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hannah

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Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #51 
0948.pdf              RATS: Guide to Protection Against Informants     November 30, 2012

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https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

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Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #52 

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Observation/Surveillance

December 7, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • October 15, 2012

(U//FOUO) Terrorists often conduct physical surveillance to identify suitable targets, determine vulnerabilities, plan attack methods, or assess the target’s security posture.  In March 2010, David Coleman Headley pled guilty for his role in the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India by conducting video and photographic surveillance of potential targets, as well as later surveilling Danish newspaper offices–the target of another attack plot.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists might exhibit during planning or actual attacks. Although none were linked to terrorist activity, we consider the examples relevant for situational awareness and training:

- (U//FOUO) A city utility company reported suspicious surveillance activity at a hydroelectric plant.  On six occasions within a three-day period, two vehicles of the same color, make, and model (but with different license plate numbers) were observed traveling slowly on the road adjacent to the plant, stopping at specific posts on the property, turning around, and slowly returning in the other direction.
- (U//FOUO) A prominent hotel in a major metropolitan area reported a male and a female photographing the hotel entrances from a vehicle with Canadian license plates.  Security camera footage showed the vehicle moved at lease twice to different locations around the hotel while the passenger took photos of the hotel and surrounding restaurants and the driver on a clipboard.  No additional information regarding this incident is available.

(U) Possible Indicators of Observation/Surveillance

(U//FOUO) The following may indicate suspicious observation/surveillance activity and should be reported to appropriate authorities, but context (time, location, personal behaviors, and other indicators) should be carefully considered to rule out legitimate, non-suspicious activities:

- (U//FOUO) Unusual, repeated, or prolonged observation of infrastructure (for example, with binoculars or video cameras);
- (U//FOUO) Taking notes or measurements, counting places, sketching floor plans, maps, or diagrams;
- (U//FOUO) Scrutinizing security personnel, shift changes, or facility activities; or
- (U//FOUO) Extended loitering without explanation, particularly in concealed locations with optimal visibility or potential targets.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).


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USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #53 

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Materials Acquisition/Storage

December 4, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 7, 2012

(U//FOUO) Terrorists overseas and in domestic attack plots have used various methods to acquire and store materials necessary to construct explosives. Najibullah Zazi, who pled guilty in 2010 to plotting to attack the New York subway system, made multiple, large-quantity purchases of chemical components needed to assemble the homemade explosive Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP)—6 bottles on one day and 12 bottles on a separate day—at beauty supply stores throughout the summer of 2009. Law enforcement and first responders should be aware that the possession, storage, or attempt to acquire unusual quantities of laboratory equipment, personal protective equipment, chemicals, and flammable accelerants—although legal to purchase and own—could provide indicators of preoperational attack planning.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents reported to the NSI shared space demonstrate types of suspicious material acquisition and storage that could be indicative of preoperational activity and attack planning. While none were ultimately linked to terrorist activity, they are cited as examples for awareness and training purposes:

— (U//FOUO) A tip prompted police to search a residential property where they discovered TATP; bomb components such as fuses and pipes; laboratory equipment such as coolers and beakers; and precursor chemicals including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, hydrochloric acid, black/smokeless powder, glycerin, and aluminum powders.
— (U//FOUO) An individual contacted a home improvement store requesting to purchase 15 gallons of 35 percent food-grade hydrogen peroxide, a substance that can be used in making homemade explosives such as TATP and Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine.

(U) Possible Indicators of Suspicious Materials Acquisition and Storage

(U//FOUO) The following activities can indicate storage or efforts to acquire materials for potentially illicit purposes. Depending on the context—type and quantity of materials, reason for possession, personal behaviors, and other indicators— suspicious activities associated with acquisition or storage of materials should be reported to appropriate authorities.

— (U//FOUO) Individuals with signs of chemical exposure, including inhalation and skin burns.
— (U//FOUO) Non-agricultural chemical impact on foliage in close proximity of a residence or a business.
— (U//FOUO) Possession or attempts by individuals to acquire unusual quantities of materials used to produce explosives inconsistent with their stated purpose, business, or purchase history.
— (U//FOUO) Presence of precursor materials and protective/specialized handling equipment in residential dwellings or chemical containers and laboratory equipment discarded in residential neighborhoods.
— (U//FOUO) Presence of metal or plastic drums for storing chemicals, foul odors or caustic fumes coming from room or building, large industrial fans in windows at odd times of year.

(U//FOUO) Additionally, attempts to acquire official or fabricated uniforms, badges, access cards, or identification credentials or officially marked vehicles should be reported.


__________________
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Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #54 

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Photography

December 6, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 13, 2012

(U//FOUO) Terrorists and criminals may use photos or videos of potential targets to gain insight into security operations and details of facility operations, including traffic flow through and around facilities, opening times, and access requirements. In late 2000 and early 2001, convicted al-Oa’ida operative Dhiren Barot took extensive video footage and numerous photographs of sites in downtown New York City and Washington, DC in preparation for planned attacks. Photographs and video useful in planning an attack may include facility security devices (surveillance cameras, security locks, metal detectors, jersey walls and planters); security personnel; facility entrances and exits; and other features such as lighting, access routes, gates, roads, walkways, and bridges.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents reported to the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) shared space demonstrate types of suspicious photography and videography consistent with pre-operational activity and attack planning. Although none were ultimately linked to terrorist activity, they are cited as examples for awareness and training purposes:

(U//FOUO) An individual took photographs of several buildings, a control tower, and lighting system poles associated with an elevated runway approach at an aviation facility.

(U//FOUO) An individual was encountered videotaping in a well-known retail complex while in the garage. The individual had video of the building’s ventilating system. The individual was
arrested when he returned to the area after; having been directed to leave.

(U//FOUO) An individual took photos and video in a mall while holding the phone close to his body at waist level. The photographs and video footage included the mall storefronts, upper mall structures, bridges, exit doors, and closed-circuit television cameras.

(U//FOUO) Indicators of Potentially Suspicious Photography

(U//FOUO) The following activities are consistent with suspicious photography. Although a single indicator may not be suspicious, one or more in combination may signify suspicious activity:

- (U//FOUO) Photography or videography focused on security features, including cameras, security personnel, gates, and barriers.
- (U//FOUO) Repeated visits by the same individual(s) taking photographs or video of vulnerable features, or security features of critical infrastructure.
- (U//FOUO) Individuals encountered with photographs of critical infrastructure, iconic buildings, or other sites not of tourist interest.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).


__________________
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Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
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Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #55 

(U//LES) FBI Sovereign Citizen Extremists Targeting Law Enforcement Creates Potential for Violent Traffic Stops

December 4, 2012 in Federal Bureau of Investigation

Recent Sovereign Citizen Extremist Targeting of Law Enforcement Highlights Potential for Violence during Traffic Stops

  • 5 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • June 1, 2012

(U//LES) The FBI assesses with medium confidence, based on reliable source reporting and reports from other law enforcement agencies, some sovereign citizen extremistsb are making more specific plans to interfere with state and local law enforcement officers during traffic stops and, in some cases, intentionally initiating contact with law enforcement. The FBI assesses with medium confidence that a shift from reacting to law enforcement scrutiny1,2 to targeting police officers indicates an increased interest in harassing and intimidating police and may lead to potentially hostile confrontations.

(U) Targeting Law Enforcement

(U//LES) Some sovereign citizen extremists have recently initiated contact with police officers, which the FBI assesses are attempts to harass officers. This assessment is based on sovereign citizen extremists’ past attempts to intimidate law enforcement and ideologically based distrust of government officials. If correct, this suggests a heightened interest among extremists in attempting to harass and intimidate law enforcement.

• (U) In April 2012, Arkansas law enforcement officers pulled over a self-proclaimed sovereign citizen. According to a news report, the man’s wife drove to the scene, told officers they had no right to arrest her husband, and said officers were committing “treason.” A struggle began and an officer used a Taser to subdue the man.

• (U//LES) In March 2012, self-described sovereign citizens in California demanded that law enforcement officers fill out a “Public Servant’s Questionnaire” during a traffic stop, with space for officers’ personal information. According to an officer of another law enforcement agency, sovereign citizens used the questionnaire to buy time and call others to the scene, who recorded the incident and made unreasonable demands.

• (U//LES) During a February 2012 traffic stop in Oregon involving a Republic for the united States of America (RuSA) [sic] member, the driver of a second vehicle traveled backward on a highway, parked, and became confrontational with the officers conducting the traffic stop, according to an officer of another law enforcement agency. The man, also a RuSA member, continued to approach even after officers ordered him to stop, but the incident ended peacefully.

• (U//LES) In December 2011, a self-described sovereign citizen followed an Arkansas state trooper and made a series of violations to deliberately initiate a traffic stop. The individual was hostile, and used a Bluetooth headset to speak to an unknown person during the stop. An unidentified driver of a second vehicle arrived at the scene, but the driver did not interact with the officer conducting the traffic stop.

(U) Plans to Target Law Enforcement Officers or Provide Armed Response to “Emergencies”

(U//LES) Some sovereign citizen extremist groups aspire to implement Ranger programs and other plans to respond to perceived law enforcement abuses. Given limited assets, the FBI assesses with high confidence complete implementation is unlikely. But the nature of these plans and beliefs that sovereign citizen extremists are legitimate law enforcement officers suggests even small or poorly funded versions of these plans have the potential for violence.

• (U) In March and April 2012, the RuSA released an American Ranger Plan to stand up full-time, armed Rangers authorized to use deadly force during official duty. Part of the plan details scenarios in which Rangers are authorized to act. Scenarios included negotiating with law enforcement for release of incarcerated RuSA members and using “all force necessary” to extract members from jail if negotiations fail, and responding to traffic stops, evictions, and “roadside piracy.” RuSA members determined these “scenarios” would not be released to the public, according to a source who has reported reliably in the past.

• (U//LES) As of late 2011, sovereign citizen extremists bought out-of-service police vehicles and trained to target police, according to officers of another law enforcement agency.

• (U//FOUO) Over the past several years, sovereign citizen extremist groups in Montana and Alaska sought to establish the Liberty Bell Network, a communications system designed to summon numerous armed group members to “emergencies,” according to reliable sources. In February 2012, a RuSA member in Arizona recommended the group implement a similar system because it worked well in Alaska.

Related Material From the Archive:

  1. (U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Advisory: Homegrown Violent Extremists Targeting Law-Enforcement Officers
  2. (U//FOUO) FBI-DHS Sovereign Citizen Group Calls for Removal of U.S. Governors
  3. Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC) Sovereign Citizen Movement
  4. (U//FOUO//LES) NGIC Gangs Targeting Law Enforcement for Weapons Theft
  5. (U//LES) FBI Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit Introduction to Sovereign Citizens
  6. (U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Mobilizing Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) Behavioral Indicators
  7. (U//FOUO/LES) LulzSec Release: Arizona Fusion Center Sovereign Citizens and Militia Information
  8. (U) US-Based Street Gangs a Potential Recruiting Pool for Terrorist Groups

__________________
Test your connection for leaks:
http://ip-check.info/?lang=en

Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
http://www.rmprepusb.com/

Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #56 

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Acquisition of Expertise

December 10, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ROLL CALL RELEASE

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • October 5, 2012

(U//FOUO) Terrorists may attempt to gain skills and knowledge necessary to plan and execute attacks by obtaining specialized training, soliciting or stealing technical and proprietary information, or reaching out to academics and experts. In 2007, German police arrested three terrorist suspects for allegedly planning and preparing car bomb attacks against US citizens and interests in Germany. The suspects traveled to Pakistan where they received weapons and explosives training from a Pakistan-based Uzbek jihadist group called the Islamic Jihad Union.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists might exhibit during pre-operational stages for attacks. While none were ultimately linked to terrorist activity, they are cited as relevant examples for awareness and training purposes:

- (U//FOUO) A university professor of cellular and molecular biology reported receiving an e-mail with a request for information about producing and disseminating a bacterial toxin. The individual requesting the information claimed to be working on an academic assignment, but would not disclose the university she represented or the details of her assignment

- (U//FOUO) An employee of an aerospace engineering consulting company received a call from an individual seeking to understand how to construct a box that could shield terahertz frequencies, which are used in mail screening and imaging to detect hidden objects and determine chemical and bio-agent composition.

(U) Possible Indicators of Suspicious Attempts to Acquire Expertise

(U//FOUO) The following activities can indicate efforts to acquire expertise for potentially illicit purposes.  Depending upon the context of the situation–reason for seeking the information, personal behaviors, and other indicators–suspicious inquiries should be reported to the appropriate authorities.

- (U//FOUO) Inquiries by individuals with no apparent need for technical or scientific knowledge that may lead to exploitation of vulnerabilities.
- (U//FOUO) Possession of blue prints, architectural diagrams, and facility information by individuals with no demonstrated need for the information
- (U//FOUO) Extensive research on a subject, such as explosive-making methodologies and guidance, which would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person.
- (U//FOUO) Seeking weapons training and conducting paramilitary exercises, particularly by individuals who are unwilling to provide an explanation for acquiring combat skills.

(U//FOUO) First Ammendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used in specific subject descriptions).


__________________
Test your connection for leaks:
http://ip-check.info/?lang=en

Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
http://www.rmprepusb.com/

Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #57 

National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds

December 12, 2012 in Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The following report was released December 10, 2012 by the National Intelligence Council.  A condensed version of the report is also available (1.17 MB PDF).

Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds

  • 160 pages
  • December 2012
  • 20.5 MB

This report is intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories during the next 15-20 years. As with the NIC’s previous Global Trends reports, we do not seek to predict the future—which would be an impossible feat—but instead provide a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.

The world of 2030 will be radically transformed from our world today. By 2030, no country—whether the US, China, or any other large country—will be a hegemonic power. The empowerment of individuals and diffusion of power among states and from states to informal networks will have a dramatic impact, largely reversing the historic rise of the West since 1750, restoring Asia’s weight in the global economy, and ushering in a new era of “democratization” at the international and domestic level. In addition to individual empowerment and the diffusion of state power, we believe that two other megatrends will shape our world out to 2030: demographic patterns, especially rapid aging; and growing resource demands which, in the cases of food and water, might lead to scarcities. These trends, which are virtually certain, exist today, but during the next 15-20 years they will gain much greater momentum. Underpinning the megatrends are tectonic shifts—critical changes to key features of our global environment that will affect how the world “works” (see table on page v).

Extrapolations of the megatrends would alone point to a changed world by 2030—but the world could be transformed in radically different ways. We believe that six key game-changers—questions regarding the global economy, governance, conflict, regional instability, technology, and the role of the United States—will largely determine what kind of transformed world we will inhabit in 2030. Several potential Black Swans—discrete events—would cause large-scale disruption (see page xi). All but two of these—the possibility of a democratic China or a reformed Iran—would have negative repercussions. Based upon what we know about the megatrends and the possible interactions between the megatrends and the game-changers, we have delineated four archetypal futures that represent distinct pathways for the world out to 2030. None of these alternative worlds is inevitable. In reality, the future probably will consist of elements from all the scenarios.

Megatrends and Related Tectonic Shifts

Megatrend 1: Individual Empowerment

Individual empowerment will accelerate substantially during the next 15-20 years owing to poverty reduction and a huge growth of the global middle class, greater educational attainment, and better health care. The growth of the global middle class constitutes a tectonic shift: for the first time, a majority of the world’s population will not be impoverished, and the middle classes will be the most important social and economic sector in the vast majority of countries around the world. Individual empowerment is the most important megatrend because it is both a cause and effect of most other trends—including the expanding global economy, rapid growth of the developing countries, and widespread exploitation of new communications and manufacturing technologies. On the one hand, we see the potential for greater individual initiative as key to solving the mounting global challenges over the next 15-20 years. On the other hand, in a tectonic shift, individuals and small groups will have greater access to lethal and disruptive technologies (particularly precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments, and bioterror weaponry), enabling them to perpetrate large-scale violence—a capability formerly the monopoly of states.

Megatrend 2: Diffusion of Power

The diffusion of power among countries will have a dramatic impact by 2030. Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size, military spending, and technological investment. China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030. In a tectonic shift, the health of the global economy increasingly will be linked to how well the developing world does—more so than the traditional West. In addition to China, India, and Brazil, regional players such as Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey will become especially important to the global economy. Meanwhile, the economies of Europe, Japan, and Russia are likely to continue their slow relative declines.

The shift in national power may be overshadowed by an even more fundamental shift in the nature of power. Enabled by communications technologies, power will shift toward multifaceted and amorphous networks that will form to influence state and global actions. Those countries with some of the strongest fundamentals—GDP, population size, etc.—will not be able to punch their weight unless they also learn to operate in networks and coalitions in a multipolar world.

Megatrend 3: Demographic Patterns

We believe that in the world of 2030—a world in which a growing global population will have reached somewhere close to 8.3 billion people (up from 7.1 billion in 2012)—four demographic trends will fundamentally shape, although not necessarily determine, most countries’ economic and political conditions and relations among countries. These trends are: aging—a tectonic shift for both for the West and increasingly most developing countries; a still-significant but shrinking number of youthful societies and states; migration, which will increasingly be a cross-border issue; and growing urbanization—another tectonic shift, which will spur economic growth but could put new strains on food and water resources. Aging countries will face an uphill battle in maintaining their living standards. Demand for both skilled and unskilled labor will spur global migration. Owing to rapid urbanization in the developing world, the volume of urban construction for housing, office space, and transport services over the next 40 years could roughly equal the entire volume of such construction to date in world history.

Megatrend 4: Growing Food, Water, and Energy Nexus

Demand for food, water, and energy will grow by approximately 35, 40, and 50 percent respectively owing to an increase in the global population and the consumption patterns of an expanding middle class. Climate change will worsen the outlook for the availability of these critical resources. Climate change analysis suggests that the severity of existing weather patterns will intensify, with wet areas getting wetter and dry and arid areas becoming more so. Much of the decline in precipitation will occur in the Middle East and northern Africa as well as western Central Asia, southern Europe, southern Africa, and the US Southwest.

We are not necessarily headed into a world of scarcities, but policymakers and their private sector partners will need to be proactive to avoid such a future. Many countries probably won’t have the wherewithal to avoid food and water shortages without massive help from outside. Tackling problems pertaining to one commodity won’t be possible without affecting supply and demand for the others. Agriculture is highly dependent on accessibility to adequate sources of water as well as on energy-rich fertilizers. Hydropower is a significant source of energy for some regions while new sources of energy—such as biofuels—threaten to exacerbate the potential for food shortages. There is as much scope for negative tradeoffs as there is the potential for positive synergies. Agricultural productivity in Africa, particularly, will require a sea change to avoid shortages. Unlike Asia and South America, which have achieved significant improvements in agricultural production per capita, Africa has only recently returned to 1970s’ levels.

One Response to National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds

  1. General Wesley Clark: Because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9/11.

    About ten days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, “Sir, you’ve got to come in and talk to me a second.” I said, “Well, you’re too busy.” He said, “No, no.” He says, “We’ve made the decision we’re going to war with Iraq.” This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, “We’re going to war with Iraq? Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” He said, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?” He said, “No, no.” He says, “There’s nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq.” He said, “I guess it’s like we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but we’ve got a good military and we can take down governments.” And he said, “I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail.”


__________________
Test your connection for leaks:
http://ip-check.info/?lang=en

Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
http://www.rmprepusb.com/

Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #58 

(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Special Report: IED Targeting of First Response Personnel

December 12, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Center, U.S. Navy

The following report prepared by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Department of Homeland Security and Office of Naval Intelligence was obtained from the website of the National Volunteer Fire Council.  The document has since been removed from the website.

Worldwide: IED Targeting of First Response Personnel—Tactics and Indicators

  • 8 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 7, 2012

(U) Key Findings

(U//FOUO) Although most terrorist IED attacks outside war zones target civilians or symbols of authority and usually involve a single device, some are designed specifically to target emergency response personnel. The most common tactics involve using secondary or tertiary devices in tiered or sequential attacks intended to kill or maim response personnel after they arrive on the scene of an initial IED incident.

• The extent of government control in the intended target zone is a critical variable in operational planning for attacks against first responders. Whether attackers have sufficient access to the target area to gain familiarity with the landscape, the presence of police or other security forces, and even possibly their emergency response procedures are significant factors in attack preparation.

• Terrorists who are well-versed in the render-safe procedures used by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams are the most likely to construct secondary devices capable of defeating techniques to defuse or destroy them.

(U//FOUO) There is widespread concern about the availability of information in online manuals, videos, and extremist discussion forums on IED design and tactics that can be used by plotters in Western countries—including the US.

• Only one Homeland attack plot by homegrown violent extremists (HVEs)a in recent years was intended to specifically target first responders, but a successful Homeland attack may be imitated once it is publicized in the media. • Growing awareness of the tactics and techniques used by terrorists elsewhere in the world— particularly in East Africa, South Asia, and Yemen —could motivate HVEs and other Homeland adversaries to deliberately plot attacks that target first responders.

• The targeting of EOD personnel during execution of render-safe and exploitation procedures represents a higher level of adversary tactical sophistication that could provide an early indication of the need to reassess the Homeland IED threat environment.

(U//FOUO) Targeting Responders Depends on Context

(U//FOUO) All incidents involving IEDs, including those that fail or are a hoax, draw emergency responders to handle any casualties, secure the area, deactivate or dispose of other potential explosive devices, and begin the process of investigative forensics. Although most terrorist IED attacks target civilians or symbols of authority and usually involve a single device, some devices encountered outside war zones are designed specifically to target emergency response personnel. Motivations for targeting first responders are highly dependent on context.

• In countries coping with insurgencies or political unrest that result in a sustained level of violence, responders may be deliberately targeted to counter their capabilities to deal with attacks by the armed opposition. Insurgents in the Iraq and Afghanistan war zones primarily target first responders—military police and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel—to degrade their ability to counter the insurgent’s primary weapon of choice, the IED. Insurgents in countries like Thailand—where the primary focus is to counter government rule or occupation—most likely attack first responders because they represent the ruling government.

• Criminal organizations under law enforcement or military pressure—such as drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in countries like Mexico and Colombia—may attack first responders to deter or inhibit disruption operations against them.

• Terrorist groups or individual extremists with ideological agendas may target responders deliberately to enhance the magnitude of their terror attack, creating increased fear and media attention by demonstrating that even would-be rescuers are vulnerable to attack.

(U//FOUO) The extent of government control in the intended target zone is a critical variable in operational planning for attacks against first responders. Whether attackers have sufficient access to the target area to gain familiarity with the landscape, the presence of police or other security forces, and even possibly their emergency response procedures are significant factors in attack preparation. Freedom of access also allows time to set up the attack, which is particularly important if multiple devices are to be employed. Attacks against responders have been particularly successful where an adaptive adversary is able to control the response environment and rely on support from local populations, either through cooperation or coercion. A pervasive security presence or particular vigilance by local citizens or police forces may not prevent conducting a single attack targeting civilians but could make it much more difficult to specifically target response personnel.

(U//FOUO) Unconstrained Diffusion of Tactics and Techniques Proliferates Knowledge

(U//FOUO) Information on IED design and tactics has become available to plotters in Western countries—including the US—who might then employ options, such as tiered attacks targeting emergency responders, they otherwise might not have considered. Explosives training manuals, extremist literature such as Inspire magazine, and Internet videos and chat rooms are widely disseminated. Violent extremists making available knowledge of EOD procedures and countermeasures could facilitate and significantly enhance the capability of terrorists to lure responders into IED ambushes and construct devices that would detonate as authorities tried to contain or deactivate them. A successful attack against responders may be imitated once publicized in the media.

• The diffusion of IED design information and tactics is not bound by geographic or motivational constraints. A review of bombmaking publications available on the Internet or in printed form dating back to the 1960s illustrates that an extremist can readily access a wide variety of manuals detailing EOD procedures and information on how to build victim-operated IEDs.

• Manuals, videos, and forum discussions are not complete substitutes for practical experience in IED emplacement, however; evidence of handson training and IED testing by terrorists in Western countries could give security services and law enforcement indicators of possible attack plotting.

(U//FOUO) Terrorists interested in conducting complex IED attacks, including deliberately targeting emergency personnel responding to an initial IED attack, can also learn from the examples of groups that have such experience in high-threat Western environments, some of whom are willing to provide expert training or instruction. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombmakers in the UK in the early 1990s created and employed a wide array of IED switches intended to reduce the effectiveness of security forces by targeting British and Irish EOD and response personnel, according to military reporting.


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2012 Ishmael Jones (P) on The Human Factor

Amazon Page

REACTION TO:  2012 Robert Steele: The Human Factor & The Human Environment: Concepts & Doctrine? Implications for Human & Open Source Intelligence 2.0

Ishmael Jones (a pseudonym) is a very experienced non-official cover (NOC) officer who left the CIA and wrote an excellent book, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture (Encounter Books, 2008).  The lessons from his experience are available directly from him to DoD clients that wish to avoid CIA’s many mistakes.

Hello Robert, thanks for your note and I comment as follows:

I certainly agree with Tom on bad management being the cause of poor intelligence collection. Bad management in the intelligence field thrives within bureaucracy, which is easy to create in the Washington, DC area. Today, more than 90% of CIA employees live and work entirely within the United States because bad management finds it convenient to do so. Employees learn skills which advance them within bureaucracy but which do not contribute to intelligence gathering. The lack of on-the ground focus on foreign lands leaves major intelligence gaps unfilled.

Best regards, Ishmael Jones

2012 Tom Briggs on The Human Factor


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2012 Tom Briggs on The Human Factor

Thomas Leo Briggs

REACTION TO:  2012 Robert Steele: The Human Factor & The Human Environment: Concepts & Doctrine? Implications for Human & Open Source Intelligence 2.0

Tom Briggs is a former CIA clandestine case officer with an excellent book to his credit, Cash on Delivery: CIA Special Operations During the Secret War in Laos (Rosebank Press, 2009).  Before joining CIA he was the Provost Marshall (sheriff) for 25,000 US personnel operating in Cam Ranh Bay, Viet-Nam.

Robert,

As I hope you remember, I started my time in info technology in requirements after many years in operations.  I learned that when you ask someone what his requirements are he most often begins to include his solutions, e.g. we need a computer database to help us keep weapons from being smuggled into this country.  My response was you don’t know if you need a computer until you tell me what data you have, what data you might be able to collect but are not collecting, and what questions you want to ask that the data might be able to help you answer.  It was hard to keep them off solutions and focused on what they knew and what they wanted to know. As I read Part IV, 01 Requirements Definition, I thought of my experience and wondered whether the definitions were being simplified to their very basics.  A colleague and I wrote the very first requirements for automating the DO.  When the IBM programmers with the contract read them they sneered and said, ‘these are high level requirements, we need to have the requirements that tell us exactly how to build the automated system’.  My colleague and I said, if you don’t understand the high level requirements, how can you begin to write the specific requirements?  Thus, the first specific things that were developed for the automated DO system were faulty in many ways. The programmers excluded my colleague and I from their deliberations as THEY wrote the specific requirements, and no one in management thought there was anything wrong with that.

My colleague was the one who named the highest level requirements.  He called one ‘author’.  He didn’t say we needed to write cables, or memos or whatever, he said we needed a computer based author capability and proceeded to outline in general the authoring needs.  I don’t remember the other 4 or 5 categories but they were similar.

So, I wonder if we really ‘assign’ requirements to humint or osint or techint?  Should we have ‘high level’ requirements from policy makers or military commanders and then figure out which int can collect on them, or, let them all collect and see whose information is the most relevant and useful?  I am talking mostly about operations, but except for acquisition of which I know not much, I think I am also talking to strategy and policy.

I read through your ‘conversation’ once and the above represents the one thing I wanted to say right away.  There are other things to say, but I can’t do it in well ‘fell swoop’ as you often do.  I need to rest to read your ‘conversation’ again and see what else I might add.

Almost any problem you can name in the intel community begins with bad management.  Even if you have an excellent manager, it is only until he moves on, and the odds are good he will be replaced with a much lesser manager.  I guess I tend to have a negative attitude.

That’s all for now.

-Tom

 

Phi Beta Iota:  Emphasis added.  What has become clear over the past 40 years is that the US intelligence community is no longer managed, it is “clerked.”  Managers are poorly educated, out of touch with reality, and more or less operating on automatic pilot folllowing predecessor models.  “This is what we have always done.”  Along the way nuances are lost, the ability to do original thinking is lost, and we end up with a bureaucracy whose primary purpose is to perpetuate itself and ideally to expand so the top clerks can get yet one more promotion.  No one is actually focused on outcomes — on being so compellingly relevant to strategy, policy, acquisition, and operations that they cannot be ignored as they are now.


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U.K. Crown Prosecution Service Guidelines for Prosecuting Social Media Communications

December 23, 2012 in United Kingdom

These guidelines set out the approach that prosecutors should take when making decisions in relation to cases where it is alleged that criminal offences have been committed by the sending of a communication via social media. The guidelines are designed to give clear advice to prosecutors who have been asked either for a charging decision or for early advice to the police, as well as in reviewing those cases which have been charged by the police. Adherence to these guidelines will ensure that there is a consistency of approach across the CPS.

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Radiological Terrorism Incident After-Action Reporting Guide

December 20, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

This Reference Aid was jointly produced by DHS and the FBI to assist in the acquisition of detailed information in the aftermath of a successful or attempted radiological terrorism incident that would be of interest to the national law enforcement and emergency response communities. It is intended to help state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies and private sector entities deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.

(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Indicators of Suspicious Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Activity

December 19, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Law enforcement and first responders may encounter chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) related material or equipment at private residences, businesses, or other sites not normally associated with such activities. There are legitimate reasons for possessing such material or equipment, but in some cases their presence can indicate intent or capability to build CBR weapons, particularly when other suspicious circumstances exist.


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National Counterintelligence Executive Specifications for Constructing Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

December 31, 2012 in National Counterintelligence Executive

The following technical specification for the construction of sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) is available online via the website of several construction companies as well as the U.S. Navy.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES

  • IC Tech Spec‐for ICD/ICS 705
  • October 31, 2011

This Intelligence Community (IC) Technical Specification sets forth the physical and technical security specifications and best practices for meeting standards of Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-1 (Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities). When the technical specifications herein are applied to new construction and renovations of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), they shall satisfy the standards outlined in ICS 705-1 to enable uniform and reciprocal use across all IC elements and to assure information sharing to the greatest extent possible. This document is the implementing specification for Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Physical and Technical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-1) and Standards for Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-2) and supersedes Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9.

The specifications contained herein will facilitate the protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) against compromising emanations, inadvertent observation and disclosure by unauthorized persons, and the detection of unauthorized entry.

A. Analytical Risk Management Process

1. The Accrediting Official (AO) and the Site Security Manager (SSM) should evaluate each proposed SCIF for threats, vulnerabilities, and assets to determine the most efficient countermeasures required for physical and technical security. In some cases, based upon that risk assessment, it may be determined that it is more practical or efficient to mitigate a standard. In other cases, it may be determined that additional security measures should be employed due to a significant risk factor.

2. Security begins when the initial requirement for a SCIF is known. To ensure the integrity of the construction and final accreditation, security plans should be coordinated with the AO before construction plans are designed, materials ordered, or contracts let.

a) Security standards shall apply to all proposed SCI facilities and shall be coordinated with the AO for guidance and approval. Location of facility construction and or fabrication does not exclude a facility from security standards and or review and approval by the AO. SCI facilities include but are not limited to fixed facilities, mobile platforms, prefabricated structures, containers, modular applications or other new or emerging applications and technologies that may meet performance standards for use in SCI facility construction.

b) Mitigations are verifiable, non-standard methods that shall be approved by the AO to effectively meet the physical/technical security protection level(s) of the standard. While most standards may be effectively mitigated via non-standard construction, additional security countermeasures and/or procedures, some standards are based upon tested and verified equipment (e.g., a combination lock meeting Federal Specification FF-L 2740A) chosen because of special attributes and could not be mitigated with non-tested equipment. The AO’s approval is documented to confirm that the mitigation is at least equal to the physical/technical security level of the standard.

c) Exceeding a standard, even when based upon risk, requires that a waiver be processed and approved in accordance with ICD 705.

3. The risk management process includes a critical evaluation of threats, vulnerability, and assets to determine the need and value of countermeasures. The process may include the following:

a) Threat Analysis. Assess the capabilities, intentions, and opportunity of an adversary to exploit or damage assets or information. Reference the threat information provided in the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA) produced by the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) for inside the U.S. and/or the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), Security Environment Threat List (SETL) for outside the U.S. to determine technical threat to a location. When evaluating for TEMPEST, the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authorities (CTTA) shall use the National Security Agency Information Assurance (NSA IA) list as an additional resource for specific technical threat information. It is critical to identify other occupants of common and adjacent buildings. (However, do not attempt to collect information against U.S. persons in violation of Executive Order (EO) 12333.) In areas where there is a diplomatic presence of high and critical threat countries, additional countermeasures may be necessary.

b) Vulnerability Analysis. Assess the inherent susceptibility to attack of a procedure, facility, information system, equipment, or policy.

c) Probability Analysis. Assess the probability of an adverse action, incident, or attack occurring.

d) Consequence Analysis. Assess the consequences of such an action (expressed as a measure of loss, such as cost in dollars, resources, programmatic effect/mission impact, etc.).


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Download a copy of the report here:


https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-winter2013-sar/
(U//FOUO) DHS Intelligence and Analysis Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Topics of Interest Winter 2013

March 1, 2013 in Department of Homeland Security

Winter 2013: DHS/I&A Analyst Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Topics of Interest

1 page
For Official Use Only
January 2013

Download

(U//FOUO) DHS/I&A is interested in the following SAR topics, which have been updated based on current issues of national interest. Previous topics remain relevant, and law enforcement, first responders, and other homeland security professionals should continue to submit reports on these issues. Per the SAR Functional Standard, only information validated as reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism should be reported as a SAR. I&A is reviewing SAR reports on these topics but would welcome any additional context, ideas or local analysis on these topics and opportunities for joint production. We will discuss key findings and assessments during scheduled HS-SLIC Weekly threat briefs.

(U//FOUO) Reports of threats to religious or cultural facilities. Reports of surveillance; verbal or telephonic threats of violence; trespassing; property damage, including vandalism or arson; or tests of security at religious or cultural facilities. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.4.2.20 Targets of elicitation – Specific sites]

(U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious activities or incidents associated with state, local, tribal, territorial, or private sector computer networks and Web sites. Reports of denial of service (DoS) attacks against Web sites; Web page defacement; physical entry resulting in unauthorized access to computer networks or hardware; suspicious e-mails that install malware on the network; data exfiltration, or other unusual network access or activity, where there are indicators that the cyber incident is reasonably indicative of links to terrorism. [HSEC-1 CYBER ATTACKS AND EXPLOITATION: HSEC-1.3 Suspicious activities and behaviors, HSEC-1.10 Incidents]

(U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious activities or incidents associated with mass gatherings, and special events. Reporting on observed casing activities; breaches or attempted intrusions at event locations or related venues; suspicious inquiries about security protocols for events or VIPs; testing of security; expressed or implied threats to specific events; incidents of suspicious acquisition of explosive precursor materials; or findings of caches or unusual amounts of weapons or explosives. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.4.2.21 Targets of elicitation – Special events].

(U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious activities, queries, theft, sabotage, tampering, or vandalism within the transportation sector—including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground and surface, rail, and pipeline systems. Reporting on attempts to elicit information such as unusual questions about routes, capacities, peak travel time, training, and security; suspicious behavior by passengers or employees; testing of security; and expressed or implied threats by individuals or groups towards this sector. Reporting on the theft, loss, or diversion of personnel identification or credentials, uniforms, equipment, or training materials. Reporting on sabotage or loss of knowledge-based materials for maintenance of fleet. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.4.2.17 Targets of elicitation – Transportation sector]

(U//FOUO) Reports of efforts to artfully conceal improvised explosive devices in innocuous items, such as satchels, backpacks, suitcases, jars, bottles, cans, shoes, clothing, parcels, or toys. Reporting on potential security probes by individuals trying to enter secure areas with devices that resemble explosive devices. Reporting on unsolicited or unusual parcels delivered from unfamiliar overseas addresses, noting the identification of the sender and recipient and whether the recipient has reported multiple suspicious parcels in recent weeks or months. Reporting on the use of special materials, such as lead or other dense metals or liquids, to prevent the discovery of illicit goods by technical detection equipment, such as x-ray radiography equipment or chemical detectors. [HSEC-8 TERRORIST OPERATIONS: HSEC-8.3.1 General suspicious activities; HSEC-8.8 Methods, capabilities, and activities of adversaries]

(U//FOUO) Note: In the course of official activities, and to the extent permitted by law, police, fire, EMS, and security personnel are encouraged to report activities of a suspicious nature; however, this information should not be collected solely on First Amendment protected activities or on the basis of any racial, ethnic, religious, or other profile.

Tags: Department of Homeland Security, For Official Use Only, Suspicious Activity Reporting
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(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Observation/Surveillance
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Theft/Loss/Diversion


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Reply with quote  #64 

GAO Report: Increasing the Effectiveness of Efforts to Share Terrorism-Related Suspicious Activity Reports

https://publicintelligence.net/gao-effective-sar/

March 24, 2013 in Government Accountability Office

The following report was released by the GAO on March 13, 2013.

INFORMATION SHARING: Additional Actions Could Help Ensure That Efforts to Share Terrorism-Related Suspicious Activity Reports Are Effective

68 pages
March 2013
5.2 MB

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The Department of Justice (DOJ) has largely implemented the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative among fusion centers—entities that serve as the focal point within a state for sharing and analyzing suspicious activity reports and other threat information. The state and local law enforcement officials GAO interviewed generally said the initiative’s processes worked well, but that they could benefit from additional feedback from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on how the reports they submit are used. The FBI has a feedback mechanism, but not all stakeholders were aware of it. Implementing formalized feedback mechanisms as part of the initiative could help stakeholders conduct accurate analyses of terrorism-related information, among other things.

The technical means that federal, state, and local entities use to collect and share terrorism-related suspicious activity reports—Shared Spaces servers that DOJ provides to most fusion centers and the FBI’s eGuardian system—provide many overlapping or duplicative services. For example, both systems provide a national network for sharing the reports and tools to analyze them. The federal government is aware that duplication exists but supports both systems to enable fusion centers to control information on individuals, consistent with the centers’ privacy requirements, and facilitate the FBI’s investigative needs. However, the FBI was concerned that supporting two systems introduces risks that it will not receive all reports. For example, at the time of our review, many fusion centers were choosing not to automatically share all of their reports with the FBI’s system—although they may have shared reports via phone or other means—and DOJ had not fully diagnosed why. In its March 2013 letter commenting on a draft of this report, DOJ stated that it had made progress on this issue. DOJ also had not formally tested the exchange of information between the two systems to ensure that the exchanges were complete. Taking additional steps to mitigate the risks that reports are not fully shared could help DOJ ensure that the FBI receives all information that can support investigations.

Stakeholders GAO interviewed generally reported that training fully or partially met objectives, such as making law enforcement more aware of the initiative. DOJ has mechanisms to assess the analyst training to help ensure that analysts have the information they need to review and share reports. However, DOJ had not fully assessed its training provided to officers on the front line, which could help ensure that officers receive sufficient information to be able to recognize terrorism-related suspicious activity. DOJ has provided training to executives at 77 of 78 fusion centers, about 2,000 fusion center analysts, and about 290,000 of the 800,000 line officers. DOJ is behind schedule in training the line officers but is taking actions to provide training to officers who have not yet received it.

DOJ and other agencies collect some data to assess the performance of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative—such as the number of reports submitted and resulting FBI investigations. These data show that stakeholders were increasingly submitting and using terrorism-related reports. However, DOJ had not yet established plans and time frames for implementing measures that assess the homeland security results achieved by the initiative and thus lacked a means for establishing accountability for implementing them.



Tags: Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing, Suspicious Activity Reporting
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Here are Homeland Security’s Top 5 Priorities for Suspicious Activity Reporting This Season
(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Photography


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http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #65 




https://publicintelligence.net/nctc-urban-exploration/


(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center: Urban Exploration Offers Insight on Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

March 19, 2013 in National Counterterrorism Center

Urban Exploration Offers Insight Into Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

1 page
For Official Use Only
November 19, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Urban Explorers (UE)—hobbyists who seek illicit access to transportation and industrial facilities in urban areas—frequently post photographs, video footage, and diagrams on line that could be used by terrorists to remotely identify and surveil potential targets. Advanced navigation and mapping technologies, including three dimensional modeling and geo-tagging, could aid terrorists in pinpointing locations in dense urban environments. Any suspicious UE activity should be reported to the nearest State and Major Area Fusion Center and to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force.



Tags: Critical Infrastructure, Domestic Terrorism, For Official Use Only, National Counterterrorism Center, Urban Exploration
20 Comments »
Related Material From the Archive:

(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Special Report: IED Targeting of First Response Personnel
(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Advisory: Homegrown Violent Extremists Targeting Law-Enforcement Officers
(U//FOUO) National Counterterrorism Center Mobilizing Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) Behavioral Indicators
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns
(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Intelligence Support to Urban Operations Field Manual
(U//FOUO) DHS Infrastructure Protection Note: Evolving Threats to the Homeland
DHS National Operations Center Operations Counterterrorism Desk (NCOD) Database Privacy Impact Assessment


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http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #66 
VPN Gate Client Plug-in with SoftEther VPN Client


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__________________
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Use TAILS
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How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
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Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

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Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #67 
ATF Seeks 'Massive' Database of Personal Info: 'Assets, Relatives, Associates and More'
April 6, 2013
By Gregory Gwyn-Williams, Jr.
Subscribe to Gregory Gwyn-Williams, Jr. RSS
2435 552


A recent solicitation from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) reveals that the agency is seeking a "massive" online database capable of pulling up individuals' personal information, connections and associates.

On March 28, ATF posted the notice on FedBizOpps.gov, entitled "Investigative System." The solicitation was updated on April 5 with a few minor changes.

The document says that the system will be utilized by staff "to provide rapid searches on various entities for example; names, telephone numbers, utility data and reverse phone look-ups, as a means to assist with investigations, and background research on people, assets and businesses."

The system is described as a "massive online data repository system that contains a wide variety of data sources both historically and current that can be utilized in support of investigations and backgrounds."

The overview of the solicitation states:

Staff will utilize "a number of internal databases as well as external sources to provide timely and relevant information and intelligence products to law enforcement agencies at the federal, state and local levels."

The system "provides a means to rapidly check records across the country" and is "necessary in assisting investigators, agents and analyst to find people, their assets, relatives, associates and more."

The ATF says they will use this system to provide information to Intelligence Analysts, Special Agents, Inspectors, Financial Investigators and Law Enforcement.

The investigative system will allow ATF to "obtain exact matches from partial source data searches such as, incomplete social security numbers, address, VIN numbers, etc."

The system will also have the ability to "link structured and unstructured data to find connection points between two or more individuals."

__________________
Test your connection for leaks:
http://ip-check.info/?lang=en

Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
http://www.rmprepusb.com/

Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #68 
https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-cloned-vehicles/


https://publicintelligence.net/cia-cto-big-data/

https://publicintelligence.net/fema-improving-sar-guide/
https://publicintelligence.net/gao-effective-sar/

__________________
Test your connection for leaks:
http://ip-check.info/?lang=en

Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
http://www.rmprepusb.com/

Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
joeb

Registered:
Posts: 8,414
Reply with quote  #69 
http://masscops.com/threads/few-police-agencies-address-suicides-within-ranks.58730/


If anyone has any resources for Massachusetts lets post it..I was sad to read about the recent suicide of the BPD Officer and agree departments still don't know how to handle this situation. Keeping her in mind maybe we can have a section here on Masscops with listed resources for everyone. This website has become a huge resource for all of us so something should be posted and accessible. If it helps one person then the site served it's purpose..Stay safe all !
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joeb

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Reply with quote  #70 



Washington, D.C. March 09, 2015        

FBI National Press Office (202) 324-3691

Director James B. Comey has named Thomas M. Class, Sr. special agent in charge of the FBI’s Dallas Division. Mr. Class most recently served as section chief of the High Value Detainee Interrogation Group in the National Security Branch (NSB) at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ). In this position, he led an FBI-lead interagency group that deploys worldwide the nation’s best interrogation resources against significant counterterrorism targets in custody.

Mr. Class began his career as a special agent with the FBI in 1990. He was first assigned to the Columbus Resident Agency, within the Atlanta Division, and he investigated a wide variety of criminal and national security matters. In 2005, Mr. Class was promoted to supervisory special agent in the Counterterrorism Division’s International Terrorism Operations Section at FBIHQ. In that role, Mr. Class served as the program manager for terrorism investigations throughout the Midwest.

In 2007, Mr. Class transferred to the Birmingham Division and served as a supervisory special agent overseeing investigations of all white-collar crime, public corruption, civil rights, and critical incident response matters within the Northern District of Alabama.

Mr. Class was promoted in 2011 to assistant special agent in charge of the Mobile Division’s NSB with investigative and administrative oversight of all counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, critical incident, human intelligence, and field intelligence matters within the Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama.

Prior to joining the FBI, Mr. Class served as a police officer and detective with the St. Petersburg Florida Police Department. He received a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from the University of South Florida in 1981 and a master’s degree in public administration from Columbus State University in 1994.
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joeb

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Reply with quote  #71 

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/amber-guyger-fallout-how-common-is-police-crime/569950/

Amber Guyger Fallout: How Common Is Police Crime?

 

https://zlotonews.com/judicial-watch-sues-justice-dept-for-records-from-anthony-weiner-laptop-zlotonews/

Conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch sued the Justice Department Tuesday for all emails found on the laptop of disgraced New York Congressman Anthony Weiner related to the FBI’s investigation into Hillary Clinton’s private email server.

Judicial Watch’s lawsuit comes following the Justice Department’s failure to act on two of the group’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. The group is seeking all records regarding the bureau’s probe of Weiner’s laptop, records retrieved from that laptop, and all records of communications between FBI officials regarding Clinton’s knowledge of “illicit activities” involving Weiner.

“The Anthony Weiner laptop-Clinton email cover-up by the Obama DOJ and FBI is central to uncovering the corrupt politicization of those agencies,” Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton said in a statement Tuesday. “The same FBI that provided cover for Hillary Clinton was going full bore against then-candidate Trump and this lawsuit aims to uncover the full truth about that corruption

BEXAR COUNTY

Deputy arrests prompt sheriff to hire psychologist

A sheriff who’s seen 18 deputies arrested this year on various charges says a staff psychologist will be hired to better screen applicants.

Bexar County Sheriff Javier Salazar is requesting that county commissioners set aside $118,000 to fund the position.

Three deputies have been arrested in the past week alone. Of the 18 arrested so

 
 
 
 
Manchurian Candidates in India
The shadowy extremist sect accused of plotting to kill intellectuals in India
 
 
 

Professor who was 'link between Trump campaign and the Kremlin' is "missing and may be dead"

Joseph Mifsud, 57, a Maltese citizen who worked at the University of Stirling in Scotland, has denied suggestions he was a Russian agent

 
 
 
 
 
Security vs. privacy: Apple says it will do more to help law enforcement with data requests
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Thousands Of Indigenous Women Are Missing & There's Been No Way To Track Them — Until Now

 
 
 
 
 
 

Feds won‘t release details of settlement with FBI agent

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