interview with Michael Isikoff of NBC and announced a book deal with Gregg Housh, and did all of this while promoting himself as the official spokesman for Anonymous, whose members are ... well, anonymous, and with good reason, because the cops would very much like to put a lot of them in prison," McCain wrote.
McCain wrote that after the FBI raided Brown in March, but did not arrest him, other members of Anonymous suspected he might be cooperating with the agency. Of the latest video, he wrote: "Being a paranoid conspiracy theorist is not illegal, and Brown's tinfoil-hat rantings about (various enemies) were just so much noise. But his threats to 'destroy' FBI agent Robert Smith? Yeah, the feds don't take that kind of talk lightly."
Joel Harding, a retired military intelligence officer and information operations expert, would say only that, "Anyone who threatens the FBI, I question their judgment."
And their desire to avoid that possibility was validated by last week's posting by Anonymous offshoot Anti-Sec of a text file on Pastie containing the names, street addresses, credit card numbers and other information of what appears to be a random series of 13 government employees around the country, ranging from military service personnel to a Department of Justice employee.
TPM reported that it had "verified that several of the phone numbers and other information contained in the text file were authentic and spoke with several victims of the hack, who were not previously aware that their information had been posted online and were confused as to why they were being targeted, having no knowledge of Brown or his arrest."
But behind the relative anonymity of comments on the YouTube video page were some critics who were a bit more outspoken. Noting Brown's semi-coherent monologue, sometimes featuring manic, table-pounding obscenities and other times uncontrollable giggling, a viewer called "Vicious Latina" observed, "This is your brain on drugs."
Brown acknowledged several times during the video his addiction to opiates, including heroin, and at one point called himself a "weird junkie."
But his major theme was that he was a victim of criminal actions by the FBI and various collaborators, and was going to take revenge in kind. He catalogued a list of grievances against the agency and various alleged informants who he claimed have been involved in a "criminal conspiracy" that has put his and members of his family's lives in danger.
Then, in an escalating series of threats, Brown first said of FBI agent Robert Smith that he would "ruin his life and look into his [expletive] kids." Brown said it would all be legal because, "Aaron Barr did the same thing [to me] and he didn't get raided for it."
Barr is a former CEO of HBGary Federal, a now-defunct firm whose email account was hacked by Anonymous in February.
Brown said he had worked with "several Mexican Anons" about a year ago in an operation called OpCartel, which he said led to speculation that he might be killed by Los Zetas, a violent criminal drug syndicate in Mexico.
After Los Zetas kidnapped a member of Anonymous, Brown claimed he had the names of 75 Zeta collaborators, which he threatened to release to the press unless the Anonymous member was set free.
In the video, Brown accused FBI informants, some of whom he said were ex-military, or military contractors, of posting pictures and the addresses of houses where he used to live, with taglines saying, "this is for the Zetas."
Jay Leiderman, an attorney at the Ventura, Calif. Law firm Leiderman Devine LLP, who has represented Brown in the past, said while he had not seen the images of Brown's residences, his understanding was that they were "out there," thanks to FBI collaborators including the former LulzSec leader "Sabu," whose name is Hector Xavier Monsegur, and who had reportedly been cooperating with the FBI after his arrest in the summer of 2011.
At some point, Brown said, his actual address was posted, again with the suggestion that it was to help Los Zetas find him. In response, he said he was concerned that Los Zetas might show up at his house posing as U.S. government or FBI officials.
"As such," he said, "any armed officials of the U.S. government, particularly the FBI, will be regarded as Zeta assassin squads. They know that I'm armed, that I come from a military family, that I was taught to shoot ... I will shoot all of them and kill them if they come, because they are involved in a criminal conspiracy and I have reason to fear for my life."
Some viewers in the comments section treated that claim with scorn. "Adrian Katterfelto" wrote, "Los Zetas have no interest in Barrett Brown. He's not a threat to them. He's not even a blip on their radar. If they had wanted him dead, we wouldn't be watching this video. Or it would be a very different kind of video. And they wouldn't need to send someone up from Mexico either, because they're already here."
But Brown had supporters as well. "Asilentfire" wrote, "What's [expletive] is how these comments try to make him look like the enemy, when we need to WAKE UP and see that he is on our side fighting for our freedoms. Can't you people see that our last line of defense against a total NWO takeover is being silenced?"
Anti-Sec, in its retaliatory posting, led with: "Barrett Brown, our controversial hated/loved friend (doesnt matter what kind of [expletive] he does, he's still one of us) seems to have been v&'d ... again."
"Hhahahaha. then try to come and convince us that FBI is not mad as hell at us. remember there's always another behind behind the behind. if u dont want to trust us, it's ok, you shouldn't. but dont be dumb and at least to not realise something here is kinda fishy currently. (tip: prepare yourself to hear anonymous is linked to al-qaeda or something). so well, we think Barrett deserves at least we bring some kind of retaliation for this FBI (expletive) against him," Anti-Sec wrote.
Brown also issued an ultimatum to the FBI to return a laptop and other property taken from him during the raid in early March, in which the agency searched both his apartment and his mother's home, where he was staying at the time. Brown said the FBI also took his mother's laptop.
Brown was not charged in connection with that raid, and he demanded that his property be returned within two weeks or he would "release some stuff that's on there, and they don't know what I have access to that I have copies of that's on there."
Jay Leiderman said that since the laptop had been seized pursuant to a warrant, it would take approval by the court to have it released. Leiderman said Brown is still in custody since his arrest last week, pending trial.
Brown also demanded an apology from Smith and an alleged informant, both for taking his property and for "threatening my [expletive] mother with obstruction of justice."
However, Brown's arrest last week was apparently without incident. That will crimp, or at least delay, another threat he made.
He said Agent Smith had referred to him during the March raid as "the bad guy." So, he said, he would prove it in the coming months, "using the court system, using the media, using my group Project PM which has always been, secretly to some extent, created for the purpose of wiping out this (expletive) government and certain media institutions, and through other means at my disposal, some of which are known, some of which are known to a few and some of which are still secret."
Leiderman, while he is not representing Brown in the current case, said he doesn't think the threats Brown made on the video were serious. He said it was "fair" to conclude that Brown may have been under the influence of some of his admitted addictions.
"I wish they had stepped back a bit and thought about it, before going in with guns blazing," he said.
Asherah aka fakegregghoush
Name: Jennifer Rose Emick
SSN: 221-66-6534 // Courtesy of JoshTheGod of ugnazi.com. Guy's an SSN dropping machine. Source: http://pastebin.com/3gZkpqem- staff
Phone Number: 734-961-8508
Address: 321 GARLAND ST YPSILANTI, MI 48198
IP: @c-98-250-163-245.hsd1.mi.comcast.net // Current as of 3/8/12
Kids: Zack, Sofie, and Asher
Name Name Type State Description View Details
1 Jennifer Emick Debtor CA Unknown View Details
Name: Jennifer Emick
Address: 1494 KANSAS ST
FAIRFIELD, CA 94533
Name: GEORGIA ANSHUS
Filing Jurisdiction: CA
Filing Jurisdiction Name: CALIFORNIA
TMS ID: HGF60027678CASOLM1
Name: Jin-Soo David Byun
Address 12332 104TH LN MIAMI, FL 33186
Florida Limited Liability Company
BACKTRACE SECURITY LLC
Document Number L11000113719
FEI/EIN Number NONE
Date Filed 10/05/2011 // And yet she was claiming back in August that backtrace was doing fed work
Effective Date 10/04/2011
14 NE FIRST AVENUE
MIAMI FL 33132
Registered Agent Name & Address
MIAMI FL 33132 US
Name & Address
BYUN, JINSOO D
14 NE FIRST AVENUE 2ND FLOOR
No Annual Reports Filed
10/05/2011 -- Florida Limited Liability
CAGE number info, which Jenn bragged about having, and held out like it was some big, secret piece of information.
DUNS Number: 078281691
JCP Cert. Number:
CAGE Code: 6MBE4
Company Name: BACKTRACE SECURITY LLC
Status: Active Record
Address: 14 NE 1ST ST 2ND FL
Voice Phone Number: 510-713-1600
Fax Phone Number: 571-295-8111
Date CAGE Code Established: 1/4/2012
Point of Contact: JENNIFER EMICK
Company Web Site:
http://pastebin.com/47njkbwC (Barrett Brown really deserves credit for being the first to conclude that Asherah = Jennifer Emick)
http://encyclopediadramatica.ch/Jennifer_Emick (Tons of profile links on Jen can be found at the bottom)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/09/anonymous-hackers_n_921724.html (This article clearly illustrates why you should never couple your real identity with your handle if you're going to try to unmask Anons).
shoutz: The #doxbin crew (Where we hardchat hyp3r l33t g0dx0r d00dz into dust), #thegibson, and anyone who can actually drop docs accurately. It seems to be a rare artform, or perhaps that's because these two inept dumbasses get all the headlines. May they follow in Aaron Barr's footsteps.
By the way, to whoever got us TOS'd: You owe me $5.
Occupy Wall Street at Liberty Square in New York City, October 10. 2011. (Photo: a c o r n)The New York City Police Department (NYPD) really has gone rogue; at least that's what a high-level FBI official believes.
Among the 5 million emails the group Anonymous hacked from the servers of private intelligence firm Stratfor in February, one seems to not only confirm the controversial NYPD surveillance activities uncovered by the Associated Press, but hints at even worse civil liberties violations not yet disclosed. Anonymous later turned the emails over to WikiLeaks, with which Truthout has entered into an investigative partnership.
I keep telling you, you and I are going to laugh and raise a beer one day, when everything Intel (NYPD's Intelligence Division) has been involved in during the last 10 years comes out - it always eventually comes out. They are going to make [former FBI Director J. Edgar] Hoover, COINTEL, Red Squads, etc look like rank amatures [sic] compared to some of the damn right felonious activity, and violations of US citizen's rights they have been engaged in.
The description of alleged NYPD excesses was leveled by an unnamed FBI "senior official" in late November 2011, in an email sent to Fred Burton, vice president for intelligence at the Austin, Texas-based Stratfor and former deputy chief of the counterterrorism division at the State Department. Burton then sent the official's email to what appears to be a listserv known as the "Alpha List."
Burton did not identify the senior FBI official in the email he sent to the listserv. He describes him as a "close personal friend," and claims he "taught him everything that he knows." He also instructs members of the listserv not to publish the contents of the email and to use it only for background.
Stratfor, in a statement released after some of the emails were made public, said some of the emails "may be forged or altered to include inaccuracies; some may be authentic" but "having had our property stolen, we will not be victimized twice by submitting to questioning about them."
What's particularly stunning about the FBI senior official's description of NYPD Intelligence Division activities, is how he connects them to previous instances when his own agency bent and broke the law in pursuit of intelligence on perceived enemies of the state throughout the 20th century - and concludes the NYPD Intelligence Division's violations are worse. As Pulitzer Prize-winning author and former New York Times reporter Tim Weiner writes in his new book, "Enemies: A History of the FBI," the Bureau has been "America's closest counterpart" to a secret police.
In the email, Burton queried the FBI official to gain a better understanding of why the FBI declined to get involved with a case involving an alleged "lone wolf" terrorist and al-Qaeda sympathizer named Jose Pimentel, a 27-year-old American of Dominican descent, accused of trying to build three pipe bombs to detonate in New York City.
The FBI official responded by describing some turf and relationship issues between NYPD intelligence officials and NYPD and FBI investigators on New York City's Joint Terrorism Task Force. It appears the FBI senior official was responding to a news story about Pimentel's arrest published by the far-right leaning Newsmax, headlined "FBI- NYPD Tensions Highlighted in Terror Case," which was attached to an email Stratfor analysts had sent around the office.
There are two issues with this case (off the record of course).One is the source (confidential informant) was a nightmare and was completely driving the investigation. The only money, planning, materials etc the bad guy got was from ... the source. The source was such a maron [sic], he smoked dope with the bad guy while wearing an NYPD body recorder - I heard in open source [sic] yesterday btw [by the way], he is going to be charged with drug possession based on the tape. Ought to go over very nicely when he testifies against the bad guy, don't you think?Issue two is that the real rub is between NYPD Intel, [Intelligence Division] and NYPD - JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force], not the FBI per se. The NYPD JTTF guys are in total sync with the Bureau and the rest of the partners who make up the JTTF - I understand there are something like 100 NYPD dics [detectives] assigned to the JTTF. NYPD Intel (Cohen, et al) on the other hand, are completely running their own pass patterns. They hate their brother NYPD dics on the JTTF and are trying to undermine them at every turn. They are also listening to [former CIA official David] Cohen [the head of NYPD's Intelligence Division] who, near as anybody can tell, never had to make a criminal case or testify in court.
There are two issues with this case (off the record of course).
One is the source (confidential informant) was a nightmare and was completely driving the investigation. The only money, planning, materials etc the bad guy got was from ... the source. The source was such a maron [sic], he smoked dope with the bad guy while wearing an NYPD body recorder - I heard in open source [sic] yesterday btw [by the way], he is going to be charged with drug possession based on the tape. Ought to go over very nicely when he testifies against the bad guy, don't you think?
Issue two is that the real rub is between NYPD Intel, [Intelligence Division] and NYPD - JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force], not the FBI per se. The NYPD JTTF guys are in total sync with the Bureau and the rest of the partners who make up the JTTF - I understand there are something like 100 NYPD dics [detectives] assigned to the JTTF. NYPD Intel (Cohen, et al) on the other hand, are completely running their own pass patterns. They hate their brother NYPD dics on the JTTF and are trying to undermine them at every turn. They are also listening to [former CIA official David] Cohen [the head of NYPD's Intelligence Division] who, near as anybody can tell, never had to make a criminal case or testify in court.
Joint Terrorism Task Forces are FBI-led counterterrorism investigative units that combine federal, state and local law enforcement in an effort to detect and investigate terrorist activity and prevent attacks before they occur. Originally created in the 1980s, the creation of JTTFs nationwide was accelerated after 9-11. Currently, 104 JTTFs operate nationwide and are considered one of the most important assets in the federal government's muscular counterterrorism architecture.
After reviewing the Stratfor email thread for Truthout, Michael German, senior policy counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union's Washington Legislative Office and a former FBI agent who infiltrated white supremacist terrorist organizations, described the FBI official's criticism of the NYPD's intelligence as "doubly ironic."
"The FBI has engaged in widespread spying on the Muslim American community as well, including counting mosques and mapping Muslim neighborhoods, infiltrating mosques with informants, and using the guise of community outreach to spy on Muslim religious and advocacy organizations," German told Truthout. "But more critically, because the FBI is charged with enforcing the civil rights laws in this country, including violations under color of law.
"This agent suggests the FBI knew the NYPD Intelligence agents were involved in widespread 'felonious' activity in violation of Americans' civil rights, yet the FBI does not appear to have opened a civil rights investigation or done anything to stop this illegal activity. Our laws are designed to apply equally to protect all of us, including to protect us from illegal police activity. When the FBI abdicates this responsibility, all Americans suffer."
Responding to the background information from the FBI senior official, Sean Noonan, a "tactical analyst" with Stratfor, wrote in an email sent to the "Alpha List," "The point that the divide is within NYPD is contradictory to how they would like present it. [sic]. The way the pro-NYPD stories cover it is that NYPD CT/Intel [counterterrorism/intelligence] has successfully gained influence within the JTTF, almost to the point of having infiltrated it."
German, however, tells Truthout that the rift between the NYPD's intelligence analysts and NYPD investigators assigned to the FBI's JTTF, as revealed by the senior FBI official's email, is consistent with his experience.
"Criminal investigators, like those assigned to the JTTFs, typically find information produced by these intelligence analysts to be useless, whether they're NYPD intelligence or FBI intelligence," he said.
And no matter how bad the mutual acrimony between NYPD intelligence analysts and New York City's JTTF has gotten, German isn't surprised that the FBI has declined to investigate allegations of the NYPD Intelligence Division breaking the law.
"The FBI didn't open investigations when it discovered other government agencies engaging in torture and illegal wiretapping either," he said.
But eventually, the senior FBI official predicts in his email to Burton, the extent of NYPD's alleged crimes will be revealed.
"As Rush Limbaugh likes to say, 'don't doubt me on this,'" he wrote at the end of his correspondence.
1:58 p.m. | Updated Adding clarification from the F.B.I. regarding how much of Stratfor’s data it was able to salvage.
Last December, a group of hackers quietly orchestrated an attack on Stratfor Global Intelligence Service, a company based in Austin, Tex., that analyzes geopolitical risk and publishes a newsletter for various clients, among them the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense. The hackers breached the company’s network and, once inside, confided in their fellow hacker, Hector Xavier Monsegur, and, as it turns out, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Six months earlier, in June, the F.B.I. had arrested Mr. Monsegur and turned him into an informant. With his help, four hackers in Britain and Ireland were charged last Tuesday with computer crimes; a fifth man was arrested Monday in Chicago. Using the information he passed along, F.B.I. officials said it was able to thwart attacks on roughly 300 private companies and government agencies.
But with Stratfor, they were not so lucky.
Conspiracy theorists across the Internet surmise that federal agents sat back and let the Stratfor attack occur to collect evidence, or perhaps net a juicier target — say, Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, which later released the five million internal e-mails that hackers obtained in the Stratfor hack.
“That’s patently false,” said one F.B.I. official, who would speak only on anonymity because the investigation was continuing. “We would not have let this attack happen for the purpose of collecting more evidence.”
F.B.I. officials said they learned of the Stratfor breach on Dec. 6, after hackers had already infiltrated the company’s network and were knee-deep in Stratfor’s confidential files. On that date, F.B.I. officials said, Jeremy Hammond, suspected as the attack’s ringleader, informed Mr. Monsegur he had found a way into Stratfor’s network and was already working to decrypt its data.
The F.B.I. said that it immediately notified Stratfor, but said that at that point it was too late. Over the next several weeks, hackers rummaged through Stratfor’s financial information, e-mail correspondence and subscribers’ personal and financial information, occasionally deleting its most valuable data — all in full view of F.B.I. agents.
In addition to monitoring hackers’ chat logs, the F.B.I. managed, with Mr. Monsegur’s help, to persuade Mr. Hammond and Stratfor’s other attackers to use one of the agency’s own computers to store data stolen from Stratfor. The hackers complied and transferred “multiple gigabytes of confidential data,” including 60,000 credit card numbers, records for 860,000 Stratfor clients, employees’ e-mails and financial data, to the F.B.I.’s computers, according to the complaint against Mr. Hammond.
In an interview, F.B.I. officials clarified that they were able to salvage the Stratfor data that hackers transferred to its servers. Officials said this included some, but not all, of Stratfor’s data. As for why the F.B.I. was not able to stop hackers from siphoning five million Stratfor e-mails to Wikileaks later on, the F.B.I. said hackers had also stored data on their own servers.
The F.B.I. said it told Stratfor to delay notifying customers while it completed its investigation — a demand that later made Stratfor the target of a class-action lawsuit from subscribers who complained the company did not inform them of the breach until it was too late. Stratfor had little choice but to go public with the breach on Dec. 24, when hackers defaced its Web site and began posting receipts online for donations they had made with customers’ stolen credit card information.
Over the following days, hackers released credit card details for thousands of Stratfor clients, made at least $700,000 in fraudulent purchases using their credit cards, and exploited their e-mail addresses for malware attacks. Stratfor was forced to stop charging for subscriptions to its newsletter — its principal source of revenue. All told, Stratfor estimates the breach cost it $2 million in damages and lost revenue, according to the complaint.
And that’s just the financial cost. Two weeks ago, the company suffered further embarrassment when, three months after the breach, hackers funneled its internal e-mails to WikiLeaks, for widespread publication.
Conspiracy theorists wonder why, with ample evidence, the F.B.I. waited three months to arrest Mr. Hammond after the Stratfor breach. Some suggest that the F.B.I. purposely waited to net a bigger fish: Mr. Assange.
But F.B.I. officials said it simply took that long to collect the evidence to support their case. Cybercrime investigators and former federal prosecutors say that this makes sense, and that the time frame between Stratfor’s attack and subsequent arrests is not unusual.
“It’s not surprising it would take them that long to make arrests,” said Mark Seiden, a cybercrime investigator. “They have to collect evidence, and the paperwork takes between three and six months. If you don’t know exactly how hackers attacked a site, it’s difficult to bring them to justice. There’s no point in picking an unripe fruit.”
That news might disappoint the conspiracy theorists, but not nearly as much as it does Stratfor and its subscribers, whose personal and financial information was compromised as a result of the attack.
“It’s extremely frustrating,” said David White, a subscriber. Mr. White said he and his company were debating whether to renew their subscription. “At this point, it’s up in the air.”
the Milan COS was a stratfor subscriber. His personal data was obtained by Sabu's hackersItalians uphold convictions of spooks2003 Milan CIA Station Chief Robert Sheldon LadyEmail Address: email@example.com
Robert Lady was/is a Stratfor member - Data released by Sabu and the FBI.The address he provided resolves to a company called Continental Freight Forwarding with it's primary area of operations listed as Central & South America.Probably a CIA front company, now blown.
(Photo: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Los Angeles District; Edited: JR / TO)Senior Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials debated whether they should pressure award-winning Rolling Stone reporter Michael Hastings to "pull down" a report he published on the magazine's web site about the agency's role in monitoring Occupy Wall Street (OWS), claiming it was riddled with "inaccuracies," according to hundreds of pages of internal DHS emails related to OWS Truthout obtained under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request we filed last October.
But it wasn't Hastings' February 28 report that was incorrect. Rather, it was an unauthorized five-page internal report prepared last October by DHS employees, who acted "outside the scope of their authority" and violated "privacy standards," according to the emails, about the potential threat posed by OWS that was flawed. The internal report strongly suggested DHS had been mining social media, such as OWS's Twitter feeds, for intelligence on the protest movement.
That document, which Hastings had accurately represented in his story, formed the basis for his Rolling Stone exclusive. It was found in more than 5 million hacked emails from private intelligence firm Stratfor that Wikileaks released earlier this year. Hastings obtained the internal report from WikiLeaks, which entered into an investigative partnership with Rolling Stone.
It was Hastings' characterization of the internal report that struck a nerve with top officials at DHS, who spent two days discussing how they should publicly respond to it, according to the heavily redacted emails, which also show that DHS learned about Hastings' story through a Google alert that contained the keywords, "Department of Homeland Security."
Robert Davis, a former USA Today reporter who left the news business in 2008 to work for DHS in its Office of External Affairs, proposed issuing a statement in response to Hastings' report.
"Rolling Stone has posted a blog with a link to a document with the DHS seal and NPPD/IP [National Protection and Programs Directorate/Infrastructure Program] markings that was posted to HSIN [DHS's Homeland Security Information Network] without approval. Here is the draft statement I would like to send to PA [office of public affairs] asap," Davis said in a February 28 email he sent to senior DHS officials after Hastings' story went live.
The statement was redacted from the emails DHS turned over to Truthout. HSIN is an internal "web-based portal" controlled by DHS where information is shared between state, local and federal officials. DHS's website says NPPD's mission is "to advance the Department's risk-reduction mission," which "requires an integrated approach that encompasses both physical and virtual threats and their associated human elements."
The emails show that Hastings contacted DHS via email on February 28 at 5:14 pm, about 90 minutes before his story was published, seeking a comment about the internal report. In his inquiry, according to one DHS email, he noted that Stratfor had the document. But DHS officials said in internal emails they were unaware how Stratfor obtained it.
"We have no insight into why Stratfor was mentioned or if they somehow obtained a copy," William Flynn, DHS's acting assistant secretary in the office of infrastructure protection, wrote in an email dated February, after Hastings was interviewed about his story and mentioned the hacked Stratfor emails. "Records indicate that they do not have a hsin account."
"It's on HSIN - basically all fusion centers and a fair number of state and locals," Chandler responded. "The doc was released by wikileaks however."
"And we stated a number of times that our privacy standards precluded us from monitoring the protests," Boogaard added.
Several of the names in Boogaard's and Chandler's reply emails were also redacted.
Flynn explained how the internal report ended up in DHS's web-based information sharing network.
"Background: IP [Infrastructure program] and (POD) [Partnership and Outreach division] complies an open source report on critical infrastructure which is posted to HSIN," Flynn wrote in an email to top DHS officials February 29. "The contract for this service recently changed and the new contractor inappropriately conducted some 'analysis' to the open source information (in this case). When it was brought to my attention the report was pulled (other steps have also been taken). However the fed staff undertook a thorough review and every source is traditional media. The report references social media resources but that was found in traditional sources. No monitoring of social media took place."
In response to a query from a colleague about whether the internal report Hastings wrote about was indeed posted to HSIN, Michael Beland, chief of staff in DHS's office of infrastructure protection, said, "We are still working on the dates, but, based upon the document and our recollection, it was posted to hsin and one cannot access the materials on hsin without a password. Once we get the dates, we'll pass them along, but that may not be before you push this [statement] out."
The publicity surrounding the internal report upset DHS employees in the Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) division, who worked hard "to make sure I&A adn the fusion centers didn't create any reports like this," Scott Matthews, a senior privacy analyst for intelligence at I&A, wrote in a February 29 email to NPPD officials.
I&A is "not very happy (me too) ..." Matthews wrote.
Caitlin Durkovich, NPPD's chief of staff, suggested reasoning with Hastings.
"I think we should consider calling Hastings and help him understand our mission," she wrote immediately after his story was published.
A day later, after Hastings' story started to attract attention on social media and received coverage by blogs and independent news organizations, Durkovich sent another email to her colleagues.
"I think we need to pick up the phone, and call Hastings. National security is his beat, but he can be provocative so we need to have a clear sey [sic] of tps [talking points]. Let's explain our mission, to include what FPS's [DHS's federal protective service's] role has been in OWS. And push back on the inaccuracies," Durkovich wrote.
A report Truthout published earlier this year based on other OWS-related documents obtained from DHS showed that FPS, which is DHS's police force, removed and arrested protesters in Portland who were gathering on federal property.
John Sandweg, special counselor to Napolitano, agreed with Durkovich. He said in a February 28 email to a dozen senior DHS officials, "Definitely think that the more we can push back on inaccuracies the better. That said, assuming [Hastings] isn't going to pull down the blog post, with other similar privacy related issues out there, we need a clear statement that explains that this [internal] report was drafted in violation of our privacy standards."
Boogaard also suggested the agency "oush [sic] back stronger."
"We never approved this approach and the individuals who piblished [sic] it [the internal DHS report] did so without approval from nppd leadership," Boogaard wrote in a February 29 email to Davis, Durkovich and other DHS officials.
Boogaard responded to Durkovich by saying he would be "happy to talk with him [Hastings], but need the talkers."
"Also, still think we need the pushback statement," Boogaard wrote in an email to Durkovich and other senior DHS officials. Durkovich characterized a statement Boogaard circulated internally the day Hastings' story was posted on Rolling Stone's website as "over reacting [sic]," according to an email Boogaard sent to officials in Napolitano's office and in the public affairs division.
"I disagree," Boogaard said about Durkovich's characterization of the prepared statement, "but wanted to make sure others didn't have a similar opinion."
It's unclear if Boogaard or any other DHS official ended up speaking with Hastings as Durkovich had suggested or attempted to contact him. Reached by Truthout Tuesday afternoon, Hastings said he could not comment about the internal discussions revolving around his report without first receiving approval from Rolling Stone, which he was unable to obtain by the time this story was published. [UPDATE 8/1/2012: Hastings spoke to Cenk Uygur, host of The Young Turks, Wednesday evening about the DHS emails that called into question his report on OWS. UPDATE 8/5/2012: In a separate interview with DemocracyNow, Hastings said DHS officials never contacted him.]
Boogaard later said in another email he did not believe "it is to our benefit to re-engage with Rolling Stone." So, he and other DHS officials sought approval from the White House for the statement they had prepared, according to a February 29 email Boogaard sent to a colleague who inquired about the status of the statement.
"Plan is to push back on the inaccuracies and issue the statement, but we are waiting on the wh [White House]," Boogaard said.
However, the plan changed. Boogaard said the statement would only be used "for any requests [for comment] that follow." But in another email he said the plan changed again and that the "wh [White House] doesn't want us to react [to Hastings' report] unless we get more requests" for comment from "traditional media," and, finally, "specific requests," which apparently never happened.
The emails also show Suzanne Spaulding, DHS's deputy undersecretary in the NPPD who oversees FPS, was also asked to review Hastings' report and the statement the agency issued in response.
Social Media Monitoring Claims Disputed
Hastings reported that the internal DHS document "goes on to sum up the history of Occupy Wall Street and assess its 'impact' on everything from financial services to government facilities. Many of the observations are benign, and appear to have been culled from publicly available sources."
"But the DHS also appears to have scoured OWS-related Twitter feeds for much of their information," Hastings wrote. "The report includes a special feature on what it calls Occupy's 'social media and IT usage,' and provides an interactive map of protests and gatherings nationwide - borrowed, improbably enough, from the lefty blog Daily Kos. 'Social media and the organic emergence of online communities,' the report notes, have driven the rapid expansion of the OWS movement.'"
Durkovich took issue with that assertion. In a February 29 email she sent to her DHS colleagues, which included Amy Shlossman, Napolitano's deputy chief of staff, Durkovich said much of the information contained in the internal report's social media section was "derived" from Daily Kos.
"If you go to the Daily Kos site, it appears that much of the social media section was derived for the [sic] from the OWS page it keeps," she wrote.
Boogaard suggested, according to another email, that any statement DHS issues should point out that the information in the internal report was generated from "open source media" and not from surveillance of OWS.
Flynn, reiterating previous comments he made in earlier emails, disputed claims in the internal report that DHS monitored social media to gather information about OWS's activities.
"No monitoring of social media took place," Flynn wrote in a February 29 email.
He adds in another email, "Just to be very clear … they did not look at social media. They looked at traditional media reporting which may have been reporting/quoting social media. This is an important distinction."
But Boogaard said regardless of whether the internal report prepared by DHS employees contained information culled from news articles as opposed to direct monitoring of social media it still violated the agency's "privacy standards."
"Just talked to our chief privacy officer," Boogaard wrote February 29 in an email sent to senior DHS officials. "At the very least they violated the situational awareness pii [personal identifiable information] because these individuals did not havew [sic] the authority to be looking at social media and drawing conclusions based on that analysis. That is why we changed the language [in the prepared statement] to privacy standards."
Spaulding, NPPD's deputy undersecretary, however, challenged the chief privacy officer's conclusions. In a February 29 email responding to the one Boogaard sent following his conversation with the chief privacy officer, Spaulding said she spoke with Flynn, who said the contractors that prepared the internal report "were not looking at social media. They execeeded their writ by doing analysis, but it was based on traditional media sources."
In the event "traditional media" contacted DHS about whether the agency was monitoring social media, Boogaard was ready to release a White House-approved "background" statement explaining when DHS monitors social media and for what purpose. "Background" means reporters could use the information but cannot attribute it to a DHS official.
"Congress requires DHS' National Operations Center (NOC) to 'provide situational awareness and establish a common operating picture for the entire federal government and for state, local, and tribal governments as appropriate, in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack and ensure that critical terrorism and disaster-related information reaches government decision makers.' Under this requirement, the NOC monitors social media only for situational awareness purposes during times of crisis, such as a terrorist attack or earthquake."
September 28, 2012 by POPEYE Filed under Establishing The Police State
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(RT) An email hacked from Stratfor that discusses the use of the TrapWire surveillance system has been decrypted, revealing insider claims that the widespread spy program was adopted by the White House, Scotland Yard, Canadian authorities and others.
When WikiLeaks published a trove of correspondence last week reported to be from the servers of Strategic Forecasting, or Stratfor, included in the data dump was at least one email that initially appeared as pure gibberish. The communiqué, sent from Stratfor Vice President of Intelligence Fred Burton to seven other staffers within the private firm, has now been decoded, however, and its content suggests that the TrapWire surveillance program was put into the hands of the most elite and powerful governments and law enforcement agencies in the entire world.
The email, dated September 23, 2010, includes a string of correspondence between Burton and more than half-a-dozen colleagues exchanging information for a full day about how Stratfor is distributing feeds from its TrapWire system and with whom. Although encoded, the emails are encrypted in Base64 format, which can easily be decoded online. A decoded copy has also been uploaded to the Web by hacktivists aligned with Anonymous.
“Chatted with Mike M, the TW [TrapWire] operator and former CIA crony,” Burton writes in the first email included in the encrypted chain. “He said our feed was taking up 25% of the TW screens inside the client command posts and that the feedback they are getting is that the info being pushed in is more geo-pol centered vice tactical-security.”
“How can we fix? Who is auditing what is going in the pipe?” Burton asks his cohorts.
Stratfor is reported to have had a contract directly with the developers of TrapWire that allowed them a substantial cut of their profits in exchange for their assistance in promoting their product to high-ranked customers, other emails published by Wikileaks as part of the Global Intelligence Files suggest. One file included in the trove, a partnering agreement between Stratfor and TrapWire’s parent group, Abraxas, provides Burton and company with an 8 percent referral fee for any businesses they help sign on to the surveillance system [pdf].
The first reply to the encrypted Burton email is from Beth Bronder, whose public LinkedIn profile documents her as serving as the senior vice president of government & corporate solutions at Stratfor until November of that year. She was only at the agency for ten months before moving to Bloomberg Government and then the CQ – Roll Call Group, where she is listed as an employee today.
According to the decrypted emails, Bronder says that Stratfor is on top of trying to fix the feed being streamed to TrapWire clients in order to make it more “security focused” per his superior’s suggestion, but when Burton responds with the names of customers involved in the surveillance program, it is no wonder why Stratfor was so eager to entice their buyers with the best material available.
“This audience is the who’s who of the CT world,” the email from Burton reads, referring to counterterrorism. “TW has RCMP, MI5, Scotland Yard SO15, USSS White House and PPD, LAPD, NYPD, Las Vegas PD and Fusion, Seattle PD, SEA-TAC…etc.”
Since breaking the news of TrapWire last week, the science-fiction-like surveillance system has slowly but surely penetrated the mainstream media, although few agencies have responded to the attention by addressing their connection with TrapWire. Earlier this week, though, New York Police Department spokesman Paul Browne flatlyrefuted on behalf of the NYPD to the New York Times, “We don’t use TrapWire.” According to Burton’s claim, however, the NYPD was indeed a customer as of September 2010, as were the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, British intelligence and the US Secret Service and White House.
Other information collected in the last week have also suggested that the NYPD was in cahoots with TrapWire, but no correspondence is believed to have been published linking the surveillance system with the Executive Branch of the United States or any agencies in Canada. Although an unencrypted email from Burton that was circulated by hacktivists last week includes the claim that TrapWire was installed on the site of every major high-value target in the continental US, UK and Canada, no other correspondence is thought to have put these specific agencies in direct connection to TrapWire.
In the next line, Burton explains that intelligence caught by TrapWire was being fed directly to these high-profile customers, bypassing any complication that could arise by a more bureaucratic distribution. He even acknowledges that problems could be put in play if they relied on sending their surveillance to the US Department of Homeland Security or lesser government agencies.
“Our materials are on their screens INSIDE the walls,” Burton writes. “We circumvent the dysfunctional DHS/DC by having our info already on their 24×7 screen.”
“We need to laser focus pieces to capture their attn. Maybe even a video,” Burton adds. “Trust me, the agents and cops watching the TW feed WANT something interesting to see.”
In a 2005 interview with The Entrepreneur Center, Richard “Hollis” Helms, co-founder of TrapWire developers Abraxas, says the system “can collect information about people and vehicles that is more accurate than facial recognition, draw patterns, and do threat assessments of areas that may be under observation from terrorists.” He calls it “a proprietary technology designed to protect critical national infrastructure from a terrorist attack by detecting the pre-attack activities of the terrorist and enabling law enforcement to investigate and engage the terrorist long before an attack is executed,” and that, “The beauty of it is that we can protect an infinite number of facilities just as efficiently as we can one and we push information out to local law authorities automatically.”
In a unencrypted email from September 26, Burton writes that the “NYPD has done what no US Govt Agency has been able to do” in the counterterrorism arena because of TrapWire.”
Since the TrapWire scandal broke, Stratfor has kept mum on the allegations that they were directly affiliated with a widespread, international surveillance program, and are probably inclined to follow the tactic proposed by the head of the security firm earlier this year. In February, Stratfor CEO and founder George Friedman addressed the hack credited to Anonymous, saying, “Some of the emails may be forged or altered to include inaccuracies,” but, also,“Some may be authentic.”
“We will not validate either, nor will we explain the thinking that went into them. Having had our property stolen, we will not be victimized twice by submitting to questions about them,” Friedman said.
By Alex Spillius, Diplomatic Correspondent
9:08PM GMT 28 Feb 2012
Fred Burton, vice president of intelligence at the Texas firm, also informed members of staff that he had a copy of the confidential indictment on Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks.
The second batch of five million internal Stratfor emails obtained by the Anonymous computer hacking group revealed that the company has high level sources within the United States and other governments, runs a network of paid informants that includes embassy staff and journalists and planned a hedge fund, Stratcap, based on its secret intelligence.
It operates something of an employment revolving door with branches of the Washington establishment. Mr Burton was previously deputy chief of the counter-terrorism division in the state department's diplomatic security service.
The emails indicated that the company pays for information. One email released by WikiLeaks described a £4,000-a-month payment made to a Middle Eastern source, and another carried bits of gossip dropped by a retired spy.
Derided as a "shadow CIA" by Mr Assange, one email from chief executive George Friedman also suggested it used methods redolent of spy agencies.
Bin Laden 'was in routine contact with Pakistan spy agency'
WikiLeaks publishes security think tank emails
In an email from Dec 6 last year, Mr Friedman advised an analyst called Reva Bhalla on how to deal with an Israeli intelligence informant providing information on the medical condition of Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan president.
"You have to take control of him. Control means financial, sexual or psychological control," he wrote.
Among Stratfor's major corporate subscribers, whose identity was previously confidential, are Coca Cola, which was concerned about animal-rights supporters disrupting the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, Canada.
"To what extent will US-based PETA supporters travel to Canada to support activism?" a Coca-Cola manager asked an analyst in a 2009 email.
The firm was also hired by Dow Chemical to spy on activists seeking redress for the 1984 gas leak at its plant in Bhopal in India that killed 15,000 people and sparked a long-running legal battle.
One of the first emails released revealed that Stratfor bosses believed that mid and senior level officials in Pakistan's ISI military intelligence agency were in regular contact with Osama bin Laden and were aware of his Abbottabad compound.
In a statement, the company said that some emails had been stolen, but suggested some placed on the internet by WikiLeaks may have been forged.
"We will not validate either. Nor will we explain the thinking that went into them. Having had our property stolen, we will not be victimised twice by submitting to questioning about them," the statement said.
Mr Assange labelled the company as a "private intelligence Enron", in reference to the energy giant that collapsed after a false accounting scandal.
The Australian founder of WikiLeaks is appealing to the Supreme Court against an extradition order to Sweden from Britain for questioning on sexual harassment judges.
Meanwhile Spain arrested four suspected hackers on Tuesday associated with Anonymous, accusing them of defacing websites and releasing personal data about police officers and bodyguards protecting Spain's royal family and the prime minister.
The arrests in Madrid and Malaga were part of an international operation that identified 10 more suspects in Argentina, six in Chile and five in Colombia, Spain's interior ministry said in a statement.
March 7, 2012 in United States
- v. -
RYAN ACKROYD, a/k/a “kayla,” a/k/a “lol,” a/k/a “lolspoon,” JAKE DAVIS, a/k/a “topiary,” a/k/a “atopiary” DARREN MARTYN, a/k/a “pwnsauce,” a/k/a “raepsauce,” a/k/a “networkkitten,” and DONNCHA O’CEARRBHAIL, a/k/a “palladium,”
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
HECTOR XAVIER MONSEGUR, a/k/a “Sabu,” a/k/a “Xavier DeLeon,” a/k/a “Leon,”
JEREMY HAMMOND, a/k/a “Anarchaos,” a/k/a “sup_g,” a/k/a “burn,” a/k/a “yohoho,” a/k/a “POW,” a/k/a “tylerknowsthis,” a/k/~ “crediblethreat,”
DONNCHA O’CEARRBHAIL, a/k/a “palladium” a/k/a “polonium,” a/k/a “anonsacco,”
Tags: Anonymous, LulzSec 3 Comments »
The controversy over the government programs led to a tense session in a packed ballroom at the Hackers on Planet Earth conference this summer in New York, where recipients and critics of the Darpa financing gathered to discuss its implications.
“If you grow a piece of celery in red water, it’s going to be red,” said Sean Auriti, who is known as Psytek at the hackerspace Alpha One Labs in Brooklyn, which he runs. “I’m just wondering how this Darpa defense contract money is going to influence these projects.”
And yet Mr. Auriti himself is benefiting from the Darpa money as a member of SpaceGambit, a consortium of hackerspaces that won a $500,000 grant for research in space exploration and colonization technologies. He said he hoped that the grant would help him build a mini-thruster to launch backpack-size satellites into orbit.
(Below) Peiter Zatko, a hacker known as Mudge who now works for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in 1999.
Mr. Zatko today.
Mudge's bribed seduction from outsider hacker to DoD agent and chief hacker briber is described in Andy Greenberg's "This Machine Kills Secrets." Noteworthy: DoD gave $503,705 to the Tor Project in 2011 for "Basic and Applied Research and Development in Areas Relating to the Navy."
Greenberg writes, p. 174:
But Mudge has something else in common with the agency that now employs him. Each has played both sides of the secret spilling game. Without DARPA's money and ideas, the transparency movement as we know it, built on the Internet and enabled by anonymity technologies, wouldn't exist.And Mudge, for his part, isn't just any hacker turned-fed. Peter Zatko, loath though he may be to discuss it, knows Julian Assange.The two forty-year-old ex-hackers grew up cruising the same primordial Internet of the 1980s and the 1990s. They bristled under the same restrictions and shared a friendship through connections that spanned continents. Twenty years ago, Mudge and Mendax (Assange) were teammates in the same digital free-for-all. Now they've found themselves on opposing sides, vying for the fate of the world's information. It's Mudge's move.
And Mudge, for his part, isn't just any hacker turned-fed. Peter Zatko, loath though he may be to discuss it, knows Julian Assange.
The two forty-year-old ex-hackers grew up cruising the same primordial Internet of the 1980s and the 1990s. They bristled under the same restrictions and shared a friendship through connections that spanned continents. Twenty years ago, Mudge and Mendax (Assange) were teammates in the same digital free-for-all. Now they've found themselves on opposing sides, vying for the fate of the world's information. It's Mudge's move.
Greenberg also writes of the development of the Tor Project, Jacob Appelbaum's role in it and his relationship to WikiLeaks and Julian Assange.
Latest Update: 12/09/27
In this section you will find various releases with no additional information or analysis. If you found something of interest please let us know and we will add this information.The latest release is listen on the top of the right hand column.
LulzSec details for the Crown Court at Southwark(PDF, 7.5MB)
We Are Legion - The Story of the Hacktivists(Documentary, 2012, .avi, 236MB)
Video footage of the Megaupload Raidbroadcasted 3News' Campbell Live Show (local mirror). Read more information on Torrentfreak. (Added 12/08/08)
Meanwhile in AustraliaFiles from qld.gov.au.tar.gzand aapt.com.au(Latest Update: 12/07/29)
Digital Music Report 2012(PDF, 15MB), Leaked on The Pirate Bay. Get the torrent yonder. (Added: 12/07/26)
The Gentleman's Guide To Forum Spies(Added: 12/07/23)
MidasBank Leak50,000 Wall Street IT Personnel Accounts (Added: 12/07/23)
Chanology Email ViewerEmails from Scientology Celebrity Center Vienna, acquired by Anonymous Austria (Added: 12/07/21)
HBGary Email ViewerEmails from HBGary, acquired by Anonymous
FBI Conference TranscriptA text version of the FBI/NSY call intercepted and published by Anonymous
We Are Anonymous - Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec(PDF, 1.5MB) Book from Parmy Olson
by Nate Anderson - Mar 7 2012, 3:30am UTC
"Script kiddie"—no hacker worth his salt wants to hear the term used to describe him. Anyone with modest computer skills can cause modest havoc using other people's code fragments, scanners, and infiltration tools, but this is little more than knowing how to point a gun in the right direction and pull the trigger. It lacks art. True hacking requires a deep knowledge of computer and network security, an ability to navigate around obstacles, and the willingness to be careful enough to always hide one's tracks. The script kiddies, they might be easy targets for the feds, but the true hackers? Shadows are their home.
The Anon-affiliated hackers who broke into the private intelligence company Stratfor to release e-mails and steal credit cards certainly didn't think they were script kiddies. In an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) just after the December 2011 hack, one of the Statfor hackers (sup_g) spoke to an unidentified chatroom member (CC-3) about the accomplishment.
CC-3: but this stratfor shit was bigger shit than CC-3: old shitsCC-3: at least it deserves no critics@sup_g: oh yes@sup_g: notice no one is throwing around script kiddie comments...CC-3: this time was classyCC-3: and thats perfectCC-3: we produced a cool videoCC-3: we announced luzxmasCC-3: we hacked big shitCC-3: we donated by 1000000...CC-3: and we destroyed a big serious intel corpCC-3: actually just a lil bunch of ppl thinks shit on thisCC-3: like 3CC-3: lol@sup_g: they are just mad because of the sheer amount of high profile people in this
The day after Christmas, sup_g had another online chat about the Stratfor hack and about some 30,000 credit card numbers that had been taken from the company. His interlocutor, CW-1, engaged in a bit of gallows humor about what might happen should they all get caught.
CW-1: hows the news looking?@sup_g: I been going hard all nightCW-1: I heard we're all over the news papersCW-1: you mother fuckers are going to get me raied [raided]CW-1: HAHAHAAHA@sup_g: we put out 30k cards, the it.stratfor.com dump, and another statement@sup_g: dude it's big..CW-1: if I get raided anarchaos your job is to cause havok in my honorCW-1: <3CW-1: sup_g:@sup_g: it shall be so
But the raid had, in fact, already happened. CW-1 was "Sabu," a top Anon/LulzSec hacker who was in real life an unemployed 28-year old living in New York City public housing. His sixth-floor apartment had been visited by the FBI in June 2011, and Sabu had been arrested and "turned." For months, he had been an FBI informant, watched 24 hours a day by an agent and using a government issued laptop that logged everything he did.
The FBI controllers behind Sabu must have found it grimly humorous to tease sup_g with threats of arrest, but they were also using Sabu's chat for a more serious purpose—correlating the many names of sup_g.
In the log above, note how Sabu suddenly addresses sup_g by a new name, "anarchaos." It would turn out that sup_g went by many names, including "anarchaos," "burn," "yohoho," "POW," "tylerknowsthis," and "crediblethreat."
Normally, the attempt to link his various names would have raised the hacker's guard; as he confided to Sabu, someone else had once tried to link the names "yohoho" and "burn," but the hacker "never answered... I think he picked up some language similarities I've worked with [REDACTED] on other ops in the past." But this was Sabu, a sort of hacker demigod in the world of Anonymous. If you couldn't trust him, who could you trust? Sabu had even provided a server to store the stolen Statfor data, so he couldn't be a fed (in reality, he had done so at the FBI's direction).
A document distributed after the Stratfor hack totted up the hack's damage.
"The sheer amount of destruction we wreaked on Stratfor's servers is the digital equivalent of a nuclear bomb," it said. "We rooted box after box on their intranet: dumping their mysql databases, stealing their private ssh keys, and copying hundred[s] of employee e-mail spools... We laid waste to their web server, their mail server, their development server, their clearspace and srm intranet portal and backup archives."
The document also claimed that more than $500,000 had been charged to credit cards and given to "charities and revolutionary organizations."
Usernames and e-mail addresses were also released; people were exhorted to "use and abuse these password lists and credit card information to wreak unholy havoc upon the systems and personal e-mail accounts of these rich and powerful oppressors."
It was vicious, and Stratfor has not in fact fully recovered. Critics of the action, like The Atlantic, called Stratfor a "joke" organization not worth targeting, though the hackers seemed more than pleased with their work; they recently passed the company e-mails to WikiLeaks for distribution.
Whatever else it did, the hack certainly brought renewed attention to hackers like sup_g. But first, the FBI had to find them.
While sup_g may indeed have been a "credible threat," he was in the end no match for the overwhelming federal resources of the FBI agents hunting him down. Over the last month, federal agents staked out his home in Chicago constantly, dug up old police surveillance records, tapped his Internet connection, used directional wireless finders to locate and identify his wireless router, and relied on Sabu back in his New York City apartment to let them know when sup_g went on or offline.
Despite his many precautions taken, the FBI moved into Chicago's Bridgeport neighborhood last night and arrested a 27-year old dreadlocked white guy said to hate racism so much that he had once violently attacked a Holocaust denier. Here's how the feds found him.
To identify sup_g, the Bureau first turned to the voluminous chat logs stored on Sabu's computer. They went through every comment that could be plausibly linked to sup_g or one of his aliases. The goal was to see if the hacker had slipped up at any point and revealed some personal information.
He had. On August 29, 2011 at 8:37 AM, "burn" said in an IRC channel that "some comrades of mine were arrested in St. Louis a few weeks ago... for midwestrising tar sands work." If accurate, this might place "burn" in the Midwest. FBI Chicago agents were able to confirm that an event called Midwest Rising was attended by Chicago resident Jeremy Hammond's twin brother. (Hammond had a history with anarchism and violent protest.)
"Anarchaos" once let slip that he had been arrested in 2004 for protesting at the Republican National Convention in New York City. Much later, "yohoho" noted that he hadn't been to New York "since the RNC," nicely tying both online handles to the same person. The FBI went to New York City police and obtained a list of every individual detained at the 2004 convention; they learned that Jeremy Hammond had in fact been detained, though he had not been arrested. The pieces were starting to fit.
"Sup_g" and "burn" both indicated later that they had spent time in prison, with “burn” indicating that he had been at a federal penitentiary. A search of Hammond's criminal records revealed that he had been arrested in March 2005 by the Chicago FBI and had pled guilty to hacking into a “politically conservative website and stealing its computer database, including credit card information,” according to an FBI affidavit. Hammond was sentenced to two years in prison for the action.
Before this 2005 arrest, Hammond had allegedly told friends in Chicago that he intended to use the credit card information from the hack to “make donations to liberal organizations.” Though he did not do so at the time, the idea matched up with the "lulzxmas" plan to distribute gifts and cash using stolen cards from Stratfor.
In yet another chat, "Anarchaos" told Sabu that he had once spent a few weeks in a county jail for possession of marijuana. He also asked Sabu not to tell anybody, “cause it could compromise my identity," and he noted that he was on probation. Both matched Hammond, who was placed on probation in November 2010 after a violent protest against the Olympics coming to Chicago. When the FBI ran a criminal history check on Hammond, it also revealed two arrests for marijuana possession.
The FBI was so thorough that it even followed up on a "POW" comment saying "dumpster diving is all good i'm a freegan goddess." ("Freegans" scavenge unspoiled, wasted food from the trash of grocery stores and restaurants.) The FBI went to Chicago authorities, who had put Hammond under surveillance when they were investigating him back in 2005. As part of that earlier surveillance, “agents have seen Hammond going into dumpsters to get food.”
Now that they had a suspect, it was time to put him under surveillance.
Convinced that they had identified the right suspect, agents began continuous physical surveillance of Hammond's two-apartment home on Chicago's South Side on February 29. Their target only used the side entrance to the building, which accessed the rear apartment; using a signal strength meter and directional antennas, FBI agents located his wireless router signal and were able to confirm that it was located in the back apartment.
Watching the WiFi network revealed the Media Access Control (MAC) addresses of each device connected to the network. Most of the time there was only one, an Apple Computer—and sup_g had told Sabu that he used a Macbook.
On March 1, the agents obtained a court order allowing them to use a "pen register/trap and trace" device that could reveal only "addressing information" and not content. In other words, if it worked, agents could see what IP addresses Hammond was visiting, but they would see nothing else.
The FBI describes its device as a "wireless router monitoring device” that captures addressing and signaling information and transmits it wirelessly through the air to FBI agents watching the home. It was installed the same day and was soon showing agents what Hammond was up to online.
His Macbook's MAC address was soon seen connecting to IP addresses known to be part of the Tor anonymizing network. "An FBI Tor network expert analyzed the data from the Pen/Trace and was able to determine that a significant portion of the traffic from the Chicago Residence to the Internet was Tor-related traffic,” said the FBI's affidavit.
And while this definitely sounded like their man, the Bureau went to even greater lengths to double-check their target. The main technique was to observe when Hammond left his home, then to call Sabu in New York and ask if any of Hammond's suspected aliases had just left IRC or the Jabber instant messaging system.
Here, for instance, are two such logs from March 1:
On March 1, 2012, at approximately 5:03 PM CST, Hammond was seen leaving the Chicago Residence. Almost immediately after, CW-1 (in New York) contacted me to report that the defendant was off-line. Pen/Trap data also reflected that Tor network activity and Internet activity from the Chicago Residence stopped at approximately the same time.Later, also on March 1, 2012, at approximately 6:23 PM CST, Hammond was observed returning to the Chicago Residence. Tor Network traffic resumed from the Chicago Residence approximately a minute or so later. Moreover, CW-1 reported to me that the defendant, using the online alias “yohoho," was back online at approximately the same time as physical surveillance in Chicago showed Hammond had returned to the Chicago Residence.
On March 1, 2012, at approximately 5:03 PM CST, Hammond was seen leaving the Chicago Residence. Almost immediately after, CW-1 (in New York) contacted me to report that the defendant was off-line. Pen/Trap data also reflected that Tor network activity and Internet activity from the Chicago Residence stopped at approximately the same time.
Later, also on March 1, 2012, at approximately 6:23 PM CST, Hammond was observed returning to the Chicago Residence. Tor Network traffic resumed from the Chicago Residence approximately a minute or so later. Moreover, CW-1 reported to me that the defendant, using the online alias “yohoho," was back online at approximately the same time as physical surveillance in Chicago showed Hammond had returned to the Chicago Residence.
Surveillance continued right up through March 4, when Sabu had his last online sighting of Hammond at 7:00pm CST. On March 5, the FBI drew up its finalized arrest affidavit and presented it to Judge Ronald Ellis in the lower Manhattan federal courthouse. Later that day, it was acted upon in Chicago.
Hammond was arrested last night. Residents of the Bridgeport neighborhood took to a Facebook group to figure out what was happening. "There is a big white truck outside now - the evidence wagon?" wrote one. "And more FBI agents." Another said he was told to go back inside and that the FBI had "some huge guns."
"There were a ton of FBI agents taking guys out of this house," said another. "At 8:00 at night. They weren't taking down a flag burner [some had speculated that it was due to Hammond's hippie, anarchic ways]. It's 11:00 now & there are 16 FBI vehicles still out here. I live across the street. I don't know who you're hearing stuff from - but this is BIG!"
"I asked the boyfriend to go out & see if he could get any more info," wrote a commenter. "The FBI guy said this will be out in the news tomorrow. Stay tuned."
Hammond was back in the news—again. He was profiled back in 2007 by Chicago magazine as part of a piece on hacktivism. "That evening, I caught up with Hammond in front of the flower shop," wrote author Stuart Luman. "He bragged about a current scheme involving Kinko's cards, which he had hacked so they would grant free copies. He fanned the cards in front of me as if he were performing a magic trick. Then he pulled from his pocket a San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit pass. 'I can clone these so easily,' he boasted."
But Hammond's passion was social change. At a hacking meeetup profiled in the piece, Hammond tells his fellow hackers that he is driven by his hatred of social inequality. "Our civilization is facing a radical, imminent mass change," he said. "The alternative to the hierarchical power structure is based on mutual aid and group consensus. As hackers we can learn these systems, manipulate these systems, and shut down these systems if we need to."
Yesterday's arrest didn't appear to surprise him. As the Chicago Tribune reported, he appeared at a hearing today in federal court and was ordered off to New York to face the charges.
"After the hearing, as he stood in a narrow hallway, Hammond appeared curious," wrote reporters Todd Lighty and Wailin Wong. "He asked deputy marshals if he could keep a copy of the criminal complaint since he had no idea about the charges until his arrest Tuesday morning. His lawyer, James Fennerty, said he considers Hammond a likable man with strongly held beliefs."
Now, those beliefs could land him in serious trouble.
October 26, 2012 in United Nations
The following document was released by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime on October 22, 2012.
Technology is one of the strategic factors driving the increasing use of the Internet by terrorist organizations and their supporters for a wide range of purposes, including recruitment, financing, propaganda, training, incitement to commit acts of terrorism, and the gathering and dissemination of information for terrorist purposes. While the many benefits of the Internet are self-evident, it may also be used to facilitate communication within terrorist organizations and to transmit information on, as well as material support for, planned acts of terrorism, all of which require specific technical knowledge for the effective investigation of these offences.It is a commonly accepted principle that, despite the heinous nature of their acts, alleged terrorists should be afforded the same procedural safeguards under criminal law as any other suspects. The defence of human rights is a core value of the United Nations and a fundamental pillar of the rule-of-law approach to the fight against terrorism. The present publication accordingly highlights the importance of respect for the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms at all times and, in particular, in the context of the development and implementation of legal instruments related to countering terrorism.…7. The Internet may be used not only as a means to publish extremist rhetoric and videos, but also a way to develop relationships with, and solicit support from, those most responsive to targeted propaganda. Terrorist organizations increasingly use propaganda distributed via platforms such as password-protected websites and restricted-access Internet chat groups as a means of clandestine recruitment. The reach of the Internet provides terrorist organizations and sympathizers with a global pool of potential recruits. Restricted access cyberforums offer a venue for recruits to learn about, and provide support to, terrorist organizations and to engage in direct actions in the furtherance of terrorist objectives. The use of technological barriers to entry to recruitment platforms also increases the complexity of tracking terrorism-related activity by intelligence and law enforcement personnel.…15. Online payment facilities may also be exploited through fraudulent means such as identity theft, credit card theft, wire fraud, stock fraud, intellectual property crimes and auction fraud. An example of the use of illicit gains to finance acts of terrorism can be seen in the United Kingdom case against Younis Tsouli (see para. 114 below). Profits from stolen credit cards were laundered by several means, including transfer through e-gold online payment accounts, which were used to route the funds through several countries before they reached their intended destination. The laundered money was used both to fund the registration by Tsouli of 180 websites hosting Al-Qaida propaganda videos and to provide equipment for terrorist activities in several countries. Approximately 1,400 credit cards were used to generate approximately £1.6 million of illicit funds to finance terrorist activity.…17. In recent years, terrorist organizations have increasingly turned to the Internet as an alternative training ground for terrorists. There is a growing range of media that provide platforms for the dissemination of practical guides in the form of online manuals, audio and video clips, information and advice. These Internet platforms also provide detailed instructions, often in easily accessible multimedia format and multiple languages, on topics such as how to join terrorist organizations; how to construct explosives, firearms or other weapons or hazardous materials; and how to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The platforms act as a virtual training camp. They are also used to share, inter alia, specific methods, techniques or operational knowledge for the purpose of committing an act of terrorism.18. For example, Inspire is an online magazine allegedly published by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula with the stated objective of enabling Muslims to train for jihad at home. It contains a large amount of ideological material aimed at encouraging terrorism, including statements attributed to Osama Bin Laden, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri and other well-known Al-Qaida figures. The fall 2010 edition included practical instructional material on how to adapt a four-wheel-drive vehicle to carry out an attack on members of the public and how a lone individual could launch an indiscriminate attack by shooting a gun from a tower. The publication even suggested a target city for such an attack, in order to increase the chances of killing a member of the Government.…1. Systematic approach to investigations involving the Internet202. There is a vast range of data and services available via the Internet which may be employed in an investigation to counter terrorist use of the Internet. A proactive approach to investigative strategies and supporting specialist tools, which capitalizes on evolving Internet resources, promotes the efficient identification of data and services likely to yield the maximum benefit to an investigation. In recognition of the need for a systematic approach to using technological developments relating to the Internet for investigative purposes, the Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale of the Carabinieri of Italy developed the following guidelines, which have been disseminated through the University College Dublin, master’s programme in forensic computing and cybercrime (see section IV.G below) and implemented by domestic enforcement authorities of many member States of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the European Police Office (Europol):Protocol of a systematic approachData collection: This phase involves the collection of data through traditional investigative methods, such as information relating to the suspect, any co-inhabitants, relevant co-workers or other associates and information compiled through conventional monitoring activities of channels of communication, including in relation to fixed-line and mobile telephone usage.Research for additional information available via Internet-based services: This phase involves requests to obtain information collected and stored in the databases of webbased e-commerce, communications and networking services, such as eBay, PayPal, Google and Facebook, as well as using dedicated search engines such as http://www.123people.com. Data collected by these services through commonly used Internet “cookies” also provide key information regarding multiple users of a single computer or mobile device.The activities in phases (a) and (b) above provide information that may be combined and cross-referenced to build a profile of the individual or group under investigation and made available for analysis during later stages of the investigation.VoIP server requests: In this phase, law enforcement authorities request information from VoIP service providers relating to the persons under investigation and any known affiliates or users of the same networking devices. The information collected in this phase may also be used as a form of “smart filter” for the purposes of verifying the information obtained in the two prior phases.Analysis: The large volume of data obtained from VoIP servers and the providers of various Internet services are then analysed to identify information and trends useful for investigative purposes. This analysis may be facilitated by computer programs, which may filter information or provide graphic representations of the digital data collected to highlight, inter alia, trends, chronology, the existence of an organized group or hierarchy, the geolocation of members of such group, or factors common among multiple users, such as a common source of financing.Identification of subjects of interest: In this phase, following smart analysis of the data, it is common to identify subjects of interest based, for example, on subscriber information linked to a financial, VoIP or e-mail account.Interception activity: In this phase, law enforcement authorities employ interception tactics similar to those used for traditional communication channels, shifting them to a different platform: digital communication channels. Interception activity may be undertaken in connection with telecommunications services, such as fixed-line broadband, mobile broadband and wireless communications, as well as with regard to services provided by ISPs, such as e-mail, chat and forum communication services. In particular, in recent years experience has revealed vulnerabilities in new communications technologies which may be exploited for investigative or intelligence-gathering purposes. Due care should be taken with respect to ensuring the forensic integrity of the data being gathered and the corroboration, to the extent possible, of any intelligence gathered with objective identifiers such as GPS coordinates, time stamps or video surveillance.Where permitted by domestic law, some law enforcement authorities may also employ digital monitoring techniques facilitated by the installation of computer hardware or applications such as a virus, a “Trojan Horse” or a keystroke logger on the computer of the person under investigation. This may be achieved through direct or remote access to the relevant computer, taking into consideration the technical profile of the hardware to be compromised (such as the presence of antivirus protections or firewalls) and the personal profile of all users of the device, targeting the least sophisticated user profile.…428. Public-private partnerships specifically targeting terrorist use of the Internet could also provide a means to promote clear guidelines regarding information-sharing between the private and public sector, consistent with applicable data protection regulations. A good basis for information-sharing guidelines is provided by the Council of Europe “Guidelines for the cooperation between law enforcement and Internet service providers against cybercrime”. The focus of these guidelines is the establishment of relationships of mutual trust and cooperation between public and private sector stakeholders as a foundation for cooperation. The guidelines also emphasize the need to promote efficient and cost-effective cooperation procedures. Law enforcement authorities and Internet service providers are encouraged to engage in information exchange to strengthen their capacity to identify and combat cybercrime through regular meetings and the sharing of good practices and feedback. The guidelines also encourage the establishment of formal partnerships and written procedures as a basis for longer-term relationships, to ensure, inter alia, that appropriate protections are provided that the partnership will not infringe upon the legal rights of industry participants or the legal powers of law enforcement authorities.429. Recommended measures to be taken by law enforcement authorities pursuant to the guidelines include:Engaging in broad strategic cooperation with ISPs, including by conducting regular technical and legal training seminars, as well as providing feedback on investigations conducted or intelligence gathered, based on ISP-initiated reports/complaintsProviding explanations and assistance to ISPs regarding investigation techniques not directly related to the case at hand, in order to facilitate an understanding of how ISP cooperation will result in more efficient investigationsPrioritizing requests for large volumes of data while avoiding unnecessary cost and disruption of business operations.430. Recommended measures to be taken by Internet Service providers pursuant to the guidelines include:Cooperating to minimize the use of services for illegal purposesReporting criminal activity to law enforcement authoritiesWhen possible, providing a list, upon request, of which types of data could be made available for each service to law enforcement, upon receipt of a valid disclosure request.431. Public-private partnerships may also provide a forum to promote minimum standards for the secure retention of data by private sector stakeholders and enhance the channels of communication for the provision of information by private sector stakeholders regarding suspicious activities.
Technology is one of the strategic factors driving the increasing use of the Internet by terrorist organizations and their supporters for a wide range of purposes, including recruitment, financing, propaganda, training, incitement to commit acts of terrorism, and the gathering and dissemination of information for terrorist purposes. While the many benefits of the Internet are self-evident, it may also be used to facilitate communication within terrorist organizations and to transmit information on, as well as material support for, planned acts of terrorism, all of which require specific technical knowledge for the effective investigation of these offences.
It is a commonly accepted principle that, despite the heinous nature of their acts, alleged terrorists should be afforded the same procedural safeguards under criminal law as any other suspects. The defence of human rights is a core value of the United Nations and a fundamental pillar of the rule-of-law approach to the fight against terrorism. The present publication accordingly highlights the importance of respect for the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms at all times and, in particular, in the context of the development and implementation of legal instruments related to countering terrorism.
7. The Internet may be used not only as a means to publish extremist rhetoric and videos, but also a way to develop relationships with, and solicit support from, those most responsive to targeted propaganda. Terrorist organizations increasingly use propaganda distributed via platforms such as password-protected websites and restricted-access Internet chat groups as a means of clandestine recruitment. The reach of the Internet provides terrorist organizations and sympathizers with a global pool of potential recruits. Restricted access cyberforums offer a venue for recruits to learn about, and provide support to, terrorist organizations and to engage in direct actions in the furtherance of terrorist objectives. The use of technological barriers to entry to recruitment platforms also increases the complexity of tracking terrorism-related activity by intelligence and law enforcement personnel.
15. Online payment facilities may also be exploited through fraudulent means such as identity theft, credit card theft, wire fraud, stock fraud, intellectual property crimes and auction fraud. An example of the use of illicit gains to finance acts of terrorism can be seen in the United Kingdom case against Younis Tsouli (see para. 114 below). Profits from stolen credit cards were laundered by several means, including transfer through e-gold online payment accounts, which were used to route the funds through several countries before they reached their intended destination. The laundered money was used both to fund the registration by Tsouli of 180 websites hosting Al-Qaida propaganda videos and to provide equipment for terrorist activities in several countries. Approximately 1,400 credit cards were used to generate approximately £1.6 million of illicit funds to finance terrorist activity.
17. In recent years, terrorist organizations have increasingly turned to the Internet as an alternative training ground for terrorists. There is a growing range of media that provide platforms for the dissemination of practical guides in the form of online manuals, audio and video clips, information and advice. These Internet platforms also provide detailed instructions, often in easily accessible multimedia format and multiple languages, on topics such as how to join terrorist organizations; how to construct explosives, firearms or other weapons or hazardous materials; and how to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The platforms act as a virtual training camp. They are also used to share, inter alia, specific methods, techniques or operational knowledge for the purpose of committing an act of terrorism.
18. For example, Inspire is an online magazine allegedly published by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula with the stated objective of enabling Muslims to train for jihad at home. It contains a large amount of ideological material aimed at encouraging terrorism, including statements attributed to Osama Bin Laden, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri and other well-known Al-Qaida figures. The fall 2010 edition included practical instructional material on how to adapt a four-wheel-drive vehicle to carry out an attack on members of the public and how a lone individual could launch an indiscriminate attack by shooting a gun from a tower. The publication even suggested a target city for such an attack, in order to increase the chances of killing a member of the Government.
1. Systematic approach to investigations involving the Internet
202. There is a vast range of data and services available via the Internet which may be employed in an investigation to counter terrorist use of the Internet. A proactive approach to investigative strategies and supporting specialist tools, which capitalizes on evolving Internet resources, promotes the efficient identification of data and services likely to yield the maximum benefit to an investigation. In recognition of the need for a systematic approach to using technological developments relating to the Internet for investigative purposes, the Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale of the Carabinieri of Italy developed the following guidelines, which have been disseminated through the University College Dublin, master’s programme in forensic computing and cybercrime (see section IV.G below) and implemented by domestic enforcement authorities of many member States of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the European Police Office (Europol):
Protocol of a systematic approach
Where permitted by domestic law, some law enforcement authorities may also employ digital monitoring techniques facilitated by the installation of computer hardware or applications such as a virus, a “Trojan Horse” or a keystroke logger on the computer of the person under investigation. This may be achieved through direct or remote access to the relevant computer, taking into consideration the technical profile of the hardware to be compromised (such as the presence of antivirus protections or firewalls) and the personal profile of all users of the device, targeting the least sophisticated user profile.
428. Public-private partnerships specifically targeting terrorist use of the Internet could also provide a means to promote clear guidelines regarding information-sharing between the private and public sector, consistent with applicable data protection regulations. A good basis for information-sharing guidelines is provided by the Council of Europe “Guidelines for the cooperation between law enforcement and Internet service providers against cybercrime”. The focus of these guidelines is the establishment of relationships of mutual trust and cooperation between public and private sector stakeholders as a foundation for cooperation. The guidelines also emphasize the need to promote efficient and cost-effective cooperation procedures. Law enforcement authorities and Internet service providers are encouraged to engage in information exchange to strengthen their capacity to identify and combat cybercrime through regular meetings and the sharing of good practices and feedback. The guidelines also encourage the establishment of formal partnerships and written procedures as a basis for longer-term relationships, to ensure, inter alia, that appropriate protections are provided that the partnership will not infringe upon the legal rights of industry participants or the legal powers of law enforcement authorities.
429. Recommended measures to be taken by law enforcement authorities pursuant to the guidelines include:
430. Recommended measures to be taken by Internet Service providers pursuant to the guidelines include:
431. Public-private partnerships may also provide a forum to promote minimum standards for the secure retention of data by private sector stakeholders and enhance the channels of communication for the provision of information by private sector stakeholders regarding suspicious activities.
Tags: Inspire Magazine, Terrorism, United Nations No Comments »
July 29, 2010 in News
Founder and editor of the WikiLeaks website, Julian Assange, faces the media during a debate event, held in London Tuesday July 27, 2010. On Sunday, the online whistle-blower website WikiLeaks released some 90,000 leaked U.S. army and intelligence documents relating to the war in Afghanistan, which have been highlighted as potentially putting American military lives at risk, although Assange says there is "no reason" to doubt the reliability of the leaked documents.(AP PHOTO/Max Nash)
WikiLeaks fallout: Tighter access to US secrets? (AP):
“Frankly, we all knew this was going to happen,” former CIA Director Michael Hayden said. In a post-WikiLeaks world, he said many he’s spoken to feel burned by the disclosures and want to return to guarding their data.The intelligence failures that led to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were blamed on government agencies hoarding information instead of sharing it, missing crucial clues that could have headed off al-Qaida’s strikes. Those changes, which reduced this kind of information “stovepiping,” have produced the opposite problem — amassing so much data that officials complain it’s hard to make sense of it or, as the WikiLeaks incident shows, keep it secret.Intelligence officials and outside experts suggested that agency chiefs may push to limit access to electronic “portals” that have provided growing data access to intelligence officers, diplomats and troops around the world. And others predicted tighter scrutiny by an administration that already has pushed aggressively to investigate and prosecute leakers.On the other hand, some lawmakers worry that the leaking incident will give the nation’s 16 intelligence agencies an excuse to go back to old ways of holding back some information as “too sensitive” to be shared.“The intelligence community has a long way to go in information sharing,” said Sen. Kit Bond of Missouri, top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “If these leaks lead to even more stovepipes,” as in limiting access to data to only certain analysts or agencies, “it would be yet another devastating result of this betrayal.”Rep. Anna Eshoo, D-Calif., a House Intelligence Committee member who shares those concerns, conducted a closed hearing Tuesday on information sharing.Eshoo would not detail what went on at the hearing, but she said “it’s the nature of the intelligence community to hoard information.” Despite the WikiLeaks episode, she said she would still push for “more information sharing in the intelligence community, not less.”Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Thursday that the leaks endangered the lives of Afghan citizens who have cooperated with NATO-led forces. He called the release of the papers “shocking” and “irresponsible.”
“Frankly, we all knew this was going to happen,” former CIA Director Michael Hayden said. In a post-WikiLeaks world, he said many he’s spoken to feel burned by the disclosures and want to return to guarding their data.
The intelligence failures that led to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were blamed on government agencies hoarding information instead of sharing it, missing crucial clues that could have headed off al-Qaida’s strikes. Those changes, which reduced this kind of information “stovepiping,” have produced the opposite problem — amassing so much data that officials complain it’s hard to make sense of it or, as the WikiLeaks incident shows, keep it secret.
Intelligence officials and outside experts suggested that agency chiefs may push to limit access to electronic “portals” that have provided growing data access to intelligence officers, diplomats and troops around the world. And others predicted tighter scrutiny by an administration that already has pushed aggressively to investigate and prosecute leakers.
On the other hand, some lawmakers worry that the leaking incident will give the nation’s 16 intelligence agencies an excuse to go back to old ways of holding back some information as “too sensitive” to be shared.
“The intelligence community has a long way to go in information sharing,” said Sen. Kit Bond of Missouri, top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “If these leaks lead to even more stovepipes,” as in limiting access to data to only certain analysts or agencies, “it would be yet another devastating result of this betrayal.”
Rep. Anna Eshoo, D-Calif., a House Intelligence Committee member who shares those concerns, conducted a closed hearing Tuesday on information sharing.
Eshoo would not detail what went on at the hearing, but she said “it’s the nature of the intelligence community to hoard information.” Despite the WikiLeaks episode, she said she would still push for “more information sharing in the intelligence community, not less.”
Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Thursday that the leaks endangered the lives of Afghan citizens who have cooperated with NATO-led forces. He called the release of the papers “shocking” and “irresponsible.”
WikiLeaks threatens drive for US security agencies to share (India Times):
A former head of the CIA warned that government secrets pouring through WikiLeaks could sabotage the post 9-11 campaign to break down walls between rival US intelligence agencies.“This is destructive on so many levels,” retired Air Force general and former CIA chief Michael Hayden said of the WikiLeaks saga, after an onstage chat on Wednesday at a Black Hat computer security conference in Las Vegas.“It reinforces the darker angels. Leaders in the intelligence community have to come to grips with this problem and work hard to find an answer.”Black Hat and an overlapping DefCon gathering of hackers have become venues for national security officials to court software wizards as allies to fight cyber wars, online crime syndicates and other mounting Internet threats.By turning the Internet into a worldwide stage for sensitive government information, WikiLeaks is sowing distrust between the very intelligence agencies castigated for being too secretive prior to the World Trade Center attack on Sept. 11, 2001.“In the years after 9/11, whenever anything went wrong I got slammed by both parties about failure to share,” Hayden said.“We told senators ‘Yes, we’ll share.’ But, in the back of your mind your conscious was saying there are real dangers in sharing. And that just got displayed.”
A former head of the CIA warned that government secrets pouring through WikiLeaks could sabotage the post 9-11 campaign to break down walls between rival US intelligence agencies.
“This is destructive on so many levels,” retired Air Force general and former CIA chief Michael Hayden said of the WikiLeaks saga, after an onstage chat on Wednesday at a Black Hat computer security conference in Las Vegas.
“It reinforces the darker angels. Leaders in the intelligence community have to come to grips with this problem and work hard to find an answer.”
Black Hat and an overlapping DefCon gathering of hackers have become venues for national security officials to court software wizards as allies to fight cyber wars, online crime syndicates and other mounting Internet threats.
By turning the Internet into a worldwide stage for sensitive government information, WikiLeaks is sowing distrust between the very intelligence agencies castigated for being too secretive prior to the World Trade Center attack on Sept. 11, 2001.
“In the years after 9/11, whenever anything went wrong I got slammed by both parties about failure to share,” Hayden said.
“We told senators ‘Yes, we’ll share.’ But, in the back of your mind your conscious was saying there are real dangers in sharing. And that just got displayed.”
Tags: Wikileaks No Comments »
Lorraine Murphy more articles | email |
Paranoia is reputed to destroy you. But if you’re a whistleblower in search of a safe, neutral outlet, it just might save you instead.
Par:AnoIA, short for Potentially Alarming Research: Anonymous Intelligence Agency, is a website designed to collect leaks, allow project participants to work on them, and release them in a way that draws the attention of the public. The Releases section of the site, for example, currently features 1.9 gigs of information from American intel corporation Innodata.
The leaks site developed in part by necessity. WikiLeaks’ touted anonymous submission system has been offline for a year. OpenLeaks never materialized. And Cryptome is... Cryptome, meaning it neither edits nor markets its documents to the public at large.
Simply put, if WikiLeaks is a PR agency for documents and Cryptome is a leak dissemination site, Par:AnoIA aims to have the best of both. Launched in March after a year and a half of development, the site picks up where Anonleaks.ch, an earlier Anonymous leaks site, left off—literally. (Par:AnoIA currently hosts HBGary documents, which were inherited from Anonleaks.ch.) Following a July profile in Wired’s Threat Level blog, it’s suddenly the hottest disclosure site still up and running. More recently, Par:AnoIA published the private information of 3,900 members of the International Pharmaceutical Federation, and a pile of documents related to the Cambodian government, a move dubbed Operation The Pirate Bay.
Cryptome founder John Young on documents, disclosures, and the competition
Bradley Manning's trial set for February in WikiLeaks case
WikiLeaks releases Guantanamo Bay prisoner policies
Everything you need to know about TrapWire, the surveillance system everyone is freaking out about
Arrested Anonymous member Barrett Brown sends letter from prison
The Daily Dot reached out on Twitter and, after some back-and-forth that included the stipulation that all chat and Twitter handles would be disguised, sat down for a Web chat with half a dozen key members of Par:AnoIA. We've given them letters of the alphabet instead of usernames.
Let's establish the tone with this excerpt from their front-page manifesto:
Thou hath interrupted our tea moment and hath made us stand up with our backs against thine wall. But hear us; we shall fight back for it is the only choice we hath left. With our whole hearts we shall support this cause. We shan't enjoy the fight but it is our only option to protect the ones that are not protected, the ones we love and for thine fairness. It is known to us thou doth not fear damage of the collateral kind and thou loveth to contain and restrict innocent peasants.
As Cryptome founder John Young pointed out, Par:AnoIA, being Anonymous, at least has a sense of humor, which differentiates it from the rest of the serious disclosure industry. As you can see from our introduction to the Web chat:
raincoaster has joined #paranoia <raincoaster> Well, I'm in. <A> lol <A> in <A> out <A> left <A> right <A> up down left right right left down up a b a b a x y
So far, so typical. Anonymous may be trying to make the world a better place, but the hacktivist collective has always been in it for the lulz, too.
“[W]e're not as srs,” C wrote in regards to Anonymous.
B wanted one thing clarified. “Let it be known that paranoia is not a hacker group.” They are a publishing group, meaning they won’t go out and create their own leaks.
The leak/disclosure community considers itself collegial, although no one else does. Quite the contrary, it can be competitive and even petty. There were no tears at WikiLeaks when rival site OpenLeaks failed to materialize. Cryptome founder John Young has taken pains to distance himself from WikiLeaks, on whose board he originally served. And, of course, whistleblowers and hackers alike are paranoid all the time, for obvious reasons.
For example, on July 12, a WikiLeaks supporter called Par:AnoIA out on Twitter for their choice of top-level domain registrar, Neustar, which Buzzfeed has called "the Keyzer Söze of surveillance," the law enforcement's data surveillance provider of choice. @Par:AnoIA, who at that point had fewer than 2,000 followers, said the whole thing was just another pointless flame war that distracted from the issue at hand.
One member explained, “To be honest, we are indifferent to WikiLeaks. They just should not start trying to tell people we host honeypots for feds.” In other words, WikiLeaks accused Par:AnoIA of being a front for the FBI, a sensitive subject given the arrest of former hacker turned informant Hector “Sabu” Monsegur.
“We don't strive to be unique; why should we?” C asked.
“We just do what we think is good and right, and i think we can do it with minimal efforts, at least in a financial sense. we are not here for competition. We don't strive to be the best. We just want to offer the best we can.”
Unlike most Anonymous projects, Par:AnoIA does ask for donations in the form of Bitcoins, an international online currency that’s difficult to trace and favored by hackers. They told us publicly that the money goes for server costs. John Young of Cryptome estimates his own server costs at around $100 per month, and he has relatively high traffic, so it’s logical to estimate their costs at less than half that.
They volunteer their time, and they volunteer a lot of it: They read each and every document that comes in. They do not edit the documents in any way, although they will not guarantee publication of every document. Archivists are philosophically split on whether their duty is owed to the documents or to the users, and Par:AnoIA clearly comes down on the side of the documents, as does Cryptome. Its redaction policy means WikiLeaks is on the other side of this prickly, barbed-wire fence.
What does that mean day-to-day? Would they refuse to release a document because it could change the world in a way they didn't like? According to the Web chat consensus, the only leak they’d withhold would be nuclear launch codes. C explained that, “Public information is better than information in secret hands. We make spies obsolete.”
They’re not relying on the general public for the leaks but rather on people within their existing networks. B said they would never run out of sources. “You always make new connections.” C added, “Our connections extend daily.”
You don’t need an engraved invitation, though, or even a Guy Fawkes mask; the site can accept submissions from anyone. The Anons dismissed the idea of accepting links via email only, for security, context, and philosophical reasons. The point is not simply to take information in, but to take it in in the original form and to also post it in a form the public can access without going through some interstitial person or process.
“You need to have a nice working site where people can just click and read and even see a summary, see evidence that this whole shit is corrupted like fuck,” C said. “Research is another vector. We do that already on a limited basis.”
The first project Par:AnoIA tackled was the Arrest Tracker, correlating all the arrests of Anons worldwide by Anon name. You’d think this would be for PR or media purposes. You’d be wrong. The Arrest Tracker is an old-school wiki (fans of Wikipedia will recognize the aesthetics) that’s thoroughly annotated, with links to newspaper reports of court appearances and schedules. C explained: “We actually started that for ourselves so we can check wtf was going on. Real names are only mentioned if disclosed in media, of course. Everything has a source. It's no foo, it's facts. I hate foo.”
The members of Par:AnoIA claimed to not have plans to monetize their content, nor did they desire to market their materials like WikiLeaks does, making media partnerships and controlling the flow of information.
“We do shit when we have time, interest .. and .. meh,” C replied. “All media are the same, 14 reader blog or Fox News. I hate the idea of elitism. Eure, some initial attention is nice.. but in the end...it's our releases that will speak.”
“I'd like see Bush & Co at the Hague...and.... something that would set Manning free,” B added, referring to alleged WikiLeaks cooperative Bradley Manning.
Knocking out private security and intel corporations like HBGary also remains a priority for the future.
C put it best, in typical chat humor: “I would like to have that document that really buttfucks the whole establishment in a bad way.
“I know it's out there, on some server, somewhere, hand us enough leaks and we will find it!”
Photo via Par:AnoIA
December 18, 2011 in Federal Bureau of Investigation
The following FBI bulletin was originally released by Anonymous on December 16, 2011.
(U//FOUO) The FBI assesses with high confidence a that law enforcement personnel and hacking victims are at risk for identity theft and harassment through a cyber technique called “doxing.” “Doxing” is a common practice among hackers in which a hacker will publicly release identifying information including full name, date of birth, address, and pictures typically retrieved from the social networking site profiles of a targeted individual.(U//FOUO) In response to law enforcement activities that have occurred against Anonymous and LulzSecc since January 2011, members of these groups have increased their interest in targeting law enforcement in retaliation for the arrests and searches conducted. Hackers and hacktivists—hackers who commit a computer crime for communicating a socially or politically motivated message—have been openly discussing these activities on Twitter and posting information pertaining to law enforcement on their Twitter accounts and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels.• (U//FOUO) In June 2011 members of Anonymous and LulzSec discussed an identified FBI agent in the IRC channel #lulzsec. The detailed information included when he or she started working for the FBI, training, assignments, and previous employment. FBI analysis suggests that this information was derived from a 2009 affidavit that was available on the Wired.com Web site.• (U//FOUO) On 26 July 2011 the Twitter account OpMonsanto, an account used by members of Anonymous, warned of the intention to “dox” FBI agents following the 19 July 2011 arrests of 16 individuals for their presumed role in Anonymous’ activities: “OpMonsanto: To any FBI agent involved in the continued unjust raiding of peaceful Anons: Expect us. You are no longer entitled to your privacy.”• (U) On 31 July 2011 more than 70 law enforcement Web sites were hacked and large amounts of confidential data was exfiltrated. These Web sites included state and local police departments that were not associated with the takedowns. The data consisted of email addresses, usernames, Social Security numbers, home addresses, phone numbers, password dumps, internal training files, informant lists, jail inmate databases, and active warrant information. Operation AntiSecd claimed that the intrusion was in response to “bogus, trumped-up charges” against the individuals associated with Anonymous’ attacks on PayPal.(U//FOUO) Recently, Anonymous members have also “doxed” the employees of companies that were victims of their previous attacks, who are perceived as working with law enforcement.• (U) In July 2011 a sealed search warrant affidavit pertaining to the 19 July takedown was available on the Internet. The affidavit contained the personal information of employees of two US companies, as well as FBI personnel. The personal information consisted of names, units, and job titles.(U) Outlook and Implications(U//FOUO) The 19 July takedown of Anonymous and LulzSec members has increased members’ interest in targeting law enforcement in retaliation for the arrests and searches conducted. As more arrests are made against suspected members of Anonymous and LulzSec, the FBI expects hacking activities and “doxing” that targets law enforcement and government interests will continue. This could compromise investigations and result in harassment and identity theft of the individuals named in the “dox.”(U//FOUO) Precautionary measures to mitigate potential harassment and identity theft risk to being “doxed” include:o Safeguarding material containing personal information pertaining to officers and named victims; o Changing passwords and do not reuse passwords for multiple accounts; o Using strong passwords; o Monitoring credit reports; o Monitoring online personal information, including what others post about you on services such as social networking sites; o Being careful when giving out contact information; and o Being aware of social engineering tactics aimed at revealing sensitive information.
(U//FOUO) The FBI assesses with high confidence a that law enforcement personnel and hacking victims are at risk for identity theft and harassment through a cyber technique called “doxing.” “Doxing” is a common practice among hackers in which a hacker will publicly release identifying information including full name, date of birth, address, and pictures typically retrieved from the social networking site profiles of a targeted individual.
(U//FOUO) In response to law enforcement activities that have occurred against Anonymous and LulzSecc since January 2011, members of these groups have increased their interest in targeting law enforcement in retaliation for the arrests and searches conducted. Hackers and hacktivists—hackers who commit a computer crime for communicating a socially or politically motivated message—have been openly discussing these activities on Twitter and posting information pertaining to law enforcement on their Twitter accounts and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels.
• (U//FOUO) In June 2011 members of Anonymous and LulzSec discussed an identified FBI agent in the IRC channel #lulzsec. The detailed information included when he or she started working for the FBI, training, assignments, and previous employment. FBI analysis suggests that this information was derived from a 2009 affidavit that was available on the Wired.com Web site.
• (U//FOUO) On 26 July 2011 the Twitter account OpMonsanto, an account used by members of Anonymous, warned of the intention to “dox” FBI agents following the 19 July 2011 arrests of 16 individuals for their presumed role in Anonymous’ activities: “OpMonsanto: To any FBI agent involved in the continued unjust raiding of peaceful Anons: Expect us. You are no longer entitled to your privacy.”
• (U) On 31 July 2011 more than 70 law enforcement Web sites were hacked and large amounts of confidential data was exfiltrated. These Web sites included state and local police departments that were not associated with the takedowns. The data consisted of email addresses, usernames, Social Security numbers, home addresses, phone numbers, password dumps, internal training files, informant lists, jail inmate databases, and active warrant information. Operation AntiSecd claimed that the intrusion was in response to “bogus, trumped-up charges” against the individuals associated with Anonymous’ attacks on PayPal.
(U//FOUO) Recently, Anonymous members have also “doxed” the employees of companies that were victims of their previous attacks, who are perceived as working with law enforcement.
• (U) In July 2011 a sealed search warrant affidavit pertaining to the 19 July takedown was available on the Internet. The affidavit contained the personal information of employees of two US companies, as well as FBI personnel. The personal information consisted of names, units, and job titles.
(U) Outlook and Implications
(U//FOUO) The 19 July takedown of Anonymous and LulzSec members has increased members’ interest in targeting law enforcement in retaliation for the arrests and searches conducted. As more arrests are made against suspected members of Anonymous and LulzSec, the FBI expects hacking activities and “doxing” that targets law enforcement and government interests will continue. This could compromise investigations and result in harassment and identity theft of the individuals named in the “dox.”
(U//FOUO) Precautionary measures to mitigate potential harassment and identity theft risk to being “doxed” include:
o Safeguarding material containing personal information pertaining to officers and named victims; o Changing passwords and do not reuse passwords for multiple accounts; o Using strong passwords; o Monitoring credit reports; o Monitoring online personal information, including what others post about you on services such as social networking sites; o Being careful when giving out contact information; and o Being aware of social engineering tactics aimed at revealing sensitive information.
Tags: Anonymous, Cybersecurity, Federal Bureau of Investigation, For Official Use Only, LulzSec 3 Comments »
Hector Xavier Monsegur used to run legendary hacker group LulzSec. Today, we found out he works for the FBI. Everybody, say hello to Sabu. posted about 8 months ago
He tweeted this about his bosses just a few days ago, and less than a week before a half-dozen of his co-conspirators were hauled away in handcuffs, thanks in no small part due to information he provided.
According to Gawker, he took his new role to heart: In February, he was arrested for trying to pass himself off as a full-fledged FBI agent.
Stuyvesant High class of 2001 REPRESENT!
He's also got two kids.
From his YouTube page: "This is the [Acura Integra] DA doing a small burnout and drive by. Stock DA's will eat niggas all day " There are dozens of these videos. Here's what he sounds like saying, "this bitch is sexy."
Sabu often used an OpenPlan.org email address. Currently, the organization is working on an open-source tracking system for NYC buses.
He couldn't even wait for the new season to start, according to his indictment. (This was actually part of one of LulzSec's hacking campaigns.)
by Nate Anderson - Nov 12 2012, 11:43am PST
Paula Broadwell, the biographer and reported mistress of CIA director David Petraeus, appears to have been a subscriber to the "private intelligence" firm Stratfor—and that means that her Stratfor login account and its hashed password were hacked and released last year by Anonymous.
The Stratfor hacker, who the US government says was Chicago-based Jeremy Hammond, obtained a complete roster of all corporate client accounts. These were released online in a massive file called stratfor_users.csv. Inside that file appear the details for one firstname.lastname@example.org, whose hashed password is listed as "deb2f7d6542130f7a1e90cf5ec607ad1."
It's not clear whether the leak was meaningful—Broadwell's Stratfor password and her actual Yahoo e-mail password might have differed—but the prevalence of password reuse raises the possibility that hackers could have accessed her Yahoo e-mail or perhaps even the Gmail account she allegedly used to correspond with Petraeus.
BuzzFeed speculated that this might have happened and that Anonymous might have had access to Broadwell's Yahoo account, at least. Security researcher Robert David Graham casts a skeptical eye on the story, though, noting that Broadwell's password was a good one that resisted obvious dictionary attacks. Graham had broken it, however, using a brute-force attack that simply tried every letter and number combination in existence, running 3.5 billion combinations per second against the password until he found it.
Given that any hacker in the world could have done this since the data leaked, and given that the password might well have been unique to Stratfor, and given that Broadwell wasn't especially in the public eye until last week, Graham concludes that it's unlikely Anonymous was somehow sitting on a gold mine of information about the Petraeus affair.
Still, the whole episode is a textbook illustration of how hashed password leaks occur, how easily the hashes are broken, and how important it is not to reuse passwords across accounts. (Seriously, don't do it if the accounts are in any way important.) If you're looking for an in-the-news example with which to encourage your dad not to set all his e-mail and banking passwords to "Elvis," look no further.
Oh—and remember to drive home the importance of both uniqueness and length. Uniqueness alone can save one leak from compromising all of one's accounts, but unique passwords can still be brute forced if they are short enough. In this case, Broadwell's eight character password took 17 hours to crack; but because "time to crack" rises dramatically as password length increases, even another digit or two can make all the difference. As Graham noted, "Had her password been one character longer, I wouldn't have cracked it."
For more information and tips to secure yourself, see our feature on password cracking from earlier this year.
Carole Cadwalladr talks to some of the 'hacktivists' and the experts who tracked them down in the deep web
by Rebecca Schoenkopf
Oh cool, Anonymous (we think it is Anonymous?) says Karl Rove was gonna vote fraud all the Machines, and that’s why he was so flabbergasted and refused to believe it when Fox called Ohio for Bamz, but they stopped him from stealing all the Machines by jamming up ORCA, because it was not actually a GOTV system but a “steal the vote” system, but they stopped him, we are pretty sure that is what the following letter, which we guess is from Anonymous probably, says. Seems legit! But here is our question! If Anonymous hacked ORCA and caused it to explode miserably on Election Day, how could Anonymous ever prove that ORCA was actually a vote-thieving program? If they hacked in, couldn’t they have planted code to make it look like Rove was gonna fraud the election? (Not that we believe for a second that Rove wasn’t trying to fraud the election, we are just saying, it seems like “logic.&rdquo
Oh, and is that Assange they’re talking about at the end? We assume that is Assange. We never did pay attention like we should have.
Sat Nov 17, 2012 at 02:47 PM PST
The hacktivist group Anonymous is claiming credit for Mitt Romney's loss, alleging that ORCA, Karl Rove's GOTV ubercomputer, was actually a vote tabulation manipulation software.
We began following the digital traffic of one Karl Rove, a disrespecter of the Rule of Law, knowing that he claimed to be Kingmaker while grifting vast wealth from barons who gladly handed him gold to anoint another king while looking the other way.After a rather short time, we identified the digital structure of Karl's operation and even that of his ORCA. This was an easy task in that barn doors were left open and his wind swept us inside.
After a rather short time, we identified the digital structure of Karl's operation and even that of his ORCA. This was an easy task in that barn doors were left open and his wind swept us inside.
But that would have allowed the damage to be done, in order to catch the criminals. Mitt Romney would have already been declared president, and it would take months of court proceedings to reverse the election, amid cries of "stealing the election!" from both sides.
Had it been effective, it would have ruined the Republican brand forever, or at least the next two years, whichever voters remember longer. Given that they were so ready to forget the failures of George W. Bush, I don't have faith in the permanence of that notion.
So the better route was to "close the barn doors" and prevent the manipulation from happening.
We coded and created, what we call The Great Oz. A targeted password protected firewall that we tested and refined over the past weeks. We placed this code on more than one of the digital tunnels and their destination that Karl's not so smart worker bees planned to use on election night. We noticed that these tunnels were strategically placed to allow tunnel rats to race to the server sewers from three different states. Ah yes, Karl tried to make it look like there were more than three but we quickly saw the folly of his ploy.
We watched as Karl's weak corrupters repeatedly tried to penetrate The Great Oz. These children of his were at a loss-how many times and how many passwords did they try-exactly 105.
Do you remember the hubris with which Karl Rove entered the election? How he was devastated and apoplectic at the Fox News brain trust for having called Ohio for Obama? Mitt Romney didn't even have a concession speech prepared, and while it's easy to chalk that up to yet another inept step in his stumbling campaign, it's easier to believe that it was a concrete example of his entitlement in action.
3:03 PM PT: H/T to Wonkette who appears to have broken the story first.
10:49 PM PT: I have waded through most of the comments and the charges that this is a Conspiracy Theory diary. The "news" aspect of this story is that someone, or someones claiming to be THE anonymous, alleges that they prevented a hacking of the vote in 3 states. I'm not saying one way or the other if this actually happened, but I do assert that a group calling themselves "anonymous" are easily capable of doing just that. There is very little original content posted here, so don't rag on me because the Orca server did not belong to Karl Rove. I'm not the one who says it did. To borrow a slogan, I report, and you decide.
LulzSec hacker Jeremy Hammond, who is accused in the Stratfor attacks could be sentenced to life in prison. The hearing was carried out in a Manhatton courtroom, where Judge Loretta Preska told Hammond that he could be sentenced to serve anywhere from 360 months-to-life, if convicted on all charges relating to last year’s Stratfor hacking.
So far, Hammond has been imprisoned for eight months without trial. And an interesting fact that came out in the entire scenario is that Judge Preska’s husband was also a victim of the Stratfor hack. What Hammond did was that he illegally obtained credit card information stolen from Stratfor and uploaded it to a server that was unbeknownst to him maintained by the federal government.
A class action suit was filed against Strafor over the breach of security, and the company settled with its customers at an estimated cost of $1.75 million. So, that’s a reason that Judge Preska may have a vested interest in seeking a prosecution. Plus, Stratfor CEO also had to resign after Wikileaks released 5M emails, where Anonymous members boasted of their partnership with Wikileaks in releasing this information.
But Anonymous group is saying that the trial against Hammond is partially unfair, and also issued a statement stating,
“Judge Loretta Preska’s impartiality is compromised by her husband’s involvement with Stratfor and a clear prejudice against Hammond exists, as evident by her statements. Judge Preska by proxy is a victim of the very crime she intends to judge Jeremy Hammond for. Judge Preska has failed to disclose the fact that her husband is a client of Stratfor and recuse herself from Jeremy’s case, therefore violating multiple sections of Title 28 of the United States Code.”“In the interest of justice, the public, media, and defense should demand Judge Preska remove herself from Hammond’s case, or if she will not, demand a superior court provide a writ of prohibition forcing her to step down. Without justice being freely, fully, and impartially administered, neither our persons, nor our rights, nor our property, can be protected.”
“Judge Loretta Preska’s impartiality is compromised by her husband’s involvement with Stratfor and a clear prejudice against Hammond exists, as evident by her statements. Judge Preska by proxy is a victim of the very crime she intends to judge Jeremy Hammond for. Judge Preska has failed to disclose the fact that her husband is a client of Stratfor and recuse herself from Jeremy’s case, therefore violating multiple sections of Title 28 of the United States Code.”
“In the interest of justice, the public, media, and defense should demand Judge Preska remove herself from Hammond’s case, or if she will not, demand a superior court provide a writ of prohibition forcing her to step down. Without justice being freely, fully, and impartially administered, neither our persons, nor our rights, nor our property, can be protected.”
“While Anonymous and its cells have gotten a lot of press, the world of hacking isn’t always sunshine and roses,” adds Kyt Dotson, HackANGLE editor. “Laws governing sentencing and damages involved in national security and other events are a strange hodgepodge of bygone eras that still think in telephones and wires–as a result, it’s very easy for a judge to ‘throw away the key.’ We can look back on Kevin Mitnick’s sentence for that.
“This era of the hacktivist, however, opens up an entire new can of worms where a multitude of sites are vulnerable to very simple attacks, the virtual crowbar through the window (without the sense of violence involved.) As a result, we’re seeing a new breed of cybercriminality rise that has a hint of mischief and that’s exactly what Anonymous latches onto.”
Add in the media frenzy surrounding anything involving Anonymous, Dotson adds, and even the smallest manifesto about a hacker who identifies with the collective can become viral. The recent trials of other hackers from LulzSec, Anonymous, and others will continue to define this era as law enforcement and the newfound underground provided by a changing social undercurrent as even more hackers arise to follow in their footsteps and carve out their own legacy.
Photo: A clipped “propaganda” illustration published to a website dedicated to raising money for the defense of alleged LulzSec hacker Jeremy Hammond. Creative Commons licensed.
Enemy of the State Article about Jeremy Hammond in The Rolling Stone (Oct 26, 2012 · PDF, 2MB · Mirror)
ARREST TRACKER FOR HACKERShttp://wiki.par-anoia.net/wiki/Main_Page
http://freehammond.org/aboutANONYMOUS FAVORS THIS SITE FOR LEAKS
Enemy of the State Article about Jeremy Hammond in The Rolling Stone (Oct 26, 2012 · PDF, 2MB · Mirror)HOW TO REACH ANONYMOUS OR GET MORE INFO
We've called him a "seed-spilling sex creep," a "pale nerd king," and "a real-life The Matrix extra," so we figured it was about time to talk to Wikileaks founder and megalomaniacal Bond villain Julian Assange. In order to promote his new book, Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet, Assange agreed to a phone interview on the condition that we speak only about the book. I agreed, which was a lie.
Cypherpunks is simply the book-length transcript of a conversation between Assange, Wikileaks activist Jacob Appelbaum, cryptography expert Andy Müller-Maguhn, and French activist Jérémie Zimmermann that took place in March 2012 (with subsequent additions and emendations). The central argument is that a new age of total electronic surveillance is dawning, which is leading us toward a "new transnational dystopia." As data storage becomes cheaper, nations are routinely vacuuming up all communication that transpires over the internet—and increasingly, all communication does transpire over the internet—for retrieval later if need be. Assange and his cohorts call this "strategic surveillance," to be distinguished from "tactical surveillance," which is the traditional let's-get-a-warrant-for-this-guy's-phone sort of spying that we're used to.
Assange, who describes himself as the "visionary behind Wikileaks" in the book's forematter, contends that he and his co-authors are at the vanguard of people who have tangled with this new surveillance regime, despite the fact that his well-publicized run-ins with the United States authorities involve a grand jury (an 846-year-old institution) issuing subpoenas (a common legal instrument) while investigating alleged violations of the Espionage Act of 1917.
Assange talked about the similarities between his own situation and that of former CIA director David Petraeus, why the New York Times and Guardian are "bootlicking" cowards, and his efforts to get a copy of his FBI file before blowing me off after about 15 minutes. He also claimed that Wikileaks, which currently offers no way for whistleblowers to securely and anonymously leak information to it—you can try "the mail," Assange told me—and has been therefore rather moribund, is releasing an average of "several thousand" documents every day.
Below is the full transcript of our conversation.
Julian Assange: Good day, John.
John Cook: Hello, Mr. Assange. Pleased to talk to you.
JA: You too.
JC: How are you doing today?
JA: I'm alright. It's been a pretty busy day as far as the book has been concerned.
JC: I can imagine. Congratulations on the book. Let me start with a question about the distinction you make between strategic and tactical surveillance. I think the grander point of the book is that we're entering an age where there's sort of the capacity for total surveillance of communications conducted through the internet, which you call strategic surveillance. But to the extent that you claim you and your co-authors are sort of representative victims of that process—do you have any evidence that this strategic surveillance, as opposed to the routine tactical surveillance you discuss, has actually been deployed against you?
JA: I mean it's—there's—the issue with strategic surveillance, and that's the new game in town, is that it's cheaper to intercept everyone and store that information and then search it than it is to work out who you want to intercept and start following them around. So the evidence for that comes out of several National Security Agency whistleblowing cases in the United States, and lawsuits surrounding that. Plus, information coming from the contracting industry worldwide, which is building mass surveillance devices, and with those devices it produces pamphlets and prospectuses that it goes to intelligence agencies with. We released, together with Privacy International and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, several hundred of those earlier this year and they speak extensively about strategic interception and describe it in the way that I've done— intercept the whole country and store the information.
JC: I gather that, but your book presents you and your co-writers as a sort of vanguard of people who are running up against this brave new world. And its seems to me that what has happened to you is that age-old, centuries-old mechanisms have been used against you. There's nothing new about subpoenas, there's nothing new about stopping people at the border and inspecting their belongings—
JA: Personally, yeah, sort of what's been happening to us personally is what happened to Petraeus personally. But that's the reason that it's easy to talk about it, is because there is some quasi-judicial process, or at least an administrative process, so there is a paper trail. For strategic interception, there is no individualized paper trail, the only paper trail that is there is on the sale of this equipment, and the funding to giant data warehouses in Utah, and statements by National Security Agency whistleblowers, and enabling legislation that has been put through in several countries. There is no individualized paper trail, because it is strategic interception—it's everyone. That's the whole idea, is you don't need to get a warrant to go after a specific person because you're after them all.
There is actually