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hannah

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Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #1 

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Soldier Surveillance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection

July 17, 2012 in U.S. Army

The following manual was uploaded to Scribd earlier this month by an unknown individual.

FM 2-91.6 SOLDIER SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE: FUNDAMENTALS OF TACTICAL INFORMATION COLLECTION

  • 90 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • October 2007

Download

This publication establishes the Army’s doctrine in support of the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative. The need for Soldiers to be aware that basic observations are an important part of operations has led to the development of this manual.

This manual expands on the information contained in ST 2-91.6 and provides a foundation for developing tactical questioning and reporting and supersedes all other tactical questioning handbooks produced by the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), specifically the Tactical Questioning Soldier’s Handbook and ST 2-91.6. This manual––

• Provides the doctrinal framework for Soldiers and leaders at all echelons and forms the foundation for ES2 curricula within the Army Education System. Its audience is broad, from military Soldiers and leaders to civilians. It is essential that all Soldiers and civilians understand how their daily observations feed into the bigger intelligence process and help create a more favorable environment for US success in a region.
• Is a compilation of tools to help all Soldiers collect information through tactical questioning, detainee handling, and document and equipment handling in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations.
• Is not intended to make the Soldier an expert on intelligence collection. It is not intended to train Soldiers as intelligence collectors nor authorize Soldiers to conduct interrogation and source operations.
• Introduces the basics of questioning and reporting and provides some tools for patrols and S-2s.
• Applies to the Full Spectrum Operations. Principles outlined are valid under conditions involving use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE).

This manual is a compilation of tools to help all Soldiers collect information through surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, interacting with the local populace, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning and detainee handling, briefing, debriefing, and reporting in offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support operations. Most of the text was developed specifically for patrols and to conduct traffic control points (TCPs) or roadblocks, and other missions where Soldiers will interact with the local populace including site exploitation and tactical questioning after a planned or hasty raid. The term “patrol” could reflect a platoon, section, fire team, or other special-purpose group given a mission as listed above.

This manual applies to Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. Although this is Army doctrine, other services will make necessary adaptations based on each of their organizations and service-specific doctrine.

3-35. When conducting tactical questioning, it is imperative that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (FM 27-10) be followed at all times. When possible, obtain as much information as needed through tactical questioning in order to exploit perishable information (for example, another insurgent operation occurring at the same time, the current location of a known HVT). Personnel talked to are not to be mistreated in any way:

DO NOT––

  • Pay money or compensate for information.
  • Attempt to force or scare information from noncombatants.
  • Attempt to recruit or task someone to go seek out information.
  • Issue government equipment or identification in exchange for information.
  • Refer to personnel questioned as “sources.”
  • Establish a “source network.”
  • Ask questions of noncombatants in an area where the questioning puts the noncombatant in danger. Be discreet, but not so discreet that you attract attention.
  • Ask questions that make your unit’s mission or information requirements obvious.
  • Take notes in front of the person after asking the question.
  • Ask leading questions. Leading questions are phrased in a way to invoke a particular answer, not simply a yes or no answer. Leading questions allow the individual to answer with a response he or she thinks you want to hear, not necessarily the facts. For example, “Is Group XYZ responsible?”
  • Ask negative questions. Negative questions are questions that contain a negative word in the question itself such as “Didn’t you go to the warehouse?”
  • Ask compound questions. Compound questions consist of two questions asked at the same time; for example, “Where were you going after work and who were you to meet there?”
  • Ask vague questions. Vague questions do not have enough information for the person to understand exactly what you are asking. They may be incomplete, general, or otherwise nonspecific and create doubt in the person’s mind.
  • Mention that they may be interrogated later or try any other “scare tactic.”
  • Give comfort items to EPWs/detainees. . . they are not your guests.
  • Inform them of their rights; someone else will handle that task.

DO—

  • Ask only basic questions as described in this section.
  • Move detainees to a detention facility as quickly as possible.

INTERVIEW PREPARATION

B-25. Soldiers should cover the following in preparing for interviews:

  • Select an appropriate site for interviews. Position and arrange the physical setup of the area. When conducting interviews with important people or individuals from different cultures, this arrangement can be significant.
  • Instruct interpreters to mirror the Soldier’s tone and personality of speech. Instruct interpreters not to interject their own questions or personality. Also instruct interpreters to inform them if they notice any inconsistencies or peculiarities from those being interviewed.
  • When possible, identify cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, Soldiers should know when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross one’s legs. Gestures, being learned behavior, vary from culture to culture. Interpreters should be able to relate a number of these cultural restrictions, which, whenever possible, should be observed in working with particular groups or individuals.
  • Rehearse with the interpreter using maps, key words or phrases, diagrams, or models that may facilitate a discussion. The interpreter may be able to explain to the Soldier the significance of symbols or gestures commonly used in a conversation to emphasize a point that may not be verbalized.

CONDUCTING AN INTERVIEW
B-26. Soldiers should cover the following when conducting an interview or presenting a lesson:

  • Avoid simultaneous translations; that is, both the Soldier and the interpreter talking at the same time. This can be disrupting unless the Soldier and interpreter work very well together.
  • Speak for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner, directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should watch the Soldier carefully and, during the translation, mimic the Soldier’s body language as well as interpret his or her verbal meaning. Observe interpreters closely to detect any inconsistencies between an interpreter’s and a Soldier’s manners. Be careful not to force an interpreter into a literal translation by being too brief. Present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in his language and culture.
  • Although interpreters perform some editing as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that they transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions. Insist that interpreters always ask for clarification, prior to interpreting, whenever they are not absolutely certain of the Soldier’s meaning. However, be aware that a good interpreter, especially one who is local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.
  • During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, interpreters should immediately relay them for an answer. Interpreters should never attempt to answer questions even though they may know the correct answer. Additionally, neither Soldiers nor interpreters should correct each other in front of an interviewee or class; all differences should be settled away from the subject or audience.
  • Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vitally important, establishing rapport with interview subjects or the target audience is equally important. Soldiers and interpreters should concentrate on rapport. To establish rapport, subjects or audiences should be treated as mature, important human beings who are capable and worthy.

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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #2 

(U//FOUO) New York Fusion Center Bulletin: Use of Cloned Vehicles in Terrorist or Criminal Operations

June 16, 2012 in Intelligence Fusion Centers, New York

The following document was obtained from the website of Monroe-Livingston Region EMS (MLREMS).

New York State Counter Terrorism Bulletin

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • May 24, 2012

Download

Criminals and terrorists have long used official vehicles, “cloned” vehicles (those painted/decorated to appear official), or seemingly legitimate vehicles (e.g. livery, maintenance or delivery) to circumvent security measures at targets of interest.

There have been numerous terrorist attacks overseas wherein operatives used police vehicles or ambulances (or vehicles painted to resemble same) to conceal improvised explosive devices. Within the US Homeland, the most common use of cloned official vehicles by criminals is for drug smuggling; however, at least one terrorist targeting New York envisioned misusing vehicles that would appear to be legitimate, in order to conduct an attack. Dhiren Barot, an al Qaeda operative involved in the 2004 Financial Centers Plot, allegedly plotted to detonate three limousines packed with explosives and gas cylinders in underground parking lots in Manhattan. While the limousines would not have masqueraded as “official vehicles” per se they would have appeared to be legitimately entering those parking structures.

Law enforcement officials and the general public should remain alert to potential fake or cloned official vehicles, with special attention near high-profile targets and mass gatherings at special events, such as upcoming Memorial Day and 4th of July holiday parades and celebrations, or large sporting events scheduled this summer across the State. These events provide the opportunity for terrorists to inflict mass casualties and evade detection by blending into large crowds.

Officials should also be mindful of locations where official vehicles may gain exclusive access, such as parking garages or loading docks proximate to potential targets of interest. Officials at such locations should know how to verify markings on any official vehicles likely to be present. Law enforcement outreach to security staff at these locations during routine patrols is encouraged.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #3 

duhhh what times are the shift changes .....



(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Terrorists Eliciting Information

June 20, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Eliciting Information

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • February 7, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorist or criminals may attempt to identify critical infrastructure vulnerabilities by eliciting information pertaining to operational and security procedures from security personnel, facility employees, and their associates. Persistent, intrusive or probing questions about security, operations or other sensitive aspects of a facility by individuals with no apparent need for the information could provide early warning of a potential attack. Notable examples of suspicious elicitation:

- (U//FOUO) May 2011: A gas station attendant asked an employee of a nearby chemical manufacturing plant a series of questions about the types of chemicals produced at the plant, whether any were explosive, and whether employees were allowed to take chemicals home. The attendant also asked if the plant employee worked with chemicals, whether certain chemicals become explosive when combined, and whether the plant was hiring.

- (U//FOUO) February 2011: An individual asked a security officer at a train station about station security practices including shift times and changes for security personnel, the number of guards on duty, location of me security company, and whether security continues after midnight. He also asked if the security officer had a key to the electrical room, contact instructions for security personnel in the event of an emergency, the time most people exit trains, and the purpose of little black balls’ (closed-circuit cameras) mounted at points around the station.


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https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #4 

U.S. Army Military Police School Civil Disturbance Operations Course

July 6, 2012 in U.S. Army

The following self-learning course from the U.S. Army Military Police School, which was formerly located at Fort McClellan, describes procedures for military police involvement in civil disturbance operations.  The course makes it clear that temporary detention facilities in the event of a civil disturbance overloading local resources would be operated under existing military doctrine for internment facilities.  The course cites U.S. Army FM 3-19.40 Internment/Resettlement Operations, which is now numbered FM 3-39.40 since its most recent revision in 2010, as the primary reference for the operation of these facilities.

United States Army Military Police School Subcourse Number MP 1005

  • 115 pages
  • April 2006

Download

This lesson is designed to describe the nature and causes of disaffection and social unrest; define the potential for social unrest in the United States; identify the types of confrontations; define crowd behavioral and psychological influences; identify patterns of disorder.

2. Application of Force.

a. General.

(1) Civil disturbance operations by federal forces will not be authorized until the President is advised by the highest officials of the state that the situation cannot be controlled with nonfederal resources available. The mission of the control force is to help restore law and order and to help maintain it until such time as state and local forces can control the situation without federal help. In performing this mission, the control force may have to actively participate, not only in subduing the disturbance, but also in helping to detain those responsible for it. Control force commanders are authorized and directed to provide such active participation, subject to restraints on the use of force.

(2) Prior to committing any federal forces in the quailing of civil disturbance whether in CONUS or OCONUS commanders should train and continually brief the control force on the rule of engagement (ROE). The commander is responsible for drafting, interpreting, disseminating, and training the control force on the ROE. The staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be included in the ROE development to ensure that it will not improperly constrain actions, but still will remain consistent with domestic and international laws, polices, and orders of the chain of command.

(3) If non lethal weapon and munitions are to be utilized, they should be addressed within the ROE and disseminated to the lowest level, preferable to platoon and squad levels. This requires that all personnel have a clear understanding of the ROE and the commander’s intent.

(4) While serving with a multinational operation under the preview of the United Nations (UN) charter or customary international law the UN will may mandate certain restrictions on the use of force. By the use of overwhelming force during a civil disturbance under the UN may compromise diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful solution. Commanders must beware that any confrontation of the ROE made by soldiers can have strategic political implications on current and future operations.

(5) The primary rule which governs the actions of federal forces in helping state and local authorities to restore law and order is that the control force use only the minimum force required fulfilling the mission. This chief principle should control both the selection of appropriate operational techniques and the choice of options for arming the control force. In carrying out this principle, the use of deadly force is authorized only under extreme circumstances where certain specific standards are met. To emphasize limitations on use of firepower and to restrict automatic fire, rifles with only a safe or semiautomatic selection capability or modified to such a capability will be used as a basic weapon for Soldiers in a civil disturbance area.

b. Use of Deadly and Non-deadly Force.

(1) Commanders are authorized to use non-deadly force to control the disturbance, to prevent crimes, and to detain persons who have committed crimes; but the degree of force used must be not greater than that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of deadly force, in effect, invokes the power of summary execution and can, therefore, be justified only by extreme circumstances. Accordingly, its use is not authorized for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant risk of death or serious bodily harm. If a mission cannot be accomplished without the use of deadly force, but deadly force is not permitted under the guidelines authorizing its use, accomplishment of the mission must be delayed until sufficient non-deadly force can be brought to bear. All the requirements of paragraph (b), below, must be met in every case in which deadly force is employed.

(2) The use of deadly force is authorized only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably be employed. Deadly force is justified under one or more of the following circumstances:

(a) Self- defense and defense of others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to protect law enforcement or security personnel who reasonably believe themselves or others to be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.

(b) Assets involving national security. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security. DoD assets shall be specifically designated as “vital to national security” only when their loss, damage, or compromise would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. Examples include nuclear weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications facilities; and designated restricted area as containing strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special access programs.

(c) Assets no involving national security but inherently dangerous to others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as operable weapons or ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., assets that, in the hands of an unauthorized individual, present a substantial potential danger of death or serious bodily harm to others. Examples include high risk portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, ammunition, explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material.

(d) Serious offenses against persons. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the commission of a serious offense involving violence and threatening death or serious bodily harm. Examples include murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault.

(e) Arrest or apprehension. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to arrest, apprehend, or prevent the escape of a person who, there is probably cause to believe, has committed an offense of the nature in (2) through (4) above.

(f) Escapes. When deadly force has been specifically authorized by the Heads of the DoD Components and reasonable appears to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided law enforcement or security personnel have probable cause to believe that the escaping prisoner poses a threat of serious bodily harm either to security personnel or others.

(3) Every Soldier has the right under the law to use reasonably necessary force to defend himself against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations of this paragraph are not intended to infringe on this right, but to prevent the unauthorized or random use of other types of deadly force.

(4) In addition, the following policies regarding the use of deadly force will be observed:

(a) Give an order to halt.

(b) Warning shot will not be fired.

(c) When a firearm is discharged it will be fired with the intent of rendering the person(s) at whom it is discharged incapable of continuing that activity or course of behavior prompting the individual to shoot.

(d) Shot will be fired only with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.

(e) In the case of holstered weapons, a weapon should not be removed from the holster unless there is reasonable expectation that use of the weapon may be necessary.

(5) Even when its use is authorized, deadly force must be used only with great selectivity and precision against the particular threat which justifies its use. For example, the receipt of sniper fire, however deadly, from an unknown location can never justify “returning the fire” against any or all persons who may be visible on the street or in nearby buildings. Such random response is far too likely to result in accidents among innocent bystanders or fellow law enforcement personnel; the appropriate response is to take cover and try to locate the source of the fire so that the threat can be neutralized.

f. Army Detention Facilities.

(1) The Army will not operate facilities for confinement, custody, or detention of civilian personnel apprehended for violation of local or state laws as long as civil confinement facilities, operated by the Department of Justice, state, or local agencies are sufficient to accommodate the number of persons apprehended.

(2) When it appears that available local facilities are insufficient, due to the large number of persons apprehended or detained, and this fact can be verified by the person or agency responsible for the facilities, temporary confinement/detention facilities may be operated with prior approval from DA, specifically, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. These facilities will be operated only until custody of the persons detained can be transferred to and assumed by civil authorities. They will not be used for the confinement of persons charged or convicted under civil jurisdiction.

(3) Temporary confinement/detention facilities can be developed from local federal facilities provided they are adaptable to the requirements of custody and control. Such facilities should be established, if possible, within the affected area; this will conserve time, transportation, and escort personnel. However, if no suitable federal property is available within the affected area, they can be located elsewhere on any property under federal control as long as the persons to be detained are apprehended in the affected area. Whenever such temporary facilities are established during civil disturbance control operations, the Army is responsible for providing those personnel, facilities, and supplies necessary for the custody, control, health, comfort, and sustenance of persons detained.

(4) Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are required to operate such facilities. Guards and support function personnel operating under the direct control of such officers and NCOs need not be specifically trained or experienced in confinement operations as long as they are under close and continuing supervision of trained responsible personnel. Whenever females are detained, they must be held in physically separate detention facilities and under the control of selected female guards operating under the supervision of trained and experienced confinement personnel.

(5) Temporary detention facilities should be constructed and arranged to provide for adequate custody, control, and safety of detainees. It is advisable to use existing permanent-type buildings. Where sufficient permanent structures are not available, only that amount of new construction required for temporary custody, control, and administration of prisoners should be accomplished. Temporary fieldtype facilities provide compartments to assure effective control.

(6) The same operational procedures that apply to the operation of installation confinement facilities and treatment of detainees apply to these temporary facilities except that those policies and procedures establishing training, employment, mail and correspondence, and administrative discipline requirements will not apply. Detailed guidance in procedures for confinement of detainees is contained in EPW Operations, FM 3-19.40.

5 Responses to U.S. Army Military Police School Civil Disturbance Operations Course


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #5 

Samir Khan Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula “Expectations Full” Jihadi Manual

May 15, 2012 in Documents

The following document entitled “Expectations Full” was reportedly authored by Samir Khan, a U.S. citizen who was killed in a drone strike in Yemen last year along with Anwar al-Awlaki.  The document details what potential Jihadis should expect and bears a great deal of similarity to Inspire magazine, which was also reportedly authored by Khan.  After several new issues of Inspire magazine surfaced online in early May, the following document has also recently appeared online with an acknowledgement of the death of Samir Khan.  We encourage readers to scrutinize the authenticity of the material provided in this publication.  We have removed password protection from the PDF to enable easier analysis, but have left the files’ original metadata intact.  Due to past incidents with law enforcement, we must emphasize that this material is provided, as always, for educational and informational purposes.

Al-Malahem Media

  • 15 pages
  • April 2012
  • 20.6 MB

Download

 


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USE the net more securely:
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https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #6 

Money as a Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A) SOP 2012

May 14, 2012 in Afghanistan, Department of Defense

Money As A Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A)

  • 268 pages
  • March 2012
  • 9.66 MB

Download

The Money As A Weapon System – Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program Standard Operating Procedure supports the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan and ISAF Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The Theater Campaign Plan lists objectives that include improving governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population. CERP provides an enabling tool that commanders can utilize to achieve these objectives. This is accomplished through an assortment of projects planned with desired COIN effects such as addressing urgent needs of the population, promoting GIRoA legitimacy, countering Taliban influence, increasing needed capacity, gaining access, building/expanding relationships, promoting economic growth, and demonstrating positive intent or goodwill.

The SOP recognizes and addresses the challenges that lie ahead as we continue the momentum of our campaign and through the challenges of transition. This revision implements policy changes, which are summarized within the summary of changes, to help improve oversight and management and incorporates the lessons we have learned to include measures adopted from the recommendations of various audits. Additionally, a broad spectrum of collaboration and research from several organizations and agencies was used to provide guidance as you plan CERP projects.

A. Counterinsurgency concepts, frameworks, and ideas ultimately find expression in activities involving investments of energy, time and resources. Projects are a primary means for executing governance since they incorporate decisions on the distribution of scarce resources, may involve negotiations on the nature of the social contract, and can create positive, interdependent relationships to allow the delivery of a service. Project management is the way to ensure these investments generate measurable returns. However, project management to COIN effects is not the same as project management to quality, timeline, scope or budget as there are different objectives with different means of judging whether the objectives are met. Project prioritization and selection must reinforce COIN objectives. The list of potential projects will always exceed the capacity to deliver. The major limiting factor will be the ability to execute and oversee projects rather than limited funding. The more technically challenging the project, the greater the need for direct presence to ensure quality. Less complex projects, by contrast, can reduce coalition forces direct presence while ensuring greater COIN effects.

B. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects (and similar stabilization funds) are vehicles for achieving effects. The desired effects are currently not well defined, measurable or standardized across projects. An effect can be:

1. Developmental, seeking to change society, build institutional capacity or promote economic improvement that is sustainable;

2. Humanitarian, seeking to alleviate human suffering without conditions or impartiality;

3. Force protection/hearts and minds, seeking to create a positive impression of coalition forces/Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in an effort to lessen attacks; or

4. Counterinsurgency, seeking to address causes of instability through fostering positive, interdependent relationships between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and key populations.


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Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
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USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #7 

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan Counterinsurgent’s Guidebook

May 14, 2012 in Afghanistan, U.S. Army

A Counterinsurgent’s Guidebook: The application of COIN doctrine and theory

  • 46 pages
  • November 2011

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The purpose of The Counterinsurgency Training Center—Afghanistan (CTC-A) “Counterinsurgent’s Guidebook” is two-fold. First, to provide a common language and framework for counterinsurgents currently engaged in Afghanistan, as well as those involved in yet-foreseen conflicts. While each insurgency is unique, the principles, processes, and tools in this Guidebook are intended to be broadly applicable. The second purpose is to provide a structured cognitive process—and supporting tools—whereby counterinsurgents can translate existing counterinsurgency doctrine and theory into practical application. The intended audience for this Guidebook is operational and tactical level U.S./NATO/Coalition counterinsurgents, military and non-military alike.

There are three (3) prerequisites that allow an insurgency various degrees of support from the population – a vulnerable population, leadership available for direction, and lack of government control (FM 3-24.2). When all three exist in any particular area, an insurgency can operate with significant freedom of action (progression from partial to total); this is gained through active and/or passive support of the population, which can become entrenched over time. These prerequisites are common to all insurgencies, but will take different forms and intensities.

1) Vulnerable Population. A population is vulnerable if the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can exploit. The insurgents can exploit the population by offering hope for change as well as exploiting political, economic and/or social dissatisfaction with the current government. A gap between the population‘s expectations and the government‘s ability to meet those expectations may cause unrest within the population, including turning to the insurgency. The larger the gap, the greater the population‘s perceived or relative sense of deprivation between what they have and what they perceive they should have. Similarly, the larger the gap, the more susceptible the population is to insurgent influence through promises to close the gap.

2) Leadership Available for Direction. A vulnerable population alone will not indefinitely support an insurgency. There must be a leadership element that can direct the frustrations of the population. If insurgents can recruit, co-opt, and coerce local leaders or the local leaders are part of the insurgency, these leaders can direct the frustrations of the populace.

3) Lack of Government Control. Real or perceived lack of governmental control can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security forces or other agencies. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success. The opposite is also true. If the government is not providing what the people believe their government should, insurgents may provide an alternative government, or ‗shadow‘ government, or they may merely nullify governance to allow freedom and movement, depending on their end state. Host Nation failure to see or admit that there is an issue or outright refusal to change can further strengthen this prerequisite.


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(U//FOUO) Open Source Center Changes in Afghan Political Landscape Leading Up to 2014

May 16, 2012 in Open Source Center

Open Source Center Analysis: Changes Expected in Afghan Political Landscape Leading Up to 2014

  • 9 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • May 4, 2012

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Open source reporting indicates the Afghan political landscape, presently dominated by four political groupings and a number of prominent politicians, is likely to undergo further changes in the lead-up to the presidential elections and withdrawal of ISAF forces in 2014. Differing views of the Taliban threat as ISAF withdraws is likely to help drive the realignment and consolidation of political forces. This realignment may result in two major groupings: President Hamid Karzai and allies keen on working with the Taliban versus former anti-Taliban forces and others opposed to the government’s alleged appeasement toward the militants. Such consolidation would likely lead the emerging generation of younger leaders to choose between joining one of the groupings or risk being marginalized at the national level. Four main political groupings — Karzai’s camp, the National Front of Afghanistan (NFA), the National Coalition of Afghanistan (NCA), and the Truth and Justice Party (TJP) — are currently dominating the Afghan political scene (See Appendix for more details on key figures and positions of the four groups).

  • Karzai’s camp is currently the dominant group but is a tenuous alliance of convenience among elements of former anti-Taliban forces, Hezb-e Islami (HI), and the Pashtun nationalist Afghan Mellat Party (AMP).
  • The NFA was launched in November 2011 by former Karzai allies who now oppose many of his policies. It features some prominent anti-Taliban figures, including Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqeq, Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, and former Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud (Daily Afghanistan, 12 November 2011).
  • The NCA was created in December 2011 as a successor to the Coalition for Change and Hope and is led by former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and former parliament speaker Mohmmad Yunos Qanuni. Like NFA, it opposes Karzai and features some prominent anti-Taliban leaders (Bokhdinews, 22 December 2011).
  • The TJP was launched in early November 2011 by a number of former cabinet ministers and lawmakers who lost their seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections, including former Minister of Rural Development Mohammad Ihsan Zia and former Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar. It is the weakest of the four main groupings and does not oppose Karzai’s policies as strongly as the NFA or NCA. (Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 November 2011; Kabulpress, 20 November 2011).

In addition, there are a handful of prominent Afghan figures with links to some of these groupings, although currently they do not formally belong to any of them: Balkh Governor, Atta Mohammad Nur, Nangarhar Governor Gol Agha Sherzai, former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh, Badakhshan MP Fawzia Koofi, Kabul MP Ramazan Bashardost, and Nangarhar MP Abdul Zaher Qadir.

Growing concerns about the Taliban threat and its role in post-2014 Afghanistan may consolidate the political landscape around two political, and possibly even militarized, rival clusters.

  • A merger of the NFA and NCA at some point before or during 2014 is possible, given their similar political agendas and common anti-Taliban roots. Both groups have called for parliamentary government and elected governors and are suspicious of reconciliation with the Taliban. The differences between them seem to be mainly of a personal nature at the leadership level. Massoud indicated recently that NFA and NCA would “merge soon” to which Abdullah responded by saying that NCA “have not yet decided on merger with [NFA]” (Bokhdinews, 17, 20 January). NCA might pursue the idea of merger more favorably after Abdullah’s rotating leadership ends, since Qanuni has expressed desire for a “grand national umbrella” to confront the looming Taliban threat (Jomhornews, 1 April).
  • In an 11 March gathering, former anti-Taliban leaders from a cross-section of the major political clusters, including Karzai’s camp, urged unity and even military preparedness among the anti-Taliban forces. Karzai ally MP Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf said: “Be very careful that we should not be undermined from within under the divisive pretexts of ethnicity, region, and language; we should preserve this united body at any cost.” He warned the anti-Taliban forces not to “sit unconcerned about the future; do not be totally oblivious and unaware about today and post-2014 and thereabouts.” (Tolonews, 11 March). Massoud suggested that the anti-Taliban forces should revive their “military structures” in anticipation of ISAF withdrawal (Jabha-e Melli, 12 March).

Should the NFA and NCA unify and attract major anti-Taliban leaders among Karzai’s allies, the remainder of the Karzai camp may rely increasingly on HI and some level of cooperation even from the Taliban to remain politically relevant.

  • In the context of his remarks to deny reports that the insurgent group Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) had severed negotiations with the government, HIG chief negotiator Ghairat Bahir effectively endorsed Karzai’s leadership by saying that “from our perspective Hamid Karzai is the president of Afghanistan” (Bokhdinews, 29 January).
  • Similarly, the Afghan Government’s backing of the Taliban’s opening of an office in Qatar and the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan’s suggestive remarks, in a 3 April interview with UK’s Guardian newspaper, that negotiations would lead to the Taliban’s participation in presidential elections suggests that at least some in Karzai’s camp may be willing to court the militants to countervail the anti-Taliban forces’ influence (Hewad, 7 April; Hasht-e Sobh, 8, 9 April).
  • State-run newspaper Hewad issued a strongly worded editorial against a 5 May 2011 opposition rally and approvingly quoted a former Taliban leader’s denunciatory words, perhaps portending the dichotomization of politics along pro- and anti-Taliban lines (7 May 2011).


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Restricted U.S. Army Internment and Resettlement Operations Manual

May 2, 2012 in U.S. Army

FM 3-39.40 Internment and Resettlement Operations

  • 326 pages
  • Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means.
  • February 12, 2010
  • 3.59 MB

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I/R operations facilitate the ability to conduct rapid and decisive combat operations; deter, mitigate, and defeat threats to populations that may result in conflict; reverse conditions of human suffering; and build the capacity of a foreign government to effectively care for and govern its population. This includes capabilities to conduct shaping operations across the spectrum of military operations to mitigate and defeat the underlying conditions for conflict and counter the core motivations that result in support to criminal, terrorist, insurgent, and other destabilizing groups. I/R operations also include the daily incarceration of U.S. military prisoners at facilities throughout the world.

This manual continues the evolution of the I/R function to support the changing nature of OEs. In light of persistent armed conflict and social turmoil throughout the world, the effects on populations remain a compelling issue. The world population will increase from 6 billion to 9 billion in the next two decades, with 95 percent of the growth occurring in the developing world. By 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population will live in urban areas. Coexisting demographically and ethnically,  diverse societies will aggressively compete for limited resources.

Typically, overpopulated third world societies suffer from a lack of legitimate and effective enforcement mechanisms, which is generally accepted as one of the cornerstones of a stable society. Stability within a population may eliminate the need for direct military intervention. The goal of military police conducting detainee operations is to provide stability within the population, its institutions, and its infrastructure. In this rapidly changing and dynamic strategic environment, U.S. forces will compete with local populations for the same space, routes, and resources. The modular force’s ability to positively influence and shape the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of select populations is critical to tactical, operational, and strategic success.

An adaptive enemy will manipulate populations that are hostile to U.S. intent by instigating mass civil disobedience, directing criminal activity, masking their operations in urban and other complex terrain,
maintaining an indistinguishable presence through cultural anonymity, and actively seeking the traditional sanctuary of protected areas as defined by the rules of land warfare. Such actions will facilitate the dispersal of threat forces, negate technological overmatches, and degrade targeting opportunities. Commanders will use technology and conduct police intelligence operations to influence and control populations, evacuate detainees and, conclusively, transition rehabilitative and reconciliation operations to other functional agencies. The combat identification of friend, foe, or neutral is used to differentiate combatants from noncombatants and friendly forces from threat forces.

Civilian Internees

1-10. A CI is a civilian who is interned during armed conflict, occupation, or other military operation for security reasons, for protection, or because he or she committed an offense against the detaining power. (JP 3-63) CIs, unless they have committed acts for which they are considered unlawful combatants, generally qualify for protected status according to the GC, which also establishes procedures that must be observedwhen depriving such civilians of their liberty. CIs are to be accommodated separately from EPWs and persons deprived of liberty for any other reason.

1-11. Protected persons are persons protected by the Geneva Convention who find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals. (AR 190-8). Protected persons who are interned for imperative reasons of security are also known as CIs. Protected persons under the Geneva Conventions include—

  • Hors de combat (refers to the prohibition of attacking enemy personnel who are “out of combat&rdquo.
  • Detainees (combatants and CIs).
  • Wounded and sick in the field and at sea.
  • Civilians.

Note. If protected persons are detained as spies or saboteurs or are suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the state or occupying power, they may be interned or imprisoned. In such cases, they retain their status as a protected person and are granted the full rights and privileges of protected persons.

DISLOCATED CIVILIANS

1-19. The term dislocated civilian is a broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. (JP 3-57) DCs are individuals who leave their homes for various reasons, such as an armed conflict or a natural disaster, and whose movement and physical presence can hinder military operations. They most likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, or clothing. DCs may not be native to the area or to the country in which they reside. (See chapter 10.) The following DC subcategories are also defined in JP 3-57:

  • Displaced person. A displaced person is a civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02) Displaced persons may have been dislocated because of a political, geographical, environmental, or threat situation.
  • Evacuee. An evacuee is a civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 3-57)
  • Internally displaced person. An internally displaced person is any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country.Internally displaced persons may have been forced to flee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, but have not crossed an internationally recognized border.
  • Expellee. An expellee is a civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes. (JP 3-57)
  • Migrant. A migrant is a person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. (JP 3-57)
  • Refugee. A refugee is a person, who by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return.
  • Stateless person. A stateless person is a civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed.

AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

1-40. External involvement in I/R missions is a fact of life for military police organizations. Some government and government-sponsored entities that may be involved in I/R missions include—

  • International agencies.
  • UN.
  • International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
  • International Organization of Migration.
  • U.S. agencies.
  • Local U.S. embassy.
  • Department of Homeland Security.
  • U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
  • Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-41. The U.S. Army National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC), supported by theater detainee reporting centers (TDRCs), detainee accountability, including reporting to the ICRC central tracing agency.

1-42. There are also numerous private relief organizations, foreign and domestic, that will likely be involved in the humanitarian aspects of I/R operations. Likewise, the news media normally provides extensive coverage of I/R operations. Adding to the complexity of these operations is the fact that DOD is often not the lead agency. For instance, the DOD could be tasked in a supporting role, with the Department of State or some other agency in the lead. (See appendix E.)

SUPPORT TO CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

2-39. Civil support is the DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 3-28) Civil support includes operations that address the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks and incidents in the U.S. and its territories.

2-40. The I/R tasks performed in support of civil support operations are similar to those during combat operations, but the techniques and procedures are modified based on the special OE associated with operating within U.S. territory and according to the categories of individuals (primarily DCs) to be housed in I/R facilities. During long-term I/R operations, state and federal agencies will operate within and around I/R facilities within the scope of their capabilities and identified role. Military police commanders must closely coordinate and synchronize their efforts with them especially in cases where civil authority and capabilities have broken down or been destroyed.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OFFICER

3-55. The PSYOP officer in charge of supporting I/R operations serves as the special staff officer responsible for PSYOP. The PSYOP officer advises the military police commander on the psychological impact of military police or MI actions to prevent misunderstandings and disturbances by detainees and DCs. The supporting I/R PSYOP team has two missions that reduce the need to divert military police assets to maintain security in the I/R facility. (See appendix J.) The team—

  • Assists the military police force in controlling detainees and DCs.
  • Introduces detainees or DCs to U.S. and multinational policy.

3-56. The PSYOP team also supports the military police custodial mission in the I/R facility. The team—

  • Develops PSYOP products that are designed to pacify and acclimate detainees or DCs to accept U.S. I/R facility authority and regulations.
  • Gains the cooperation of detainees or DCs to reduce the number of guards needed.
  • Identifies malcontents, trained agitators, and political leaders within the facility who may try to organize resistance or create disturbances.
  • Develops and executes indoctrination programs to reduce or remove antagonistic attitudes.
  • Identifies political activists.
  • Provides loudspeaker support (such as administrative announcements and facility instructions when necessary).
  • Helps the military police commander control detainee and DC populations during emergencies.
  • Plans and executes a PSYOP program that produces an understanding and appreciation of U.S. policies and actions.

DETAINEE PROCESSING TECHNIQUE

4-33. Upon capture, Soldiers must process detainees using the “search, silence, segregate, speed, safeguard, and tag (5 Ss and T)” technique. This technique provides a structure to guide Soldiers in conducting detainee operations until they transfer custody of detainees to another authority or location. Complete the “5 Ss and T” technique as follows:

  • Search. Neutralize a detainee and confiscate weapons, personal items, and items of potential intelligence and/or evidentiary value.
  • Silence. Prevent detainees from communicating with one another or making audible clamor such as chanting, singing, or praying. Silence uncooperative detainees by muffling them with a soft, clean cloth tied around their mouths and fastened at the backs of their heads. Do not use duct tape or other adhesives, place a cloth or either objects inside the mouth, or apply physical force to silence detainees.
  • Segregate. Segregate detainees according to policy and SOPs (segregation requirements differ from operation to operation). The ability to segregate detainees may be limited by the availability of manpower and resources at the POC. At a minimum, try to segregate detainees by grade, gender, age (keeping adults from juveniles and small children with mothers), and security risk. MI and military police personnel can provide additional guidance and support in determining the appropriate segregation criteria.
  • Speed. Quickly move detainees from the continuing risks associated with other combatants or sympathizers who may still be in the area of capture. If there are more detainees than the Soldiers can control, call for additional support, search the detainees, and hold them in place until reinforcements arrive.
  • Safeguard. Protect detainees and ensure the custody and integrity of all confiscated items. Soldiers must safeguard detainees from combat risk, harm caused by other detainees, and improper treatment or care. Report all injuries. Correct and report violations of U.S. military policy that occur while safeguarding detainees. Acts and/or omissions that constitute inhumane treatment are violations of the law of war and, as such, must be corrected immediately. Simply reporting violations is insufficient. If a violation is ongoing, a Soldier has an obligation to stop the violation and report it.
  • Tag. Ensure that each detainee is tagged using DD Form 2745. Confiscated equipment, personal items, and evidence will be linked to the detainee using the DD Form 2745 number. When a DA Form 4137 is used to document confiscated items, it will be linked to the detainee by annotating the DD Form 2745 control number on the form.

6-8. When constructing a facility, planning considerations may include, but are not limited to—

  • Clear zones. As appropriate, mission variables determine the clear zone surrounding each facility that houses detainees. Construct at least two fences (interior and exterior) around the detainee facility and ensure that the clear zone between the interior and exterior fences is free of vegetation and shrubbery.
  • Guard towers. Locate guard towers on the perimeter of each facility. Place them immediately outside the wall or, in case of double fencing, where they permit an unobstructed view of the lane between the fences. The space between towers must allow overlapping observation and fields of fire. During adverse weather, it may be necessary to augment security by placing fixed guard posts between towers on the outside of the fence. Towers must be high enough to allow an unobstructed view of the compound and low enough to permit an adequate field of fire. The tower platform should have retractable ladders and should be wide enough to mount crew-served weapons. Another consideration involves using nonlethal capabilities from guard towers.
  • Lights. Provide adequate lighting, especially around compound perimeters. Illuminating walls and fences discourages escapes, and illuminating inner strategic points expedites the handling of problems caused by detainees. Lights should be protected from breakage with an unbreakable glass shield or a wire mesh screen. Ensure that lights on the walls and fences do not interfere with the guards’ vision. Provide secondary emergency lighting.
  • Patrol roads. Construct patrol roads for vehicle and foot patrols. They should be adjacent to outside perimeter fences or walls.
  • Sally ports. A sally port is required to search vehicles and personnel entering and leaving the main compound. It is recommended that a sally port be placed at the back entrance to the facility.
  • Communications. Ensure that communication between the towers and the operation headquarters is reliable. Telephones are the preferred method; however, ensure that alternate forms of communication (radio and visual or sound signals) are available if telephones are inoperable.

6-9. The facility layout depends on the nature of the operation, terrain, building materials, and HN support. Each facility should contain—

  • Barracks (may be general-purpose medium tents in the early stages of an operation).
  • Kitchen and dining facilities.
  • Bath houses.
  • Latrines.
  • Recreation areas.
  • Chapel facilities.
  • Administrative areas with a command post, an administrative building, an interrogation facility, a dispensary, an infirmary, a mortuary, and a supply building.
  • Receiving and processing centers.
  • Maximum security areas with individual cells.
  • Parking areas.
  • Trash collection points.
  • Potable water points.
  • Storage areas.
  • Hazardous materials storage areas.
  • Generator and fuel areas.


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(U//LES) FBI International Expansion and Influence of US-Based Gangs

April 10, 2012 in Federal Bureau of Investigation

NGIC Intelligence Assessment

  • 27 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • December 16, 2005

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The purpose of this assessment is to explore the expansion and influence of US-based gangs abroad and their illicit operations and associations with foreign criminal organizations. For the purpose of this assessment, the term “gang” encompasses both street gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs. In addition to FBI and open source reporting, the following law enforcement agencies from the United States, Canada, Central America, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom were surveyed to obtain data for the assessment.

(U) Key Judgments

  • (U//LES) Several US-based gangs have expanded internationally, although their expansion appears to be limited and unsystematic. Major US-based gangs are operating in Australia, Asia, Canada, the Caribbean, Central America, Europe, Mexico, South America, and New Zealand. Most gang members abroad are not counterparts of US-based sets or cliques, but are homegrown or “wanna-be” gang members influenced by media and popular culture. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs), Hispanic gangs, and street gangs on or near US military bases abroad tend to be affiliated with or an extension of a US-based gang.
  • (U//LES) Many US-based gangs maintain some ties to foreign criminal organizations. Most criminal gangs involved in drug trafficking and distribution have alliances with Mexican, Colombian, or Nigerian drug cartels, or to organized crime or domestic terrorist groups. Such alliances could ultimately facilitate the gang’s expansion abroad and collaboration with foreign criminal organizations.
  • (U//LES) The international expansion of US-based gangs appears to be facilitated by several factors, including criminal opportunities available in a specific region; the presence of family members or friends; gang suppression laws in a specific region; and ties to foreign criminal organizations such as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), organized crime groups, or terrorist groups. Gangs that are sophisticated and organized are more likely to have factions abroad. US-based gangs will continue to expand their operations abroad as long as conditions facilitating such expansion and a market for illicit goods are present.
  • (U) OMGs have strong international links and are present in 45 countries, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, South America, Asia, and most European Union nations. Their expansion abroad is primarily driven by the illicit drug market and the search for international suppliers. Major OMGs are expanding faster overseas than they are in the United States, and expansion efforts are likely to continue.
  • (U//LES) Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) operates in Mexico, Central America, and Canada. MS-13 members are allegedly involved in alien smuggling outside of the United States and are providing alien smuggling organizations with enforcement services for a fee. Although there is no evidence suggesting a link between MS-13 and any terrorist organizations, the gang’s propensity for alien smuggling and profit motivations may make them amenable to smuggling terrorists into the United States.
  • (U//LES) According to open source and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reporting, several criminal gangs, including the Black Disciples, Black Peace Stones, Crips, Latin Kings, MS-13, Netas, and the Texas Syndicate have members who have been affiliated with foreign extremist groups and terrorist organizations. Furthermore, some of these gangs subscribe to radical Islam, making them more susceptible to recruitment by terrorist organizations and more likely to travel abroad to engage in criminal activity. The potential for terrorist recruitment of street gangs greatly increases in correctional institutions, where several associations between American gangs and international terrorists have been documented.
  • (U//LES) US law enforcement officials have suggested that US-based gangs migrate abroad and collaborate with questionable international interest groups for a profit-related purpose. Consequently, it is likely that several US-based gangs will augment their relationships with foreign criminal organizations and DTOs to obtain access to the illicit global market, should it serve their financial objectives.

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Director of National Intelligence Blackbook Semantic Data Management Presentations

March 29, 2012 in Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The following presentations on the DNI’s Blackbook semantic data management framework are from 2008-2009 and reflect information on versions 2 and 3.  An official description of the Blackbook project:

“Blackbook2 is a project architected by Intervise’s Chief Technology Officer (Scott Streit), which moved into open source on September 1, 2009. Blackbook2 is a standard for semantic web processing and is currently used, in production or pilots, at the Department of Defense, Dole Foods, and the Environmental Protection Agency, just to name a few. Without changing Blackbook2, merely adding new data, Blackbook2 processes anything from Shipping Visibility Data to classified, analytical processing.

For web application framework for data analysis, Blackbook2′s architecture provides secure support for visualization, transformation, data source integration, asynchronous operations, and is vocabulary agnostic. Application programming interfaces (APIs) exist for plugin components that visualize, discover, transform, extract, enrich, or filter graph‐based data such as social networks. Data sources of many types (RDBMs, Documents, RSS) can be mapped into Blackbook2 as RDF/OWL, either by Ingest or real-time mapping solutions such as D2RQ.”

blackbook229 pagesDownload
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Reply with quote  #12 

(U//LES) FBI Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) International Assessment

March 28, 2012 in Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13): An International Perspective

  • 39 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • August 26, 2005

Download

(U) The purpose of this assessment is to provide an overview of the international activities of the MS-13 criminal organization. The report is the result of the analysis of arrest records, law enforcement reports, deportation records, interviews, and observations conducted by members of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force (NGTF) regarding documented MS-13 members in the United States; Chiapas, Mexico; El Salvador; and Honduras. Violent MS-13 members have crossed international boundaries and key members have documented links between the United States and the countries addressed in this assessment (see Appendix A).

(U) Key Judgements

  • Available law enforcement information indicates that there are approximately 8,000-10,000 active MS-13 members in the United States. However, due to diverse law enforcement gang membership criteria and migration issues, the exact number of MS-13 gang members in this country is unknown.
  • (U) In the United States, MS-13 has an identified presence in 33 states and the District of Columbia. FBI information indicates that MS-13 is considered highly active in California, Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
  • (U//LES) Although leaders of several cliques may work together occasionally to achieve a common goal, a single national or international MS-13 gang leader has not been identified within the United States or abroad. The autonomy of the gang’s cliques makes them difficult to target as there is no centralized leadership. The structure of the cliques varies based on membership, criminal activity, and the background of the clique’s founding members.
  • (U//LES) As of July 2005, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had identified 127 incarcerated MS-13 members. The majority of these individuals are El Salvadoran nationals; however, some are also US citizens.
  • (U//LES) MS-13 members in the United States are actively involved in drug related criminal activity in Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Indiana, Nevada, Arkansas, California, Tennessee, New York, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Washington, Virginia and Maryland.
  • (U) According to intelligence analysis and source reporting, the formation of MS-13 cliques (groups of individuals joined together in a region) is often the result of MS-13 member migration to new areas. The migration of individuals is based on factors such as job availability, avoidance of law enforcement, family connections, and prison sentencing.
  • (U//LES) US-based MS-13 members have been arrested for violent crimes including murder, robbery, drive-by-shootings, stabbings, assault, rape, witness intimidation, extortion, malicious wounding, and threats against law enforcement. MS-13 cliques will adapt their criminal activity based on the opportunities available in a specific area.
  • (U//LES) In December 2004, the El Salvador Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) reported a total of 126 active MS-13 cliques in El Salvador. These cliques are generally well-organized with a defined leader and several “national” leaders. In El Salvador, an MS-13 clique’s primary financial gain is through drug sales and extortionate activities. However, MS-13 gang members are best known for their violence and are responsible for more homicides than other El Salvadoran gangs combined.
  • (U//LES) Both US and foreign law enforcement agencies have documented communications between MS-13 members in El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico with members in the United States. Additionally, telephone calls and money transfers have been documented between US and El Salvador members.
  • (U//LES) The Honduras Policia Preventiva (HPP) has identified 13 active MS-13 cliques in five sectors of Honduras: San Pedro Sula, La Ceiba, Comayagua, Tegucigalpa, and Choluteca.
  • (U//LES) In Honduras, the HPP has identified a five- level structure within the MS-13 gang which includes aspiring members, sympathizers, new members, permanent members, and leaders. MS-13 is accused of murdering civilians to protest political decisions. Five of the key MS-13 members implicated in a 23 December 2004 bus massacre in Honduras (which killed 28 civilians) had documented links to the United States.
  • (U//LES) Cellular telephones are the most common communication method used by MS-13 members both internationally and domestically. Telephone calls between Honduras and the United States have been documented by law enforcement and corrections agencies in both countries.
  • (U//LES) Analysis of source and law enforcement reporting indicates that MS-13 members in Honduras are more financially stable than MS-13 members in other countries. This may be partially due to the nature of MS-13 criminal activities in Honduras and the fact that some members have obtained wealth from legitimate business or family inheritance.
  • (U//LES) The city of Tapachula, on the border with Guatemala, has the largest concentration of MS-13 members in Chiapas, Mexico. Membership among incarcerated adult members in Chiapas consists primarily of transient MS-13 members from Central American countries in route to the United States. Most of the criminal activity revolves around the location of railroad lines. Other immigrants are the primary victims of MS-13 criminal activities in this area.
  • (U) Although MS-13 is active in the Chiapas area, particularly along the border and near railroads, there is no evidence to support the allegation that they “control” the area.

Related Material From the Archive:

  1. (U//LES) Virginia Fusion Center Mara Salvatrucha 13 Report
  2. (U//LES) FBI National Gang Threat Assessment 2011
  3. USSOUTHCOM El Salvador Gangs Presentation
  4. (U//FOUO) National Gang Intelligence Center Juggalos Intelligence Report
  5. (U//LES) Mississippi Analysis and Information Center Gang Threat Assessment 2010
  6. (U//LES) California State Threat Assessment Center: Gangs Seek Training to Enhance Their Skills
  7. What the FBI Wants to Hide From You In Their 2011 Gang Threat Assessment
  8. (U) US-Based Street Gangs a Potential Recruiting Pool for Terrorist Groups

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"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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Reply with quote  #13 

(U//FOUO) San Diego Fusion Center Terrorism Imagery Recognition

March 28, 2012 in California, Intelligence Fusion Centers

San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center

  • 15 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • August 2011

Download

Group logos, flags, and other extremist imagery are prevalent throughout most terrorist and extremist groups. Imagery provides a means of evoking existing emotional and historical memories in addition to communicating ideas to potential recruits. Logos and symbols are often used as visual representation of groups and/or their ideology. Print, internet propaganda, tattoos, clothing and accessories, stickers, and other graphic media are the most common representations of extremist imagery. First responders need to be aware of common extremist imagery as it may indicate involvement or support for a particular domestic extremist organization or international terrorist group.

This product provides law enforcement and homeland security partners with information drawn from open source materials including online editions of printed newspapers and relevant counterterrorism sites.


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Reply with quote  #14 

Joint Special Operations University Report on Convergence of Special Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement

March 27, 2012 in U.S. Special Operations Command

Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement

  • 122 pages
  • July 2010

Download

In recent years there has been an apparent convergence of the operations conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and those of civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs), especially Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units, in what were formerly separate and distinct missions. The requirements to obtain warrants prior to execution of raids for high-value targets, collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecution, and on occasion present testimony in courts of law are new missions for SOF. They are not relatively simple changes in the rules of engagement or comparable techniques. As far as can be determined, previously no U.S. military combat arms unit has ever been tasked with such a mission during combat operations. The thesis is straightforward; if such missions are to continue, then consideration must be given to adequate training for them.

In addition, the dangers faced by civilian LEAs in the U.S. have been constantly escalating. Many criminals are equipped with fully automatic weapons and in some areas conducting small-unit operations. The response to these threats requires additional SOF-like civilian units within LEAs. As such, SOF and LEAs will be competing for personnel from a limited subset of the American population.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the elements precipitating this circumstance, provide SOF with a better understanding of changing domestic threats and operational capabilities of LEAs, and draw insights from the similarities and challenges imposed by transnational gangs and terrorists both domestically and abroad. The monograph will argue that SOF need new skills and training to assume the law-enforcement-like missions they are being assigned. In addition, it will provide leaders of major LEAs a better understanding of special operations and potentially facilitate a basis for future cooperation and mutual support. The monograph is written as a forward-looking document and a harbinger of emerging trends; some are quite clear, and others more subtle, but all worth contemplating, especially by those engaged in planning for the future of SOF. It is also argued that the public attitude toward conflict is changing and perhaps the legal underpinnings on use of force as well.

An important issue surfaced while conducting interviews with special operations personnel from various elements concerning assigned missions. That topic was how many of them reported being asked to conduct functions in Iraq that were very similar to those found in U.S. civilian law enforcement. These assignments were found at various operational levels from those involved in direct action and capture of high-value targets to liaison with Iraqi law enforcement at varying levels of headquarters. It is noted some officers believe such tasks and constraints to be inappropriate for SOF; however, that discussion is not relevant to this monograph. The missions have occurred, are ongoing, and likely to represent a trend for the future. Those SOF having been assigned law enforcement-like missions were asked about any police techniques training they had received prior to arrival in country; they usually responded that they had none. A few, mostly from the reserve components, were civilian law enforcement officers recalled to active duty and had been trained through police academies. The majority of respondents, however, indicated they had learned on the job. It is only because SOF are inherently adaptive and innovative that they were able to perform as well as they did.

The military aspect of this trend was also noted in a U.S. Marine Corps War College student paper in 2008. Both authors—Alan Ivy, a supervisory special agent in the FBI, and COL Ken Hurst, a Special Forces commander—had extensive experience in Iraq and encountered these situations. In their paper they correctly asserted:

The merging of law enforcement and combat operations is producing a fundamental change in how the Department of Defense (DoD) is conducting combat operations. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is forcing combat soldiers to collect evidence and preserve combat objectives as crime scenes in order to prevent captured enemy forces from returning to the field of battle. The military has been slow to codify the doctrinal and equipment changes that support the incorporation of law enforcement techniques and procedures into military operations.


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"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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Reply with quote  #15 

(U//LES) Central Florida Intelligence Exchange CopBlock.org Bulletin

March 26, 2012 in Florida, Intelligence Fusion Centers

Central Florida Intelligence Exchange “When Should You Shoot A Cop” Situational Awareness Bulletin

  • 2 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • June 28, 2011

Download

On 28 June 2011, a guest author posted an article entitled “When Should You Shoot A Cop” on the official website for the Cop Block project. In the article the author poses the question of when it is acceptable to forcibly resist law enforcement officials.

Throughout the article the author makes mention of the “tyranny and oppression” imposed by law enforcement officers and highlights that “far more injustice, violence, torture, theft and outright murder has been committed IN THE NAME of ‘law enforcement,’ than has been committed in spite of it”. He goes on to state that the regimes of “Stalin, or Lenin or Chairman Mao, or Hitler…or any number of other tyrants in history” carried out their atrocities in the name of ‘law enforcement’. The author believes that the world would have been less gruesome if there “had been a lot MORE ‘cop-killers’ around”.

[Analyst Notes] Cop Block, based on the description on their Facebook page, is a “decentralized project supported by a diverse group of individuals united by their shared goals of police accountability, education of individual rights and the dissemination of effective tactics to utilize while filming police.” The project was founded in 2010 by an individual who started Cop Block due to his personal experiences with law enforcement when he was “a victim of the war on drugs, twice”.

In addition to posting information about incidents involving police actions [articles, photos, and/or videos], the contributors to the site also call for those interested in helping “the cause” to participate in “call floods”, in which numerous ‘activists’ call a specific agency to “express [their] disapproval [of] the police for their actions”. In December 2010, Cop Block activists, in association with the Bradley Manning Support Network, call flooded the offices of the Quantico Base Commander and the Marine Brig Commanding Officer demanding that Manning be released immediately and to inform them that “exposing the crimes of a government is heroic”.

In order to raise money, as well as promote the project, Cop Block offers items that can be purchased for donations [i.e. stickers, t-shirts, dime cards, etc]. One of the products is a business card which is meant to be distributed not only to “like-minded activists”, but also to law enforcement: “See a police cruiser parked where you’d be ticketed? Leave a card to remind the driver that they have no extra rights.”

Currently there is no specific threat to law enforcement personnel based on this article; however, this bulletin is being provided for situational awareness. Although it is unclear exactly how many individuals are involved in the Cop Block project, the forum on the official website has 127 members and their Facebook group has been “liked” by over 10,000 people.

In order to protect the online identity of you and your agency, the utilization of an anonymizer is recommended when viewing information on this site and others like it.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #16 

(U//FOUO/LES) LulzSec Release: California STAC Gang Infiltration of Law Enforcement Agencies

June 26, 2011 in California, Intelligence Fusion Centers

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

STAC Bulletin: Threat of Gang Infiltration to Law Enforcement Agencies

  • 6 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • January 4, 2011

Download

(U) Threat of Gang Infiltration

(U//FOUO) Infiltration of any law enforcement agency by a gang member can have severe ramifications for the agency involved, its employees, the public it serves, and its allied agencies. Gangs employ various tactics to include infiltrating an agency directly or indirectly, to achieve their objective; to counter this threat, law enforcement must remain cognizant of and employ mitigation strategies. Gangs’ motivations for infiltrating agencies vary; thus law enforcement must remain cognizant of suspicious employee behavior, identify possible motivations for infiltration, and employ mitigation strategies to counter infiltration threats.

(U) Kinds of Infiltration

(U//FOUO) A person who infiltrates an organization on behalf of an aggressor – a gang in this case – is called an infiltrator. There are two different kinds of infiltration: sources of information and influencers. Officers, dispatchers, records personnel, correctional officers and non-sworn personnel with access to sensitive and/or confidential information are examples of potential sources. Influencers include persons who can affect policy or make important decisions, such as correctional officers – who can recommend housing assignments, work details, or issue write-ups – and law enforcement supervisors and managers.

(U) Assessing

(U//LES) Assessing the insider’s exploitable vulnerabilities and motivations are the next step in the recruitment cycle. For example, is the insider disgruntled; seeking friendship, family, or companionship; ideologically motivated; adventurous; or egomaniacal? The recruiter is looking for vulnerabilities or problems he/she can exploit and is more likely to target an employee who openly discusses their dissatisfaction with their agency, is greedy, or is looking for personal gain. An employee who openly discusses their dissatisfaction with their agency, is greedy, or is looking for personal gain may be more susceptible to recruitment or exploitation. Recruiters also seek out personnel who romanticize the gang lifestyle and try to take advantage of the target’s perception of gangs. Examples of motivators may include: financial gain, a sense of power, and access to sex, narcotics, and weapons. For example, a former Transportation Security Administration worker, employed to stop the illegal transport of drugs, benefited from selling and distributing drugs to other dealers. Gangs often use a target’s greed (or desire for personal gain) to influence them to engage in criminal and/or gang-like activity. Recruiters often recruit for personal gain but in a manner that will benefit the gang overall.

(U//FOUO) Infiltration is often seen in jails or prisons where officers and custodial staff have close and constant contact with inmates. Some inmates will try to build a relationship with a nurse or clerical staff member. In the field, officers must often build a rapport with gang members they encounter, as that rapport is established, some gang members may try to exploit the relationship.

(U) Developing

(U//LES): Once the recruiter has assessed the insider’s vulnerabilities, the recruiter moves to the next phase in the cycle and begins to develop a relationship with the insider. It is in this stage that the recruiter exploits the insider’s vulnerabilities. An officer’s appreciation for the gang lifestyle, an association with inmates or gang members, blurred boundaries, and false sense of friendship or loyalty may create a forum for the recruiter to entice the officer. The recruiter may also begin to ask for small, seemingly innocent favors. The recruiter’s intent is to gain control and exploit the insider. They maintain control by helping the insider justify his/her actions and agency betrayal. An Orange County Prosecutor was caught providing sensitive case information to a Hells Angels drug-dealer in exchange for free trips to Las Vegas. He pled guilty to a charge of drug-trafficking conspiracy; he admitted being manipulated by the drug dealer and had not intended to cause harm.

(U) Recruiting/Exploiting

(U//LES) Once the recruiter has developed a relationship with the insider, recruitment and/or exploitation begins, whether ambiguous or unambiguous. Ambiguous recruitment, which is unspoken and progresses “naturally,” is often seen in relationships where the insider’s motivations are typically personal (e.g., friendship, love, sex, etc.) Unambiguous recruitment is much more clear and concise. The insider and recruiter have clearly stated their relationship; the insider is often motivated by tangible gain (e.g., money, power, weapons, etc.) Once this has begun, the recruiter has successfully infiltrated an agency. Four Maryland correctional officers, and members of the Black Guerrilla Family, were arrested on Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization charges for smuggling contraband into two Maryland prisons in exchange for money and other compensation.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #17 

Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage

March 26, 2012 in China, United States

Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage

  • 137 pages
  • March 7, 2012

Download

The PLA’s sustained modernization effort over the past two decades has driven remarkable transformation within the force and put the creation of modern command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure at the heart of the PLA’s strategic guidelines for long term development. This priority on C4ISR systems modernization, has in turn been a catalyst for the development of an integrated information warfare (IW) capability capable of defending military and civilian networks while seizing control of an adversary’s information systems during a conflict.

Information Warfare Strategy

PLA leaders have embraced the idea that successful warfighting is predicated on the ability to exert control over an adversary’s information and information systems, often preemptively. This goal has effectively created a new strategic and tactical high ground, occupying which has become just as important for controlling the battlespace as its geographic equivalent in the physical domain.

The PLA has not publicly disclosed the existence of a computer network operations strategy distinct from other components of IW, such as electronic warfare, psychological operations, kinetic strike, and deception, but rather appears to be working toward the integration of CNO with these components in a unified framework broadly known as “information confrontation.” This concept, as discussed by the PLA, seeks to integrate all elements of information warfare—electronic and non-electronic—offensive and defensive under a single command authority.

Earlier in the past decade, the PLA adopted a multi-layered approach to offensive information warfare that it calls Integrated Network Electronic Warfare or INEW strategy. Now, the PLA is moving toward information confrontation as a broader conceptualization that seeks to unite the various components of IW under a single warfare commander. The need to coordinate offensive and defensive missions more closely and ensure these missions are mutually supporting is driven by the recognition that IW must be closely integrated with PLA campaign objectives. The creation of what a probable information assurance command in the General Staff Department bureaucracy suggests that the PLA is possibly creating a more centralized command authority for IW that will possibly be responsible for coordinating at least network defense throughout the PLA.

As Chinese capabilities in joint operations and IW strengthen, the ability to employ them effectively as either deterrence tools or true offensive weapons capable of degrading the military capabilities of technologically advanced nations or hold these nations’ critical infrastructure at risk in ways heretofore not possible for China will present U.S. leaders and the leaders of allied nations with a more complex risk calculus when evaluating decisions to intervene in Chinese initiated conflicts such as aggression against Taiwan or other nations in the Western Pacific region.

Chinese Use of Network Warfare Against the United States

Chinese capabilities in computer network operations have advanced sufficiently to pose genuine risk to U.S. military operations in the event of a conflict. A defense of Taiwan against mainland aggression is the one contingency in the western Pacific Ocean in which success for the United States hinges upon the speed of its response and the ability of the military to arrive on station with sufficient force to defend Taiwan adequately. PLA analysts consistently identify logistics and C4ISR infrastructure as U.S. strategic centers of gravity suggesting that PLA commanders will almost certainly attempt to target these system with both electronic countermeasures weapons and network attack and exploitation tools, likely in advance of actual combat to delay U.S. entry or degrade capabilities in a conflict.

The effects of preemptive penetrations may not be readily observable or detected until after combat has begun or after Chinese computer network attack (CNA) teams have executed their tools against targeted networks. Even if circumstantial evidence points to China as the culprit, no policy currently exists to easily determine appropriate response options to a large scale attack on U.S. military or civilian networks in which definitive attribution is lacking. Beijing, understanding this, may seek to exploit this gray area in U.S. policymaking and legal frameworks to create delays in U.S. command decision making.

Key Entities and Institutions Supporting Chinese Computer Network Operations

The decision to employ computer network operations and INEW capabilities rests with the senior political and military leadership and would be part of a larger issue of employing force during a crisis. Once that decision was made, however, the operational control for the military use of CNO rests with the PLA’s Third and Fourth Departments of the General Staff Department (GSD). The Third Department (3PLA), China’s primary signals intelligence collector is likely tasked with the network defense and possibly exploitation missions. The Fourth Department (4PLA), the traditional electronic warfare arm of the PLA, likely has the responsibility for conducting network attack missions.

The PRC government actively funds grant programs to support CNO related research in both offensive and defensive in orientation at commercial IT companies and civilian and military universities. A review of PRC university technical programs, curricula, research foci, and funding for research and development in areas contributing to information warfare capabilities illustrates the breadth and complexity of the relationships between the universities, government and military organizations, and commercial high-tech industries countrywide.

Related Material From the Archive:

  1. People’s Republic of China Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation Capability Report
  2. Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar
  3. Naval Network Warfare Command Guidance for Internet-Based Capabilities
  4. U.S. Military Failed to Disclose Cyberwarfare Operations
  5. Chinese General Discusses Sensitive Espionage Cases in Leaked Video
  6. HBGary DoD Cyber Warfare Support Work Statement
  7. NSA to Assist DHS with Domestic Cyberwarfare Operations
  8. Naval Network Warfare Command Brief

__________________
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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #18 

Attorney General Eric Holder Speech on Targeted Killing of U.S. Citizens Full Transcript

March 6, 2012 in Department of Justice

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder delivers a national security speech regarding the Obama administration's ongoing counter terrorism efforts during his visit to Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago, March 5, 2012. REUTERS/Jeff Haynes

Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law (doj.gov):

As prepared for delivery

Thank you, Dean [Daniel] Rodriguez, for your kind words, and for the outstanding leadership that you provide – not only for this academic campus, but also for our nation’s legal community. It is a privilege to be with you today – and to be among the distinguished faculty members, staff, alumni, and students who make Northwestern such an extraordinary place.

For more than 150 years, this law school has served as a training ground for future leaders; as a forum for critical, thoughtful debate; and as a meeting place to consider issues of national concern and global consequence. This afternoon, I am honored to be part of this tradition. And I’m grateful for the opportunity to join with you in discussing a defining issue of our time – and a most critical responsibility that we share: how we will stay true to America’s founding – and enduring – promises of security, justice and liberty.

Since this country’s earliest days, the American people have risen to this challenge – and all that it demands. But, as we have seen – and as President John F. Kennedy may have described best – “In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger.”

Half a century has passed since those words were spoken, but our nation today confronts grave national security threats that demand our constant attention and steadfast commitment. It is clear that, once again, we have reached an “hour of danger.”

We are a nation at war. And, in this war, we face a nimble and determined enemy that cannot be underestimated.

Like President Obama – and my fellow members of his national security team – I begin each day with a briefing on the latest and most urgent threats made against us in the preceding 24 hours. And, like scores of attorneys and agents at the Justice Department, I go to sleep each night thinking of how best to keep our people safe.

I know that – more than a decade after the September 11th attacks; and despite our recent national security successes, including the operation that brought to justice Osama bin Laden last year – there are people currently plotting to murder Americans, who reside in distant countries as well as within our own borders. Disrupting and preventing these plots – and using every available and appropriate tool to keep the American people safe – has been, and will remain, this Administration’s top priority.

But just as surely as we are a nation at war, we also are a nation of laws and values. Even when under attack, our actions must always be grounded on the bedrock of the Constitution – and must always be consistent with statutes, court precedent, the rule of law and our founding ideals. Not only is this the right thing to do – history has shown that it is also the most effective approach we can take in combating those who seek to do us harm.

This is not just my view. My judgment is shared by senior national security officials across the government. As the President reminded us in 2009, at the National Archives where our founding documents are housed, “[w]e uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but because it strengthens our country and it keeps us safe. Time and again, our values have been our best national security asset.” Our history proves this. We do not have to choose between security and liberty – and we will not.

Today, I want to tell you about the collaboration across the government that defines and distinguishes this Administration’s national security efforts. I also want to discuss some of the legal principles that guide – and strengthen – this work, as well as the special role of the Department of Justice in protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution.

Before 9/11, today’s level of interagency cooperation was not commonplace. In many ways, government lacked the infrastructure – as well as the imperative – to share national security information quickly and effectively. Domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence operated in largely independent spheres. But those who attacked us on September 11th chose both military and civilian targets. They crossed borders and jurisdictional lines. And it immediately became clear that no single agency could address these threats, because no single agency has all of the necessary tools.

To counter this enemy aggressively and intelligently, the government had to draw on all of its resources – and radically update its operations. As a result, today, government agencies are better postured to work together to address a range of emerging national security threats. Now, the lawyers, agents and analysts at the Department of Justice work closely with our colleagues across the national security community to detect and disrupt terrorist plots, to prosecute suspected terrorists, and to identify and implement the legal tools necessary to keep the American people safe. Unfortunately, the fact and extent of this cooperation are often overlooked in the public debate – but it’s something that this Administration, and the previous one, can be proud of.

As part of this coordinated effort, the Justice Department plays a key role in conducting oversight to ensure that the intelligence community’s activities remain in compliance with the law, and, together with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, in authorizing surveillance to investigate suspected terrorists. We must – and will continue to – use the intelligence-gathering capabilities that Congress has provided to collect information that can save and protect American lives. At the same time, these tools must be subject to appropriate checks and balances – including oversight by Congress and the courts, as well as within the Executive Branch – to protect the privacy and civil rights of innocent individuals. This Administration is committed to making sure that our surveillance programs appropriately reflect all of these interests.

Let me give you an example. Under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize annually, with the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, collection directed at identified categories of foreign intelligence targets, without the need for a court order for each individual subject. This ensures that the government has the flexibility and agility it needs to identify and to respond to terrorist and other foreign threats to our security. But the government may not use this authority intentionally to target a U.S. person, here or abroad, or anyone known to be in the United States.

The law requires special procedures, reviewed and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to make sure that these restrictions are followed, and to protect the privacy of any U.S. persons whose nonpublic information may be incidentally acquired through this program. The Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence conduct extensive oversight reviews of section 702 activities at least once every sixty days, and we report to Congress on implementation and compliance twice a year. This law therefore establishes a comprehensive regime of oversight by all three branches of government. Reauthorizing this authority before it expires at the end of this year is the top legislative priority of the Intelligence Community.

But surveillance is only the first of many complex issues we must navigate. Once a suspected terrorist is captured, a decision must be made as to how to proceed with that individual in order to identify the disposition that best serves the interests of the American people and the security of this nation.

Much has been made of the distinction between our federal civilian courts and revised military commissions. The reality is that both incorporate fundamental due process and other protections that are essential to the effective administration of justice – and we should not deprive ourselves of any tool in our fight against al Qaeda.

Our criminal justice system is renowned not only for its fair process; it is respected for its results. We are not the first Administration to rely on federal courts to prosecute terrorists, nor will we be the last. Although far too many choose to ignore this fact, the previous Administration consistently relied on criminal prosecutions in federal court to bring terrorists to justice. John Walker Lindh, attempted shoe bomber Richard Reid, and 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui were among the hundreds of defendants convicted of terrorism-related offenses – without political controversy – during the last administration.

Over the past three years, we’ve built a remarkable record of success in terror prosecutions. For example, in October, we secured a conviction against Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab for his role in the attempted bombing of an airplane traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. He was sentenced last month to life in prison without the possibility of parole. While in custody, he provided significant intelligence during debriefing sessions with the FBI. He described in detail how he became inspired to carry out an act of jihad, and how he traveled to Yemen and made contact with Anwar al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen and a leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Abdulmutallab also detailed the training he received, as well as Aulaqi’s specific instructions to wait until the airplane was over the United States before detonating his bomb.

In addition to Abdulmutallab, Faizal Shahzad, the attempted Times Square bomber, Ahmed Ghailani, a conspirator in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and three individuals who plotted an attack against John F. Kennedy Airport in 2007, have also recently begun serving life sentences. And convictions have been obtained in the cases of several homegrown extremists, as well. For example, last year, United States citizen and North Carolina resident Daniel Boyd pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad; and U.S. citizen and Illinois resident Michael Finton pleaded guilty to attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his efforts to detonate a truck bomb outside of a federal courthouse.

I could go on. Which is why the calls that I’ve heard to ban the use of civilian courts in prosecutions of terrorism-related activity are so baffling, and ultimately are so dangerous. These calls ignore reality. And if heeded, they would significantly weaken – in fact, they would cripple – our ability to incapacitate and punish those who attempt to do us harm.

Simply put, since 9/11, hundreds of individuals have been convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offenses in Article III courts and are now serving long sentences in federal prison. Not one has ever escaped custody. No judicial district has suffered any kind of retaliatory attack. These are facts, not opinions. There are not two sides to this story. Those who claim that our federal courts are incapable of handling terrorism cases are not registering a dissenting opinion — they are simply wrong.

But federal courts are not our only option. Military commissions are also appropriate in proper circumstances, and we can use them as well to convict terrorists and disrupt their plots. This Administration’s approach has been to ensure that the military commissions system is as effective as possible, in part by strengthening the procedural protections on which the commissions are based. With the President’s leadership, and the bipartisan backing of Congress, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 was enacted into law. And, since then, meaningful improvements have been implemented.

It’s important to note that the reformed commissions draw from the same fundamental protections of a fair trial that underlie our civilian courts. They provide a presumption of innocence and require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. They afford the accused the right to counsel – as well as the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. They prohibit the use of statements obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. And they secure the right to appeal to Article III judges – all the way to the United States Supreme Court. In addition, like our federal civilian courts, reformed commissions allow for the protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence gathering, and for the safety and security of participants.

A key difference is that, in military commissions, evidentiary rules reflect the realities of the battlefield and of conducting investigations in a war zone. For example, statements may be admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings, because we cannot expect military personnel to administer warnings to an enemy captured in battle. But instead, a military judge must make other findings – for instance, that the statement is reliable and that it was made voluntarily.

I have faith in the framework and promise of our military commissions, which is why I’ve sent several cases to the reformed commissions for prosecution. There is, quite simply, no inherent contradiction between using military commissions in appropriate cases while still prosecuting other terrorists in civilian courts. Without question, there are differences between these systems that must be – and will continue to be – weighed carefully. Such decisions about how to prosecute suspected terrorists are core Executive Branch functions. In each case, prosecutors and counterterrorism professionals across the government conduct an intensive review of case-specific facts designed to determine which avenue of prosecution to pursue.

Several practical considerations affect the choice of forum.

First of all, the commissions only have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals who are a part of al Qaeda, have engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, or who have purposefully and materially supported such hostilities. This means that there may be members of certain terrorist groups who fall outside the jurisdiction of military commissions because, for example, they lack ties to al Qaeda and their conduct does not otherwise make them subject to prosecution in this forum. Additionally, by statute, military commissions cannot be used to try U.S. citizens.

Second, our civilian courts cover a much broader set of offenses than the military commissions, which can only prosecute specified offenses, including violations of the laws of war and other offenses traditionally triable by military commission. This means federal prosecutors have a wider range of tools that can be used to incapacitate suspected terrorists. Those charges, and the sentences they carry upon successful conviction, can provide important incentives to reach plea agreements and convince defendants to cooperate with federal authorities.

Third, there is the issue of international cooperation. A number of countries have indicated that they will not cooperate with the United States in certain counterterrorism efforts — for instance, in providing evidence or extraditing suspects – if we intend to use that cooperation in pursuit of a military commission prosecution. Although the use of military commissions in the United States can be traced back to the early days of our nation, in their present form they are less familiar to the international community than our time-tested criminal justice system and Article III courts. However, it is my hope that, with time and experience, the reformed commissions will attain similar respect in the eyes of the world.

Where cases are selected for prosecution in military commissions, Justice Department investigators and prosecutors work closely to support our Department of Defense colleagues. Today, the alleged mastermind of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole is being prosecuted before a military commission. I am proud to say that trial attorneys from the Department of Justice are working with military prosecutors on that case, as well as others.

And we will continue to reject the false idea that we must choose between federal courts and military commissions, instead of using them both. If we were to fail to use all necessary and available tools at our disposal, we would undoubtedly fail in our fundamental duty to protect the Nation and its people. That is simply not an outcome we can accept.

This Administration has worked in other areas as well to ensure that counterterrorism professionals have the flexibility that they need to fulfill their critical responsibilities without diverging from our laws and our values. Last week brought the most recent step, when the President issued procedures under the National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation, which Congress passed in December, mandated that a narrow category of al Qaeda terrorist suspects be placed in temporary military custody.

Last Tuesday, the President exercised his authority under the statute to issue procedures to make sure that military custody will not disrupt ongoing law enforcement and intelligence operations — and that an individual will be transferred from civilian to military custody only after a thorough evaluation of his or her case, based on the considered judgment of the President’s senior national security team. As authorized by the statute, the President waived the requirements for several categories of individuals where he found that the waivers were in our national security interest. These procedures implement not only the language of the statute but also the expressed intent of the lead sponsors of this legislation. And they address the concerns the President expressed when he signed this bill into law at the end of last year.

Now, I realize I have gone into considerable detail about tools we use to identify suspected terrorists and to bring captured terrorists to justice. It is preferable to capture suspected terrorists where feasible – among other reasons, so that we can gather valuable intelligence from them – but we must also recognize that there are instances where our government has the clear authority – and, I would argue, the responsibility – to defend the United States through the appropriate and lawful use of lethal force.

This principle has long been established under both U.S. and international law. In response to the attacks perpetrated – and the continuing threat posed – by al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, Congress has authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those groups. Because the United States is in an armed conflict, we are authorized to take action against enemy belligerents under international law. The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of violent attack. And international law recognizes the inherent right of national self-defense. None of this is changed by the fact that we are not in a conventional war.

Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. Over the last three years alone, al Qaeda and its associates have directed several attacks – fortunately, unsuccessful – against us from countries other than Afghanistan. Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.

This does not mean that we can use military force whenever or wherever we want. International legal principles, including respect for another nation’s sovereignty, constrain our ability to act unilaterally. But the use of force in foreign territory would be consistent with these international legal principles if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved – or after a determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States.

Furthermore, it is entirely lawful – under both United States law and applicable law of war principles – to target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associated forces. This is not a novel concept. In fact, during World War II, the United States tracked the plane flying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – the commander of Japanese forces in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway – and shot it down specifically because he was on board. As I explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee following the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the same rules apply today.

Some have called such operations “assassinations.” They are not, and the use of that loaded term is misplaced. Assassinations are unlawful killings. Here, for the reasons I have given, the U.S. government’s use of lethal force in self defense against a leader of al Qaeda or an associated force who presents an imminent threat of violent attack would not be unlawful — and therefore would not violate the Executive Order banning assassination or criminal statutes.

Now, it is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that some of the threats we face come from a small number of United States citizens who have decided to commit violent attacks against their own country from abroad. Based on generations-old legal principles and Supreme Court decisions handed down during World War II, as well as during this current conflict, it’s clear that United States citizenship alone does not make such individuals immune from being targeted. But it does mean that the government must take into account all relevant constitutional considerations with respect to United States citizens – even those who are leading efforts to kill innocent Americans. Of these, the most relevant is the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which says that the government may not deprive a citizen of his or her life without due process of law.

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause does not impose one-size-fits-all requirements, but instead mandates procedural safeguards that depend on specific circumstances. In cases arising under the Due Process Clause – including in a case involving a U.S. citizen captured in the conflict against al Qaeda – the Court has applied a balancing approach, weighing the private interest that will be affected against the interest the government is trying to protect, and the burdens the government would face in providing additional process. Where national security operations are at stake, due process takes into account the realities of combat.

Here, the interests on both sides of the scale are extraordinarily weighty. An individual’s interest in making sure that the government does not target him erroneously could not be more significant. Yet it is imperative for the government to counter threats posed by senior operational leaders of al Qaeda, and to protect the innocent people whose lives could be lost in their attacks.

Any decision to use lethal force against a United States citizen – even one intent on murdering Americans and who has become an operational leader of al-Qaeda in a foreign land – is among the gravest that government leaders can face. The American people can be – and deserve to be – assured that actions taken in their defense are consistent with their values and their laws. So, although I cannot discuss or confirm any particular program or operation, I believe it is important to explain these legal principles publicly.

Let me be clear: an operation using lethal force in a foreign country, targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans, would be lawful at least in the following circumstances: First, the U.S. government has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.

The evaluation of whether an individual presents an “imminent threat” incorporates considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United States. As we learned on 9/11, al Qaeda has demonstrated the ability to strike with little or no notice – and to cause devastating casualties. Its leaders are continually planning attacks against the United States, and they do not behave like a traditional military – wearing uniforms, carrying arms openly, or massing forces in preparation for an attack. Given these facts, the Constitution does not require the President to delay action until some theoretical end-stage of planning – when the precise time, place, and manner of an attack become clear. Such a requirement would create an unacceptably high risk that our efforts would fail, and that Americans would be killed.

Whether the capture of a U.S. citizen terrorist is feasible is a fact-specific, and potentially time-sensitive, question. It may depend on, among other things, whether capture can be accomplished in the window of time available to prevent an attack and without undue risk to civilians or to U.S. personnel. Given the nature of how terrorists act and where they tend to hide, it may not always be feasible to capture a United States citizen terrorist who presents an imminent threat of violent attack. In that case, our government has the clear authority to defend the United States with lethal force.

Of course, any such use of lethal force by the United States will comply with the four fundamental law of war principles governing the use of force. The principle of necessity requires that the target have definite military value. The principle of distinction requires that only lawful targets – such as combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, and military objectives – may be targeted intentionally. Under the principle of proportionality, the anticipated collateral damage must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Finally, the principle of humanity requires us to use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering.

These principles do not forbid the use of stealth or technologically advanced weapons. In fact, the use of advanced weapons may help to ensure that the best intelligence is available for planning and carrying out operations, and that the risk of civilian casualties can be minimized or avoided altogether.

Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces. This is simply not accurate. “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.

The conduct and management of national security operations are core functions of the Executive Branch, as courts have recognized throughout our history. Military and civilian officials must often make real-time decisions that balance the need to act, the existence of alternative options, the possibility of collateral damage, and other judgments – all of which depend on expertise and immediate access to information that only the Executive Branch may possess in real time. The Constitution’s guarantee of due process is ironclad, and it is essential – but, as a recent court decision makes clear, it does not require judicial approval before the President may use force abroad against a senior operational leader of a foreign terrorist organization with which the United States is at war – even if that individual happens to be a U.S. citizen.

That is not to say that the Executive Branch has – or should ever have – the ability to target any such individuals without robust oversight. Which is why, in keeping with the law and our constitutional system of checks and balances, the Executive Branch regularly informs the appropriate members of Congress about our counterterrorism activities, including the legal framework, and would of course follow the same practice where lethal force is used against United States citizens.

Now, these circumstances are sufficient under the Constitution for the United States to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen abroad – but it is important to note that the legal requirements I have described may not apply in every situation – such as operations that take place on traditional battlefields.

The unfortunate reality is that our nation will likely continue to face terrorist threats that – at times – originate with our own citizens. When such individuals take up arms against this country – and join al Qaeda in plotting attacks designed to kill their fellow Americans – there may be only one realistic and appropriate response. We must take steps to stop them – in full accordance with the Constitution. In this hour of danger, we simply cannot afford to wait until deadly plans are carried out – and we will not.

This is an indicator of our times – not a departure from our laws and our values. For this Administration – and for this nation – our values are clear. We must always look to them for answers when we face difficult questions, like the ones I have discussed today. As the President reminded us at the National Archives, “our Constitution has endured through secession and civil rights, through World War and Cold War, because it provides a foundation of principles that can be applied pragmatically; it provides a compass that can help us find our way.”

Our most sacred principles and values – of security, justice and liberty for all citizens – must continue to unite us, to guide us forward, and to help us build a future that honors our founding documents and advances our ongoing – uniquely American – pursuit of a safer, more just, and more perfect union. In the continuing effort to keep our people secure, this Administration will remain true to those values that inspired our nation’s founding and, over the course of two centuries, have made America an example of strength and a beacon of justice for all the world. This is our pledge.

Thank you for inviting me to discuss these important issues with you today.


__________________
Test your connection for leaks:
http://ip-check.info/?lang=en

Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
http://www.rmprepusb.com/

Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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(U//FOUO//LES) DHS Terrorist Use of Social Networking Facebook Case Study

December 5, 2010 in Department of Homeland Security

Due to its format, the following document cannot be conclusively dated. However, it is believed to have been created within the last month.

TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
FACEBOOK CASE STUDY

  • For Official Use Only
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • 2010

Terrorists have traditionally sought to exploit new and alternative media, particularly on the Internet, to spread their propaganda and to a lesser extent, operational and tactical guidance to prospective supporters through websites, forums, blogs, chat rooms etc. In recent years, Islamic terrorists have expanded the purview of their online endeavors into social networking sites, websites that create and foster online communities organized around shared affinities and affiliations that connect people based on interests and relationships. In most cases, social networking sites are openly viewable to any participant on the site.

As part of this trend, jihad supporters and mujahideen are increasingly using Facebook, one of the largest, most popular and diverse social networking sites, both in the United States and globally, to propagate operational information, including IED recipes primarily in Arabic, but in English, Indonesian, Urdu and other languages as well. While some tactical information is available on Facebook, the majority of extremist use of Facebook focuses on disseminating ideological information and exploiting the site as an alternative media outlet for terrorist propaganda. However, to a lesser degree, the site is used as a gateway to radical forums and jihadi sites with explicit radical agendas (and easily downloadable operational information) and as a platform to promulgate some tactical and operational information.

Terrorist Use of Facebook:

• As a way to share operational and tactical information, such as bomb recipes, AK-47 maintenance and use, tactical shooting, etc.
• As a gateway to extremist sites and other online radical content by linking on
Facebook group pages and in discussion forums.
• As a media outlet for terrorist propaganda and extremist ideological messaging.
• As a wealth of information for remote reconnaissance for targeting purposes.

Operational & Tactical Information

Two Arabic-language IED recipes, one for explosive ammonal and one for a poisonous smoke bomb, along with Arabic-language instructions on how to prepare nitric acid were collected from the discussion board of a Facebook group with a clear radical preference. While the group only boasted 47 members and all the posts were from the same user whose profile picture and user name was Osama bin Laden (obscuring the user’s true identity), all content on the group’s Facebook page is open to the public, meaning anyone with a Facebook account has access to the posts.
By making a group open to the public, its actual membership number becomes almost irrelevant in terms of access to information sharing. It is worth noting that the same toxic smoke bomb recipe posted on the Facebook page was collected at roughly the same time from an Arabic-language radical forum, suggesting that there is some cross-over between radical content disseminated on Facebook and on Islamist extremist forums. In addition to explosives related material, informational videos with titles such as “tactical shooting,” “getting to know your AK-47,” “how to field strip an AK-47” etc. were collected from a radical Facebook group with over 2,000 members, which was open and accessible to non-members.

While how-to videos about firearms are not inherently terrorist source material pertaining to tactics and procedures, and are not nefarious in isolation (they are within the scope of acceptable content on Facebook, YouTube, and other social networking sites), the ones found on Facebook were taken from radical groups dedicated to jihad. These combined with the juxtaposition of a video on tactical shooting with video clips from al- Qaeda’s media wing, As-Sahab, featuring Osama bin Laden and Adam Gadahn from a Facebook page explicitly dedicated to jihad (“wherever the mujahedeen are fighting, they are doing their religious duty as well as fighting for their right&rdquo, makes these videos terrorist source material.

Facebook as a Gateway

While a plethora of radical content and terrorist propaganda is already being posted on Facebook, radicals are also using Facebook group discussion forums and wall posts to link to radical forums, media sites for extremist groups, and recruitment pages. Some Islamist radical forums even have Facebook pages, which facilitate navigation between the two. In this way, Facebook acts as a gateway or launching pad for further radicalization and for easy access to sites where explosives recipes and IED information are regularly posted. For example, a Facebook group with over 5,000 members claiming to defend Islam had links to Hizb ut Tahrir and al- Aqsa’s homepage.

Links to al-Qaeda videos on YouTube, propaganda videos featuring wounded and dead Palestinians in Gaza, and videos promoting female suicide bombers were all openly accessible as well. Facebook has also become a popular platform for the dissemination and quick spread of Osama bin Laden statements, whether audio or video. His most recent statements have appeared on a number of Facebook group pages within 48 hours of release. There were also a number of groups dedicated to Hezbollah and Hassan Nasr Allah that had propaganda videos showing the organization’s weapons arsenal and training.

Radical Forums and Facebook as Jihadi Media

While social networking sites have recently become popular with radicals, forums have long been used by terrorists to exchange ideas, and spread ideological, tactical and operational information among a sympathetic audience. A number of discussion threads have been collected from these well-established, radical forums that focus on expanding into other social networking interfaces, especially Facebook:

• This [Facebook] is a great idea, and better than the forums. Instead of waiting for people to [come to you so you can] inform them, you go to them and teach them! God willing, the mujahedeen, their supporters, and proud jihadi journalists will [use the site, too]. [First,] it has become clear that the market of social networking websites is developing in an astonishing manner and that it fulfills important needs for Internet users, particularly younger ones.
• Facebook has become very successful in this field; therefore, it is our duty to use it, as adherents of jihad and [members] of the blessed jihadi media. [I] mean, if you have a group of 5,000 people, with the press of a button you [can] send them a standardized message. [That] means if you send one message with a link to [forum names], a clear [path] to jihadi media is open.
• I entreat you, by God, to begin registering for Facebook as soon as you [finish] reading this post. Familiarize yourselves with it. This post is a seed and a beginning, to be followed by serious efforts to optimize our Facebook usage. Let’s start distributing Islamic jihadi publications, posts, articles, and pictures. Let’s anticipate a reward from the Lord of the Heavens, dedicate our purpose to God, and help our colleagues.

General Goals of the Invasion
1. Reach the wide base of Muslims who [use] Facebook.
2. Encourage brothers to devise new online media in support of jihadi media.
3. Form a solid base on Facebook and shed light on it as a medium for reaching people.
4. Move from an elite society ([on] jihadi forums and websites) to mainstream Muslims, [encourage] their participation, and interact with them.
5. Advance media operations and encourage creativity, innovation, flexibility, and change. Reach large [numbers] of Crusaders, broadcast the losses of their armies, expose the lies of their leaders, and call Muslims to jihad.

These posts call for the organized, strategic exploitation of Facebook, recognizing its value as a platform for reaching a wider, younger audience. The user who posted steps for ‘invading’ Facebook recognizes the inherent value in exploiting a non-ideological medium, namely its wide user base that is comprised of the general public.

It also serves as recognition that jihadi forums are mostly frequented by people who have already become radicalized or support jihad, i.e. “elite society,” whereas Facebook offers a space to interact with “mainstream Muslims” and attract and recruit new supporters. Given that in terror networks social bonds tend to be more significant than external factors like shared hatred or ideology, social networking interfaces whose purpose is to virtually connect people based on such common social bonds clearly lend themselves to extremist use and recruitment efforts.
Operational Security (OPSEC)

In addition to discussing the exploitation of Facebook to promote jihadi media, a number of forum threads also discuss how best to do so while maintaining a high level of operational security. The posts explicate OPSEC measures that should be taken to maintain anonymity, encourage users to fictionalize and use artifice and demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the online security environment and the need for anonymity even within a medium that is relatively un-policed like Facebook. The following terrorist source material was harvested from a number of Arabic-language radical forum threads:

• First, we make clear that [you should] use Tor to email, register, and [use Facebook]. Don’t join unless you are using Tor. Take care that all data be “fictional,” and the Facebook password should not be the [same] as the email password. In general, don’t use a password twice, meaning don’t [use] your password for [forum] or [forum] on another forum.
• [Make sure] all the data is fictional and that the password for Facebook is a new
password [you have] never used before. [Make sure the password] is complicated [and includes] some uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols. Save it in your notebook on the [computer] or on a flash (USB) [drive].
• I [think it’s best] not to post a picture with jihadi meaning, so that the eyes of the idolater dogs won’t be on you. If you want, post a picture that calls attention to God, so that you will benefit from good things. Don’t [use a picture] of yourself.
• In order for the maximum number of “Facebookers” to join your group, you should reveal to them that you are, for example, an expert in terrorist groups. You don’t have to reveal that you sympathize with al-Qaeda. The group’s members will automatically sympathize with the organization once they become familiar with the organization’s tapes and jihadi operations. You must use artifice.

While radical Islamist forum discussion threads demonstrate acuity for the need for strong OPSEC, there may be little need for such care on sites like Facebook. The much higher frequency with which radical content appears on Arabic-language Facebook group pages, as opposed to radical content in Spanish and English, may be due to the lack of oversight of the Arabic-language in comparison to the other two languages, which are well monitored because of the relative ease of doing so.

According to Facebook Rights and Responsibilities on the website, “You will not post content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else’s rights or otherwise violates the law.” It also states that “We can remove any content or information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement.” However, information is not screened before it is posted, so posts that violate the rules remain on the site until they are detected and removed.

Remote Reconnaissance

In addition to using Facebook to disseminate information, information posted by users can also be exploited by adversaries for targeting purposes. For example, Facebook postings have been used domestically by robbers to determine when a user would be out of the house. The Shin Bet security agency (part of the Israeli Ministry of Defense) has recognized terrorist use of social networking sites for remote reconnaissance, warning Israeli soldiers about posting sensitive information: “terror organizations are using these [social networking] sites to tempt Israelis to meet up in person in order to either abduct them, kill them or recruit them as spies.” The English-language Lebanese media outlet, Ya Libnan, has also reported that an Israeli soldier was sentenced to 19 days in a military brig after posting a photograph of the base where he was assigned.” Although there have been no reported cases of social network sites being used for targeting in explosives related cases, it is another reconnaissance resource available to terrorists.

Conclusions

The vast size, linguistically and culturally diverse user base, and lack of verification of user supplied biographical information on social networking sites make monitoring and evaluation of potential threats on these sites extremely difficult. Moreover, the presence of non-violent extremist material on user profiles and in “linked” content complicates the task of isolating and assessing more credible threats. These attributes, combined with the complicated array of privacy settings users may employ–or augment with secondary forms of communication, ranging from traditional web forums to email–make social networking sites a viable tool for terrorists to use.

While Facebook is currently being used as a platform to share operational and tactical information, a gateway to extremist sites and forums, an outlet for propaganda and extremist ideological messaging and for conducting remote reconnaissance, it is by no means the only social networking site being employed for extremist use. Radical material including documents, videos, and audio files have been disseminated on other popular social networking sites, such as Twitter, YouTube, and MySpace.

The radical Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, has even created and launched its own social networking site that operates in much the same way as Facebook called Ikhwan Book. These sites, with their vast user bases and profusion of user generated information present both challenges and opportunities for law enforcement. While social networking sites are difficult to police given the sheer volume of information and complicated privacy settings, they do contain a wealth of knowledge about potential threats and current tactics and techniques being disseminated on the web.

Comment: For all inquiries related to Pinpoint Reports, please contact the Helpdesk at tripwirehelp@dhs.gov.

Source; TRIPwire’s Pinpoint. This report combine terrorist source material translation with open source research and original TRIPwire analysis to evaluate

DISSEMINATION INSTRUCTIONS: This document is marked Law Enforcement Sensitive/For Offical Use Only and may be disseminated, with proper attribution, to Law Enforcement, DOD, or U.S. Intelligence Agencies. Further disclosure to unauthorized entities could jeopardize ongoing investigations, operations, and personal safety. This product shall not be released to the public or media.


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White House ATF Fast and Furious Emails and Documents

October 4, 2011 in Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives, White House

These emails and documents related to the ongoing investigation of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’  “Fast and Furious”/Project Gun Runner program were obtained by CBS.  Redactions were presumably performed by CBS.

White House ATF Fast and Furious Emails and Documents

  • 102 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • 2010
  • 8.5 MB

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(U//LES) Arizona Fusion Center Warning: Police Officers Targeted on Facebook

February 23, 2011 in Arizona, Intelligence Fusion Centers

ARIZONA COUNTER-TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER

  • 1 page
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • October 29, 2010

Download

PHOENIX POLICE OFFICERS TARGETED ON FACEBOOK

On October 28, 2010 a DUI traffic stop by MCSO uncovered a CD containing multiple photographs and names of over 30 Phoenix PD officers and civilian employees. All of the names and photographs found on the CD were obtained from Facebook and reveal the identity of several patrol and undercover officers. All officers who were identified on the CD have been notified. It is unknown how many more CDs (if any) may be circulating. This information is provided for Officer Safety and Situational Awareness purposes.

Law enforcement officers should use good judgment when posting personal information about themselves on social networks. For instance, if you have worked or are currently working in an undercover capacity it is recommended that you DO NOT post photographs of yourself with your personal information on social networking sites – as this may create serious officer safety consequences.

Suggested Measures:

  • Secure all photographs and other information by customizing your privacy settings to control who may access your information and photographs
  • Set privacy settings to ‘Friends Only’
  • Make your profile photo something that is obscure or known only to those who know you
  • Remember: anyone can see your profile photo
  • Do not post photographs or information that identifies you as a law enforcement officer
  • Stay current on security changes and updates on social networking sites, as they are constantly changing

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Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center: Officers Should Be Hidden from the Public

March 10, 2010 in California, Intelligence Fusion Centers

OFFICER SAFETY BULLETIN

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • October 20, 2008

download

The website https://msn.whitepages.com was brought to our attention as an officer safety concern due to the ease in which personal information, such as home address, could be obtained. This bulletin will provide you with information on how to remove your name and personal information from the list:

• In your internet browser type in “https://msh.whitepages.com in the URL address bar
• Type in your name under “People Search”.

• If your name appears click on the details button
• Scroll down near the bottom of the page to the “White pages.com Privacy Options” section and click on “Is this you? Remove from listing” link.

The information was removed within a couple of minutes; however, it can take up to 5 days per the website.

If you have any questions or further information, please contact the Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (SAC RTTAC) at 916-808-8383.


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https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-ohio-fusion-center-winter-clothing-warning/

https://publicintelligence.net/ufouoles-dhs-terrorist-use-of-social-networking-facebook-case-study/

https://publicintelligence.net/ny-police-rental-car-database-info-poses-risk-to-undercover-officers/

https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-illinois-fusion-center-ninja-whip-belt-warning/



misc

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(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Bulletin: Indicators of Suspicious Behaviors at Hotels

October 31, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Indicators of Suspicious Behaviors at Hotels

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • July 26, 2010

Download

(U//FOUO) Known or possible terrorists have displayed suspicious behaviors while staying at hotels overseas—including avoiding questions typically asked of hotel registrants; showing unusual interest in hotel security; attempting access to restricted areas; and evading hotel staff. These behaviors also could be observed in U.S. hotels, and security and law enforcement personnel should be aware of the potential indicators of terrorist activity.

(U//FOUO) Possible indicators of terrorist behaviors at hotels: The observation of multiple indicators may represent—based on the specific facts or circumstances—possible terrorist behaviors at hotels:

— (U//FOUO) Not providing professional or personal details on hotel registrations—such as place of employment, contact information, or place of residence.
— (U//FOUO) Using payphones for outgoing calls or making front desk requests in person to avoid using the room telephone.
— (U//FOUO) Interest in using Internet cafes, despite hotel Internet availability.
— (U//FOUO) Non-VIPs who request that their presence at a hotel not be divulged.
— (U//FOUO) Extending departure dates one day at a time for prolonged periods.
— (U//FOUO) Refusal of housekeeping services for extended periods.
— (U//FOUO) Extended stays with little baggage or unpacked luggage.
— (U//FOUO) Access or attempted access to areas of the hotel normally restricted to staff.
— (U//FOUO) Use of cash for large transactions or a credit card in someone else’s name.
— (U//FOUO) Requests for specific rooms, floors, or other locations in the hotel.
— (U//FOUO) Use of a third party to register.
— (U//FOUO) Multiple visitors or deliveries to one individual or room.
— (U//FOUO) Unusual interest in hotel access, including main and alternate entrances, emergency exits, and surrounding routes.
— (U//FOUO) Use of entrances and exits that avoid the lobby or other areas with cameras and hotel personnel.
— (U//FOUO) Attempting to access restricted parking areas with a vehicle or leaving unattended vehicles near the hotel building.
— (U//FOUO) Unusual interest in hotel staff operating procedures, shift changes, closed-circuit TV systems, fire alarms, and security systems.
— (U//FOUO) Leaving the property for several days and then returning.
— (U//FOUO) Abandoning a room and leaving behind clothing, toiletries, or other items.
— (U//FOUO) Noncompliance with other hotel policies.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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(U//FOUO) DHS-FBI Suspicious Activity Reporting Bulletin: Misrepresentation

October 31, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR): Misrepresentation

  • 1 page
  • For Official Use Only
  • September 14, 2012

Download

(U//FOUO) Terrorists might use disguises, fraudulent or stolen credentials, and cloned or repurposed vehicles to gain access to restricted areas, to blend in with their surroundings when conducting surveillance, or to conceal other activities while planning or executing an attack. Anders Breivik, the gunman who was sentenced to 21 years in prison for the July 2011 attack on the Workers’ Youth League summer camp in Norway, wore a police uniform and displayed false identification to gain unauthorized access to the camp. Depending on the target, disguises might be aimed at impersonating law enforcement, emergency services, or officials of an institution who have legitimate access to secured/restricted sites.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists might exhibit during planning or actual attacks. Although none were linked to terrorist activity, we consider the examples relevant for situational awareness and training:

— (U) A security officer at a critical infrastructure site approached two individuals who displayed badges and holstered hand guns and claimed to be “homeland security” personnel conducting an investigation. The individuals refused to identify themselves and directed the officer to stay back. Subsequent investigation revealed the individuals were not authorized homeland security/law enforcement officials.

— (U) A subject, who falsely claimed to be an undercover FBI agent, contacted a security officer at an indoor concert arena in an attempt to obtain security plans for the building. He presented a fake business card that identified him as a special agent with the FBI and was later arrested and charged with impersonating a police officer.

(U) Possible Indicators of Misrepresentation

(U//FOUO) The following activities might indicate attempts at misrepresentation and fraudulent impersonation. Depending on the context—time, location, personal behaviors, and other indicators—suspicious persons who attempt to access restricted areas under disguise or using questionable credentials should be reported to appropriate authorities.

— (U//FOUO) Presentation of outdated, expired, tampered with, or otherwise invalid credentials, including documents displaying photographs that don’t match the individual.
— (U//FOUO) Display of uniform without proper identification, or use of partial uniforms and props such as mock weapons to access restricted areas.
— (U//FOUO) Attempt to gain entry by using stolen access cards or special keys.
— (U//FOUO) Attempt to discourage security personnel from requesting proof of identification by evoking authority or displaying intimidating behavior.
— (U//FOUO) Use of one’s legitimate credentials to access areas outside his or her scope of responsibilities (insider threat).
— (U//FOUO) Use of cloned emergency vehicles where the identifiers (decals, markings, logos) differ slightly from the official government or industry vehicles.


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Attorney General Eric Holder Speech on Targeted Killing of U.S. Citizens Full Transcript

March 6, 2012 in Department of Justice

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder delivers a national security speech regarding the Obama administration's ongoing counter terrorism efforts during his visit to Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago, March 5, 2012. REUTERS/Jeff Haynes

Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law (doj.gov):

As prepared for delivery

Thank you, Dean [Daniel] Rodriguez, for your kind words, and for the outstanding leadership that you provide – not only for this academic campus, but also for our nation’s legal community. It is a privilege to be with you today – and to be among the distinguished faculty members, staff, alumni, and students who make Northwestern such an extraordinary place.

For more than 150 years, this law school has served as a training ground for future leaders; as a forum for critical, thoughtful debate; and as a meeting place to consider issues of national concern and global consequence. This afternoon, I am honored to be part of this tradition. And I’m grateful for the opportunity to join with you in discussing a defining issue of our time – and a most critical responsibility that we share: how we will stay true to America’s founding – and enduring – promises of security, justice and liberty.

Since this country’s earliest days, the American people have risen to this challenge – and all that it demands. But, as we have seen – and as President John F. Kennedy may have described best – “In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger.”

Half a century has passed since those words were spoken, but our nation today confronts grave national security threats that demand our constant attention and steadfast commitment. It is clear that, once again, we have reached an “hour of danger.”

We are a nation at war. And, in this war, we face a nimble and determined enemy that cannot be underestimated.

Like President Obama – and my fellow members of his national security team – I begin each day with a briefing on the latest and most urgent threats made against us in the preceding 24 hours. And, like scores of attorneys and agents at the Justice Department, I go to sleep each night thinking of how best to keep our people safe.

I know that – more than a decade after the September 11th attacks; and despite our recent national security successes, including the operation that brought to justice Osama bin Laden last year – there are people currently plotting to murder Americans, who reside in distant countries as well as within our own borders. Disrupting and preventing these plots – and using every available and appropriate tool to keep the American people safe – has been, and will remain, this Administration’s top priority.

But just as surely as we are a nation at war, we also are a nation of laws and values. Even when under attack, our actions must always be grounded on the bedrock of the Constitution – and must always be consistent with statutes, court precedent, the rule of law and our founding ideals. Not only is this the right thing to do – history has shown that it is also the most effective approach we can take in combating those who seek to do us harm.

This is not just my view. My judgment is shared by senior national security officials across the government. As the President reminded us in 2009, at the National Archives where our founding documents are housed, “[w]e uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but because it strengthens our country and it keeps us safe. Time and again, our values have been our best national security asset.” Our history proves this. We do not have to choose between security and liberty – and we will not.

Today, I want to tell you about the collaboration across the government that defines and distinguishes this Administration’s national security efforts. I also want to discuss some of the legal principles that guide – and strengthen – this work, as well as the special role of the Department of Justice in protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution.

Before 9/11, today’s level of interagency cooperation was not commonplace. In many ways, government lacked the infrastructure – as well as the imperative – to share national security information quickly and effectively. Domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence operated in largely independent spheres. But those who attacked us on September 11th chose both military and civilian targets. They crossed borders and jurisdictional lines. And it immediately became clear that no single agency could address these threats, because no single agency has all of the necessary tools.

To counter this enemy aggressively and intelligently, the government had to draw on all of its resources – and radically update its operations. As a result, today, government agencies are better postured to work together to address a range of emerging national security threats. Now, the lawyers, agents and analysts at the Department of Justice work closely with our colleagues across the national security community to detect and disrupt terrorist plots, to prosecute suspected terrorists, and to identify and implement the legal tools necessary to keep the American people safe. Unfortunately, the fact and extent of this cooperation are often overlooked in the public debate – but it’s something that this Administration, and the previous one, can be proud of.

As part of this coordinated effort, the Justice Department plays a key role in conducting oversight to ensure that the intelligence community’s activities remain in compliance with the law, and, together with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, in authorizing surveillance to investigate suspected terrorists. We must – and will continue to – use the intelligence-gathering capabilities that Congress has provided to collect information that can save and protect American lives. At the same time, these tools must be subject to appropriate checks and balances – including oversight by Congress and the courts, as well as within the Executive Branch – to protect the privacy and civil rights of innocent individuals. This Administration is committed to making sure that our surveillance programs appropriately reflect all of these interests.

Let me give you an example. Under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize annually, with the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, collection directed at identified categories of foreign intelligence targets, without the need for a court order for each individual subject. This ensures that the government has the flexibility and agility it needs to identify and to respond to terrorist and other foreign threats to our security. But the government may not use this authority intentionally to target a U.S. person, here or abroad, or anyone known to be in the United States.

The law requires special procedures, reviewed and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to make sure that these restrictions are followed, and to protect the privacy of any U.S. persons whose nonpublic information may be incidentally acquired through this program. The Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence conduct extensive oversight reviews of section 702 activities at least once every sixty days, and we report to Congress on implementation and compliance twice a year. This law therefore establishes a comprehensive regime of oversight by all three branches of government. Reauthorizing this authority before it expires at the end of this year is the top legislative priority of the Intelligence Community.

But surveillance is only the first of many complex issues we must navigate. Once a suspected terrorist is captured, a decision must be made as to how to proceed with that individual in order to identify the disposition that best serves the interests of the American people and the security of this nation.

Much has been made of the distinction between our federal civilian courts and revised military commissions. The reality is that both incorporate fundamental due process and other protections that are essential to the effective administration of justice – and we should not deprive ourselves of any tool in our fight against al Qaeda.

Our criminal justice system is renowned not only for its fair process; it is respected for its results. We are not the first Administration to rely on federal courts to prosecute terrorists, nor will we be the last. Although far too many choose to ignore this fact, the previous Administration consistently relied on criminal prosecutions in federal court to bring terrorists to justice. John Walker Lindh, attempted shoe bomber Richard Reid, and 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui were among the hundreds of defendants convicted of terrorism-related offenses – without political controversy – during the last administration.

Over the past three years, we’ve built a remarkable record of success in terror prosecutions. For example, in October, we secured a conviction against Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab for his role in the attempted bombing of an airplane traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. He was sentenced last month to life in prison without the possibility of parole. While in custody, he provided significant intelligence during debriefing sessions with the FBI. He described in detail how he became inspired to carry out an act of jihad, and how he traveled to Yemen and made contact with Anwar al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen and a leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Abdulmutallab also detailed the training he received, as well as Aulaqi’s specific instructions to wait until the airplane was over the United States before detonating his bomb.

In addition to Abdulmutallab, Faizal Shahzad, the attempted Times Square bomber, Ahmed Ghailani, a conspirator in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and three individuals who plotted an attack against John F. Kennedy Airport in 2007, have also recently begun serving life sentences. And convictions have been obtained in the cases of several homegrown extremists, as well. For example, last year, United States citizen and North Carolina resident Daniel Boyd pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad; and U.S. citizen and Illinois resident Michael Finton pleaded guilty to attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his efforts to detonate a truck bomb outside of a federal courthouse.

I could go on. Which is why the calls that I’ve heard to ban the use of civilian courts in prosecutions of terrorism-related activity are so baffling, and ultimately are so dangerous. These calls ignore reality. And if heeded, they would significantly weaken – in fact, they would cripple – our ability to incapacitate and punish those who attempt to do us harm.

Simply put, since 9/11, hundreds of individuals have been convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offenses in Article III courts and are now serving long sentences in federal prison. Not one has ever escaped custody. No judicial district has suffered any kind of retaliatory attack. These are facts, not opinions. There are not two sides to this story. Those who claim that our federal courts are incapable of handling terrorism cases are not registering a dissenting opinion — they are simply wrong.

But federal courts are not our only option. Military commissions are also appropriate in proper circumstances, and we can use them as well to convict terrorists and disrupt their plots. This Administration’s approach has been to ensure that the military commissions system is as effective as possible, in part by strengthening the procedural protections on which the commissions are based. With the President’s leadership, and the bipartisan backing of Congress, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 was enacted into law. And, since then, meaningful improvements have been implemented.

It’s important to note that the reformed commissions draw from the same fundamental protections of a fair trial that underlie our civilian courts. They provide a presumption of innocence and require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. They afford the accused the right to counsel – as well as the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. They prohibit the use of statements obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. And they secure the right to appeal to Article III judges – all the way to the United States Supreme Court. In addition, like our federal civilian courts, reformed commissions allow for the protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence gathering, and for the safety and security of participants.

A key difference is that, in military commissions, evidentiary rules reflect the realities of the battlefield and of conducting investigations in a war zone. For example, statements may be admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings, because we cannot expect military personnel to administer warnings to an enemy captured in battle. But instead, a military judge must make other findings – for instance, that the statement is reliable and that it was made voluntarily.

I have faith in the framework and promise of our military commissions, which is why I’ve sent several cases to the reformed commissions for prosecution. There is, quite simply, no inherent contradiction between using military commissions in appropriate cases while still prosecuting other terrorists in civilian courts. Without question, there are differences between these systems that must be – and will continue to be – weighed carefully. Such decisions about how to prosecute suspected terrorists are core Executive Branch functions. In each case, prosecutors and counterterrorism professionals across the government conduct an intensive review of case-specific facts designed to determine which avenue of prosecution to pursue.

Several practical considerations affect the choice of forum.

First of all, the commissions only have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals who are a part of al Qaeda, have engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, or who have purposefully and materially supported such hostilities. This means that there may be members of certain terrorist groups who fall outside the jurisdiction of military commissions because, for example, they lack ties to al Qaeda and their conduct does not otherwise make them subject to prosecution in this forum. Additionally, by statute, military commissions cannot be used to try U.S. citizens.

Second, our civilian courts cover a much broader set of offenses than the military commissions, which can only prosecute specified offenses, including violations of the laws of war and other offenses traditionally triable by military commission. This means federal prosecutors have a wider range of tools that can be used to incapacitate suspected terrorists. Those charges, and the sentences they carry upon successful conviction, can provide important incentives to reach plea agreements and convince defendants to cooperate with federal authorities.

Third, there is the issue of international cooperation. A number of countries have indicated that they will not cooperate with the United States in certain counterterrorism efforts — for instance, in providing evidence or extraditing suspects – if we intend to use that cooperation in pursuit of a military commission prosecution. Although the use of military commissions in the United States can be traced back to the early days of our nation, in their present form they are less familiar to the international community than our time-tested criminal justice system and Article III courts. However, it is my hope that, with time and experience, the reformed commissions will attain similar respect in the eyes of the world.

Where cases are selected for prosecution in military commissions, Justice Department investigators and prosecutors work closely to support our Department of Defense colleagues. Today, the alleged mastermind of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole is being prosecuted before a military commission. I am proud to say that trial attorneys from the Department of Justice are working with military prosecutors on that case, as well as others.

And we will continue to reject the false idea that we must choose between federal courts and military commissions, instead of using them both. If we were to fail to use all necessary and available tools at our disposal, we would undoubtedly fail in our fundamental duty to protect the Nation and its people. That is simply not an outcome we can accept.

This Administration has worked in other areas as well to ensure that counterterrorism professionals have the flexibility that they need to fulfill their critical responsibilities without diverging from our laws and our values. Last week brought the most recent step, when the President issued procedures under the National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation, which Congress passed in December, mandated that a narrow category of al Qaeda terrorist suspects be placed in temporary military custody.

Last Tuesday, the President exercised his authority under the statute to issue procedures to make sure that military custody will not disrupt ongoing law enforcement and intelligence operations — and that an individual will be transferred from civilian to military custody only after a thorough evaluation of his or her case, based on the considered judgment of the President’s senior national security team. As authorized by the statute, the President waived the requirements for several categories of individuals where he found that the waivers were in our national security interest. These procedures implement not only the language of the statute but also the expressed intent of the lead sponsors of this legislation. And they address the concerns the President expressed when he signed this bill into law at the end of last year.

Now, I realize I have gone into considerable detail about tools we use to identify suspected terrorists and to bring captured terrorists to justice. It is preferable to capture suspected terrorists where feasible – among other reasons, so that we can gather valuable intelligence from them – but we must also recognize that there are instances where our government has the clear authority – and, I would argue, the responsibility – to defend the United States through the appropriate and lawful use of lethal force.

This principle has long been established under both U.S. and international law. In response to the attacks perpetrated – and the continuing threat posed – by al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, Congress has authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those groups. Because the United States is in an armed conflict, we are authorized to take action against enemy belligerents under international law. The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent threat of violent attack. And international law recognizes the inherent right of national self-defense. None of this is changed by the fact that we are not in a conventional war.

Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. Over the last three years alone, al Qaeda and its associates have directed several attacks – fortunately, unsuccessful – against us from countries other than Afghanistan. Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.

This does not mean that we can use military force whenever or wherever we want. International legal principles, including respect for another nation’s sovereignty, constrain our ability to act unilaterally. But the use of force in foreign territory would be consistent with these international legal principles if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved – or after a determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States.

Furthermore, it is entirely lawful – under both United States law and applicable law of war principles – to target specific senior operational leaders of al Qaeda and associated forces. This is not a novel concept. In fact, during World War II, the United States tracked the plane flying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – the commander of Japanese forces in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway – and shot it down specifically because he was on board. As I explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee following the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the same rules apply today.

Some have called such operations “assassinations.” They are not, and the use of that loaded term is misplaced. Assassinations are unlawful killings. Here, for the reasons I have given, the U.S. government’s use of lethal force in self defense against a leader of al Qaeda or an associated force who presents an imminent threat of violent attack would not be unlawful — and therefore would not violate the Executive Order banning assassination or criminal statutes.

Now, it is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that some of the threats we face come from a small number of United States citizens who have decided to commit violent attacks against their own country from abroad. Based on generations-old legal principles and Supreme Court decisions handed down during World War II, as well as during this current conflict, it’s clear that United States citizenship alone does not make such individuals immune from being targeted. But it does mean that the government must take into account all relevant constitutional considerations with respect to United States citizens – even those who are leading efforts to kill innocent Americans. Of these, the most relevant is the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which says that the government may not deprive a citizen of his or her life without due process of law.

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause does not impose one-size-fits-all requirements, but instead mandates procedural safeguards that depend on specific circumstances. In cases arising under the Due Process Clause – including in a case involving a U.S. citizen captured in the conflict against al Qaeda – the Court has applied a balancing approach, weighing the private interest that will be affected against the interest the government is trying to protect, and the burdens the government would face in providing additional process. Where national security operations are at stake, due process takes into account the realities of combat.

Here, the interests on both sides of the scale are extraordinarily weighty. An individual’s interest in making sure that the government does not target him erroneously could not be more significant. Yet it is imperative for the government to counter threats posed by senior operational leaders of al Qaeda, and to protect the innocent people whose lives could be lost in their attacks.

Any decision to use lethal force against a United States citizen – even one intent on murdering Americans and who has become an operational leader of al-Qaeda in a foreign land – is among the gravest that government leaders can face. The American people can be – and deserve to be – assured that actions taken in their defense are consistent with their values and their laws. So, although I cannot discuss or confirm any particular program or operation, I believe it is important to explain these legal principles publicly.

Let me be clear: an operation using lethal force in a foreign country, targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans, would be lawful at least in the following circumstances: First, the U.S. government has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.

The evaluation of whether an individual presents an “imminent threat” incorporates considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United States. As we learned on 9/11, al Qaeda has demonstrated the ability to strike with little or no notice – and to cause devastating casualties. Its leaders are continually planning attacks against the United States, and they do not behave like a traditional military – wearing uniforms, carrying arms openly, or massing forces in preparation for an attack. Given these facts, the Constitution does not require the President to delay action until some theoretical end-stage of planning – when the precise time, place, and manner of an attack become clear. Such a requirement would create an unacceptably high risk that our efforts would fail, and that Americans would be killed.

Whether the capture of a U.S. citizen terrorist is feasible is a fact-specific, and potentially time-sensitive, question. It may depend on, among other things, whether capture can be accomplished in the window of time available to prevent an attack and without undue risk to civilians or to U.S. personnel. Given the nature of how terrorists act and where they tend to hide, it may not always be feasible to capture a United States citizen terrorist who presents an imminent threat of violent attack. In that case, our government has the clear authority to defend the United States with lethal force.

Of course, any such use of lethal force by the United States will comply with the four fundamental law of war principles governing the use of force. The principle of necessity requires that the target have definite military value. The principle of distinction requires that only lawful targets – such as combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, and military objectives – may be targeted intentionally. Under the principle of proportionality, the anticipated collateral damage must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Finally, the principle of humanity requires us to use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering.

These principles do not forbid the use of stealth or technologically advanced weapons. In fact, the use of advanced weapons may help to ensure that the best intelligence is available for planning and carrying out operations, and that the risk of civilian casualties can be minimized or avoided altogether.

Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces. This is simply not accurate. “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.

The conduct and management of national security operations are core functions of the Executive Branch, as courts have recognized throughout our history. Military and civilian officials must often make real-time decisions that balance the need to act, the existence of alternative options, the possibility of collateral damage, and other judgments – all of which depend on expertise and immediate access to information that only the Executive Branch may possess in real time. The Constitution’s guarantee of due process is ironclad, and it is essential – but, as a recent court decision makes clear, it does not require judicial approval before the President may use force abroad against a senior operational leader of a foreign terrorist organization with which the United States is at war – even if that individual happens to be a U.S. citizen.

That is not to say that the Executive Branch has – or should ever have – the ability to target any such individuals without robust oversight. Which is why, in keeping with the law and our constitutional system of checks and balances, the Executive Branch regularly informs the appropriate members of Congress about our counterterrorism activities, including the legal framework, and would of course follow the same practice where lethal force is used against United States citizens.

Now, these circumstances are sufficient under the Constitution for the United States to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen abroad – but it is important to note that the legal requirements I have described may not apply in every situation – such as operations that take place on traditional battlefields.

The unfortunate reality is that our nation will likely continue to face terrorist threats that – at times – originate with our own citizens. When such individuals take up arms against this country – and join al Qaeda in plotting attacks designed to kill their fellow Americans – there may be only one realistic and appropriate response. We must take steps to stop them – in full accordance with the Constitution. In this hour of danger, we simply cannot afford to wait until deadly plans are carried out – and we will not.

This is an indicator of our times – not a departure from our laws and our values. For this Administration – and for this nation – our values are clear. We must always look to them for answers when we face difficult questions, like the ones I have discussed today. As the President reminded us at the National Archives, “our Constitution has endured through secession and civil rights, through World War and Cold War, because it provides a foundation of principles that can be applied pragmatically; it provides a compass that can help us find our way.”

Our most sacred principles and values – of security, justice and liberty for all citizens – must continue to unite us, to guide us forward, and to help us build a future that honors our founding documents and advances our ongoing – uniquely American – pursuit of a safer, more just, and more perfect union. In the continuing effort to keep our people secure, this Administration will remain true to those values that inspired our nation’s founding and, over the course of two centuries, have made America an example of strength and a beacon of justice for all the world. This is our pledge.

Thank you for inviting me to discuss these important issues with you today.


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(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Report: Cultural Islam in Afghanistan

March 5, 2012 in Afghanistan, U.S. Marine Corps

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) Note

  • MCIA-2634-AFG-046-08
  • 12 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • 2008

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(U) Islam is practiced differently in Afghanistan than in any other part of the world. For operations in Afghanistan, it is significant to know the origins of existing cultural influences come from pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs. This knowledge is necessary for two key reasons. First, understanding the specific cultural-religious mindset of local Afghans is essential to successful operations within the population. Secondly, Afghan cultural Islam conflicts with the fundamentalist Islamic movements that influence the current insurgency. Knowing and exploiting these differences can be beneficial to counteracting insurgent IO campaigns and to discourage local Afghans from identifying with insurgent groups vying for control of the population.

(U) Three main topics of discussions are key in understanding the cultural-religious mindset of the Afghans: (1) Demographics: When/how did Islam arrive in the geographic region of Afghanistan and what major sects of Islam can claim followers there? (2) Integrated Pre-Islamic Traditions: What are the origins and the lasting traditional influences of pre-Islamic Central Asian beliefs in Afghanistan? (3) Islam in the Insurgency: What Islamic movements influence the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and how do these movements specifically conflict with Afghan cultural Islam? Further, how have insurgency groups used Islam and Afghan cultural traditions for their gain? By answering these three questions, Coalition forces in Afghanistan can benefit from greater knowledge of the local religious sentiment. That knowledge can be used to a tactical and operational advantage in a variety of situations ranging from interaction with the locals to information operations.

(U) Pre-Islamic Central Asian Beliefs and their Integration into Muslim Life in Afghanistan

(U//FOUO) Afghans are a traditionally superstitious culture who place heavy emphasis on signs, dreams, and symbols as logical decision factors in daily life. Further, several existing Afghan Islamic practices have their origin in pre-Islamic beliefs. These practices are based primarily in Central Asian belief systems that include lasting cult traditions, ziarats and shrine-worship, spirits (jinnd), witches, witchcraft, shamanism, and malangs. Most of these practices conflict with the strict interpretation of the Qur’an found in movements that influence the insurgency such as Wahhabism, Deobandism, and the teachings of Abdullah Azzam.

(U) Pre-Islamic belief systems in Afghanistan include ‘imported’ faiths like Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Lasting effects of these traditions are evident in the giant Buddhas of Bamyan Province and in the Kalash religion of the Nuristanis (forcibly converted to Islam in the mid-19th century). Legacies of the Hindu caste system are evident in popular Afghan folklore that is more than 2,400 years old. The Mogul ruler Akbar, who exerted considerable influence over Central Asia in the early 1500s, dreamed of uniting his empire under one religion, Din Illahi, which would combine elements of Islam, Christianity, Jain, Hindu, and Judaism. He was not aggressive in terms of forcefully converting the inhabitants of Central Asia, but his ideas influenced the Afghan traditions combining elements of many religious influences into their Islamic practice.

(U) In addition to the effects of these imported religions, there were also indigenous movements that remain key influences.

(U) Strategic Use of Islam in Afghanistan

(U) Insurgent propaganda is both effective and dangerous. The strategic use of religion, traditional cultural mediums like song and dance, and the timely distribution of propaganda to the media in local language gives the insurgency an advantage in IO efforts. To efficiently counter these efforts, which damage nationbuilding  incentive and Coalition success, it is significant to understand how and by what means the insurgents are strategically using Islam and other cultural traditions for their gain.

(U//FOUO) There are a number of instances where insurgent groups have used Islam as a method of gaining/coercing support from the local population. For example, Taliban propaganda suggested that Mullah Omar received dreams of Muhammad instructing him to unite Afghanistan under Shari’a. This helped the movement to gain legitimacy among the Afghan nationals. Not only does this example display a manipulative use of Afghan Islamic belief, but also of Afghan mystical traditions that place heavy emphasis on the importance of dreams.

(U) Karzai’s government has shown effective examples of recognizing the influence of religion among Afghans. The Religious Cultural Affairs division of the Afghan National Army is working to legitimize the new government and military through religious means. As one mullah, Moheburahman, points out: “The most effective thing that can persuade Muslims to do dangerous things and to fight is to give them the  legitimacy of what they are fighting for. I describe the legitimacy of this government and point to verses [in the Qur’an].”

(U) The insurgency also uses media outlets to manipulate the Afghan public’s religious and cultural traditions. There are recent reports of Taliban use of DVDs, song, and poems (most of which were once banned under Taliban rule) to spread propaganda. Media outlets like newspapers and television reports also show evidence of this propaganda effort.

(U) On 26 March 2001, a Kandahar paper, Tolu-e Afghan, an article written in Pashtu, reported that the true aim of the United States in Afghanistan was to eliminate Islam. This insurgent propaganda cited the Secretary of Defense’s anger at the Taliban’s destruction of a historic statue of Buddha as evidence that the United States wanted to eliminate Islam from Afghanistan. The article continues to accuse the United States government of encouraging “nakedness” and “degradation” of Afghan women. The article also identifies Coalition-supporting Afghans as “pro-infidel” Afghans and claims they are part of the problem. This kind of reporting is an effective method of intimidating Afghan locals and using their fear of God to not only turn locals against United States forces, but also to help eliminate local customs and traditions that separate Afghan Muslim practices from the Taliban’s ideals.

 


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(U//LES) San Diego Fusion Center Tijuana Drug Cartel Ambush Analysis and Gang Collaboration

September 2, 2011 in California, Intelligence Fusion Centers

This document was first released publicly via a tweet on the AnonymousIRC Twitter feed.

Tactics of the Tijuana Cartel: An Analysis of Ambush Attacks on Tijuana Law Enforcement

  • 6 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • NOFORN
  • November 17, 2010

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(U//FOUO) The intent of this bulletin is to provide Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) with a general knowledge of ambush tactics used by the Tijuana Cartel against Mexican LEOs in Tijuana, Mexico. The San Diego Police Department (SDPD) Officer Safety Bulletin dated October 3, 2010, outlining Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations’ (DTOs) and San Diego street gangs’ use of Tijuana Cartel tactics in San Diego County, identified a need for a more comprehensive review of cartel tactics used south of the U.S. border.

(U//LES//NOFORN) Tijuana DTOs and San Diego Street Gang Collaboration

(U//LES//NOFORN) Recent incidents in San Diego County involving Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and San Diego street gangs have highlighted a potential increased threat to law enforcement personnel. A SDPD investigation revealed credible information that Mexican DTOs in collaboration with San Diego street gangs are using sophisticated counter surveillance techniques and are willing to use armed ambush assaults to protect drug shipments.

(U//LES//NOFORN) In one incident, a Mexican DTO enforcement cell comprised of Tijuana Cartel and San Diego street gang members was assigned to protect narcotics shipments north of the border. The enforcement cell misidentified a SDPD undercover unit as a competing DTO ‘rip crew.’ Rip crews attempt to confront or assault enforcement cells in an effort to steal the narcotics shipments of other DTOs. In this incident, the DTO enforcement cell demonstrated mobile counter-surveillance techniques, such as varying vehicle speeds, switching lanes, and rotating vehicles in the convoy, to identify the vehicles following the drug shipment.

(U//LES//NOFORN) SDPD received credible information that the leadership of this DTO enforcement cell mistook the undercover law enforcement personnel for an opposing cartel ‘rip crew.’ Using push-to-talk communications, the enforcement cell called for additional San Diego street gang members to recover automatic weapons from a San Diego stash house and move to a preplanned location in Southeast San Diego. The cartel convoy then attempted to lead the suspected ‘rip crew,’ in this case undercover SDPD Officers, into an ambush at the preplanned location.

(U//LES//NOFORN) Counter Ambush Techniques

(U//LES//NOFORN) This bulletin is not intended to provide guidance or training in counter ambush or counter surveillance techniques to U.S. law enforcement. However, certain overarching principals pertaining to officer safety in an ambush situation have been outlined below.

(U//LES//NOFORN) In the Field:
• Keep the vehicle moving, never stop in the “kill zone”
• Always turn into the vehicle in the direction of a Blind Side ambush
• Keep your front seat clear to lay down or exit either door if under fire
• Consider your vehicle an offensive weapon
• When possible, travel in the far left lane
• Have one car length between you and the car in front of you while stopped in traffic
• Check mirrors for surveillance vehicles (especially SUVs and Vans)
• Watch for more than one vehicle traveling in tandem
• Alternate daily routine and routes
• Appoint a ‘counter-surveillance officer’ as part of a team during operations
• Conduct random security checks of law enforcement stations
• When there is an overt threat, use ‘overwatch’ techniques on calls, stops, and operations

(U//LES//NOFORN) In Training and Off-Duty Hours:
• Periodically conduct counter-surveillance training
• Practice vehicle-based shooting scenarios
• Train to respond to multiple ambush scenarios
• Develop, implement, and update a security plan for both home and duty hours

(U) Conclusion

(U//FOUO) The use of cartel ambush tactics and techniques against San Diego law enforcement is currently assessed low. The potential for San Diego and Imperial county law enforcement being targeted as a case of mistaken identity as a competing cartel or ‘rip crew’ is assessed as moderate based on the recent events in the San Diego region. Considering recent reporting of Mexican DTO and San Diego street gang collaboration, law enforcement operating in an undercover or surveillance capacity should consider increased surveillance and counter-surveillance training.


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U.S. Strategic Command Workshop Report: Deterring Violent Non-State Actors in Cyberspace

February 22, 2012 in U.S. Strategic Command

Deterrence 2.0: Deterring Violent Non-State Actors in Cyberspace

  • 116 pages
  • January 2008

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The chapters before you were born from the examination of two fundamental questions regarding the nature and theory of deterrence in the 21st century. First we had to consider what had changed since our victory in the Cold War (the experience from which most of our current doctrine is derived); and, armed with that understanding, consider how the United States might execute deterrence strategy in this new era. Our study revealed elemental shifts in the state of play that required more than “tweaking” on the margins of our thinking. Our observations compelled us to challenge the epistemological underpinnings of traditional nation-state deterrence models. What can be held at risk as we seek to deter the violent metastasis of ideas propagated over the Internet? How can we prevail in a global marketplace of ideas without compromising our own sacred values? The enclosed pages contain comments, insights and recommendations that transcend any thinking about deterrence that has ever gone before those of us in uniform. As evidenced by the sage words of James Fallows in the Foreword to this report, the ideas contained within are “worth reading.” The Deterrence of Violent Non-State Actor Workshop during the period of 9-10 January 2008 was a special event that was both compelling and timely.

So what has changed? Of course, the answer is rather obvious yet curiously underrepresented in the recent deterrence scholarship. Humanity is undergoing a transformation from the Industrial Age characterized by machinery, factories, urbanization and measured change where resources, production and optimization were the source of wealth and power, to an Information Age, defined by knowledge and networks, interconnectedness, globalization, adaptability, agility, innovation and rapid change. New rules sets are emerging that cannot be predicted and with them come opportunities, creativity and societal dislocations that often breed violence and instability.

Like Damocles’ sword, this global interconnectivity both strengthens us and moderates us at the same time. We are strengthened because we are better connected to others than ever before and thus capable of spreading the seeds of liberty and opportunity to populations that yearn for it and where the lack of it is still being justified. We are moderated by this interconnectivity because others can more easily exploit the seams and turn our freedoms against us to infect with vitriolic propaganda that violently radicalizes populations across this interconnected web. It is the matter of moderation of our strength that brought together the remarkable group of thinkers whose words are reflected within this report. We are concerned here with the problem of deterring violent non-state actors from doing harm to our nation and to our allies. The questions of extending freedom through access while mitigating the misuse of that freedom to harm us were the dominant questions we took up in this workshop. This report captures the intellectual power and dynamic interactions that took place during these two days and must be read by today’s and tomorrow’s decision-makers. These thoughts will inform the planning and execution of deterrence principles for years to come.

5 Models of Emergent Behavior of Violent Non-State Actors in Cyberspace

by Robert Popp, National Security Innovations; Laura Mariano, University of Connecticut;
Krishna Pattipati, University of Connecticut; Victor Asal, State University of NY at Albany; and
Katya Drozdova, National Security Innovations.

Executive Summary – Chapter 5

For violent non-state actors (VNSAs) on a mission to spread their message, or cyberterrorists who just want to create mischief, cyberspace offers limitless resources and opportunities for achieving these goals. The Internet is unparalleled in its ability to grant individuals access to a mass audience in an environment that has almost no enforceable personal conduct regulations or monitoring capabilities. According to a report compiled by Dr. Gabriel Weimann of the United States Institute of Peace, as of 2004, all active terrorist groups had established a Web presence of some kind, with the intention of exposing current and potential supporters, as well as enemies, to their ideologies (Weimann, 2004). The behavior of such groups in cyberspace has been studied extensively and can be broadly classified by the impact it has on the cyber and corporeal realms. Figure 1 below depicts this interaction and categorizes the behavior according to its origin and impact. Cyber-psychological activities include dissemination of propaganda and disinformation, intimidation, and indoctrination via cyber-based communication channels. Cyber-cyber interactions describe efforts to negatively impact the cyber infrastructure, while attacks planned via cyber means that target the corporeal realm are illustrative of the cyber-corporeal connection. A final category of interaction that is germane to this discussion is the corporeal-cyber connection, which represents actions originating in the corporeal realm that affect the cyber infrastructure. Table 1 below provides examples of recent actions from each of these categories. This chapter focuses on the cyber-psychological and cyber-corporeal connections, with further discussion of the use of cyberspace by VNSAs to disseminate propaganda, recruit members, create publicity, collect and share data, network, plan, coordinate, raise funds, and wage psychological warfare (Weimann, 2004).

The wide-ranging and covert nature of VNSA activity in cyberspace makes modeling their emergent behavior a difficult task that requires a large-scale, multidisciplinary effort. The current paradigm combines technology and perspectives from the sub-disciplines of data collection, data mining and analysis, and predictive modeling; each of these contributes a piece to the puzzle. Automated data collection techniques address the issue of extracting “clean,” meaningful, and relevant information from the seemingly limitless datasets that constitute the cyberspace. The methodology must be able to locate a “needle-in-a-haystack”, since the activity is often intentionally hidden, scattered across many sites, and frequently moved or removed. However, without the kind of content-rich datasets that data collection techniques can provide, modeling is cumbersome and time consuming, if not infeasible. An example of such a dataset is the so-called ‘Dark Web’ collection, which contains about two terabytes (2 TB) of extremist/terrorist related content collected using a semi-automated Web-crawling approach developed by researchers at the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Lab (Univ. of Arizona, 2008).


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(U//FOUO) U.S. Air Force Top Ten Cyber Threats 2012

February 5, 2012 in U.S. Air Force

The following “For Official Use Only” Cyber Threat Bulletin from the U.S. Air Force’s 624th Operations Center Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Division, formerly part of the Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), is almost a verbatim recreation of a public report issued by McAfee.

624th Operations Center Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Division (AFCYBER)

  • 4 pages
  • January 9, 2012

Download

Every year as technology grows and advances thus do the threats that surround it. Predicting what new cyber threats to look for may not always be an easy task. By keeping up with the past trends and ever changing current environment, may help to give us a good handle on how to prepare for what may be to come.

Last year we saw great changes in Hacktivism, mobile threats, social-media exploitation, client-side exploitation, and targeted attacks. As many of these will only continue to evolve as we step in to 2012, there are many more to be added to the list and not ignored. According to McAfee, the top ten threats for 2012 are:

1. Attacking Mobile Devices – Over the last two years mobile devices and smartphones have experienced a huge increase in attacks with 2011 showing the largest levels in mobile malware history. As they did on PCs, rootkits and botnets deliver ads and make money off of their mobile victims the same way. The installation of software or spyware, ad clicks or premium-rate text messages, as well as a shift toward mobile banking attacks is just a few threats facing mobile device users. As more users handle their finances on mobile devices, techniques previously dedicated for online banking will now focus on mobile banking users, bypassing PCs and going straight for mobile banking apps.

2. Embedded Hardware – GPS, routers, network bridges, and recently many consumer electronic devices use embedded functions and designs. Malware that attacks at the hardware layer will be required for exploiting embedded systems. Attackers will often try to “root” a system at its lowest level. If code can be inserted that alters the boot order or loading order of the operating system, greater control is gained and can maintain long-term access to the system and its data. The consequence of this trend is that other systems that use embedded hardware, for example, automotive systems, medical systems, or utility systems will become susceptible to these types of attacks. These proofs-of-concept code are expected to become even more effective in 2012.

3. “Legalized” Spam – Since the drop in global spamming volumes from the peak in 2009 and the increased black market cost of sending spam through botnets, “legitimate” advertising agencies. The United States’ CAN-SPAM Act was watered down so much that advertisers are not required to receive consent for sending advertising. “Legal” spams, and the technique known as “snowshoe spamming,” are expected to continue to grow at a faster rate than illegal phishing and confidence scams.

4. Industrial Attacks – Gaining more attention every day, the cyber threat potential is one of few that pose real loss of property and life. Water, electricity, oil and gas are essential to people’s everyday lives, Many industrial systems are not prepared for cyber attacks, yet many such as water, electricity, oil and gas are essential to everyday living. As with recent incidents directed at water utilities in the U.S., attackers will continue to leverage this lack of preparedness.

5. Hacktivism – One thing is certain, when a target was identified, hacktivists are a credible force. The problem in 2011 was the undefined structure, differentiating between rogue script kiddies and a politically motivated campaign was a task. McAfee Labs predicts that in 2012, either the “true” Anonymous group will re-invent itself, or die out. The other piece to look for in 2012, digital and physical demonstrations becoming more engaged and targeting public figures more than ever before.

6. Virtual Currency – Also commonly referred to as cyber-currency, a popular means to exchange money online which is not backed by tangible assets or legal tender laws. Many use services such as Bitcoin, which allows users to make transactions through a decentralized, peer-to-peer network using an online wallet to receive “coins” and make direct online payments. Users need a wallet address to be able to send and receive coins, the wallets however are not encrypted and the transactions are public. This boosts opportunity for cybercriminals, not to mention Trojan malware.

7. Rogue Certificates – We often tend to trust digitally-signed certificates without a second thought believing the digital signature or certificate authority they came from to be legit. Recent threats such as Stuxnet and Duqu used rogue certificates to evade detection and investigations have shown that as many as 531 fraudulent certificates were issued from DigiNotar, a troubled Dutch authority that recently declared bankruptcy. Increased targeting of certificate authorities and the broader use of fraudulent digital certificates will only increase, giving attackers an even greater advantage.

8. Cyber War – As more and more countries are realizing the harmful outcomes cyber attacks pose, industrial attacks for example, that carry crippling potential, the need for defense is more apparent than ever. McAfee Labs expects to see countries demonstrate their cyber war capabilities in 2012, in order to send a message.

9. Domain Name System Security Extensions – A technology to protect name-resolution services from spoofing and cache poisoning by using a “web of trust” based on public-key cryptography; meant to protect a client computer from inadvertently communicating with a host as a result of a “man-in-the-middle” attack. Unfortunately it would also protect from spoofing and redirection of any attempts by authorities who seek to reroute Internet traffic destined to websites that are trafficking in illegal software or images. With governing bodies around the globe taking a greater interest in establishing “rules of the road” for Internet traffic, McAfee Labs expects to see more and more instances in which future solutions are hampered by legislative issues.

10. Advances in Operating Systems – Recent versions of Windows have included data-execution protection as well as address-space layout randomization. These security methods make it harder for attackers to compromise a victim’s machine. Encryption technologies have also boosted OS protection in recent years. As with most internal OS security measures, attackers very quickly found ways to evade them. Advances by the information security industry and operating system will continue to advance, but will that push malware writers to focus on directly attacking hardware? McAfee Labs expects to see more effort put into hardware and firmware exploits and their related real-world attacks through 2012.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #31 

DHS Testimony on Social Networking and Media Monitoring

February 17, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security

Complete video of the House Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hearing on DHS monitoring of social networking and media. Video stream in .asx format requires Windows Media Player.

Joint testimony of Chief Privacy Officer Mary Ellen Callahan, and Operations Coordination and Planning Director Richard Chávez for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hearing on DHS monitoring of social networking and media

Release Date: February 16, 2012

311 Cannon

Introduction

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and Members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) use of social media, and the privacy protections the DHS Privacy Office has put into place.

Social media are web-based and mobile technologies that turn communication into an interactive dialogue in a variety of online fora. It may be appropriate for the government, including DHS, to use social media for a variety of reasons. The President has challenged his Administration to use technology and tools to create a more efficient, effective, and transparent government1. DHS recognizes that the use of social media by government actors must occur with appropriate privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections; whether DHS is disclosing its information and press releases via social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook, reviewing news feeds for situational awareness, or researching identified, discrete targets for legitimate investigatory purposes. Accordingly, DHS has created Department-wide standards designed to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in each category of its use. There are three general ways in which DHS utilizes social media, and each has associated privacy protections:

  • External communications and outreach between the Department and the public;
  • Awareness of breaking news of events or situations related to homeland security, known as “situational awareness;” and
  • Operational use, when DHS has the appropriate authorities, such as law enforcement and investigations.

In each category, the Department has established and enforces standards that incorporate privacy protections ex ante, create uniform standards across the components and Department, and are transparent with regard to the scope of our activities

External Communications and Outreach

Consistent with the President’s 2009 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Open Government Directive2 and OMB’s Memorandum M-10-23, Guidance for Agency Use of Third-Party Websites and Applications3, the Department uses the social networking medium to provide the public with robust information through many channels. For example, DHS currently has a presence on many of the major social networking platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. In addition, FEMA launched a FEMA app for smartphones that contains preparedness information for different types of disasters. Similarly, the Transportation Security Administration has MyTSA Mobile Application, which enables the traveling public access to relevant TSA travel information, such as types of items that may be carried through TSA security checkpoints, or estimated wait times.

In 2009, the Department established a Social Media Advisory Group, with representatives from the Privacy Office; Office of General Counsel; Chief Information Security Officer; Office of Records Management; and Office of Public Affairs to ensure that a variety of compliance issues including privacy, legal, security, and records management issues are addressed as DHS uses social media. This group governs and provides guidance on social media initiatives related to external communications and public outreach by reviewing recommendations from components and offices and evaluating Terms of Service agreements and Terms of Use policies. The group also developed a social media use plan, while working to ensure compliance issues are addressed and resolved before the first Department use of a particular application of social media.

DHS also established Department-wide standards for use of social media for communications and outreach purposes through the creation, and development of, two Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs). The PIAs address two types of uses of social media within the communications/outreach category: 1) interactive platforms where the Department has official identities, using those profiles to provide information about the Department and its services, while having the ability to interact with members of the public such as allowing them to post comments on the official Department page or profile;4 and 2) unidirectional social media applications encompassing a range of applications, often referred to as applets or widgets, that allow users to view relevant, real-time content from predetermined sources, such as podcasts, Short Message Service (SMS) texting, audio and video streams, and Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds.5

The PIAs analyze the Department’s use of social media and networking for communications purposes, if and how these interactions and applications could result in the Department receiving personally identifiable information (PII), and the privacy protections in place. The PIAs describe the information the Department may have access to, how it will use the information, what information is retained and shared, and how individuals can gain access to and correct their information. For example, official DHS accounts across social media and networking websites and applications must be identified by the component or Department seal as well as an anonymous, but easily identifiable user name account displaying a DHS presence, such as “DHS John Q. Employee.” Both the communications and outreach PIAs also include periodically-updated appendices that identify the specific Department-approved profiles and applications. In addition, the PIAs contain provisions that Department-approved profiles are subject to Privacy Compliance Reviews by the DHS Privacy Office.

Situational Awareness

The Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS), National Operations Center (NOC), has a statutory responsibility (Section 515 of the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. § 321d(b)(1))) to provide situational awareness and establish a common operating picture for the federal government, and for state, local, tribal governments as appropriate, in the event of a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster, and (2) ensure that critical terrorism and disaster-related information reaches government decision-makers. Traditional media sources, and more recently social media sources, such as Twitter, Facebook, and a vast number of blogs, provide public reports on breaking events with a potential nexus to homeland security. By examining open source traditional and social media information, comparing it with many other sources of information, and including it where appropriate into NOC reports, the NOC can provide a more comprehensive picture of breaking or evolving events. To fulfill its statutory responsibility to provide situational awareness and to access the potential value of the public information within the social media realm, in 2010, the NOC launched the first of three pilots using social media monitoring related to specific natural disasters and international events.

Beginning with the pilots, the reason the NOC utilizes social media tools is to identify breaking or evolving incidents and events to provide timely situational awareness and establish a more complete common operating picture. The NOC views information from a variety of sources to include open source reporting and a variety of public and government sources. The NOC synthesizes these reports for inclusion in a single comprehensive report. These reports are then disseminated to DHS components, interagency partners, and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners with access to the NOC’s common operating picture. The content of the reports may be related to standing critical information requirements, emerging events potentially affecting the homeland, or special events such as the Super Bowl or the United Nations General Assembly.

Prior to implementing each social media pilot, the Privacy Office and the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning developed detailed standards and procedures associated with reviewing information on social media web sites. These standards and procedures are documented through a series of pilot-specific PIAs.6

The NOC pilots occurred during the 2010 Haiti earthquake response, the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia; and the response to the April 2010, Deep Water Horizon Gulf Coast oil spill. For each of these pilots, the NOC utilized internet-based platforms to provide situational awareness and develop a common operating picture directly related to the response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts in Haiti by reviewing information on publicly-available online fora, blogs, public websites, and message boards. Following the three discrete social media monitoring pilots by the NOC, the Privacy Office did a thorough (and public) Privacy Compliance Review of the NOC’s implementation of the PIAs’ privacy protections.7 The Privacy Office’s review found that the NOC’s social media monitoring activities did not collect PII, did not monitor or track individuals’ comments, and complied with the stated privacy parameters set forth in the underlying PIAs.

Given the positive assessment of the three pilots, OPS and the Privacy Office designed a holistic set of privacy protections to be implemented whenever information made available through social media is being reviewed for situational awareness and establishing a common operating picture. In June 2010, the Department released its Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative PIA, incorporating these protections.8 This PIA describes how the NOC uses Internet-based platforms that provide a variety of ways to review information accessible on publicly-available online fora, blogs, public websites, and message boards. Through the use of publicly-available search engines and content aggregators, the NOC reviews information accessible on certain heavily-trafficked social media sites for information that the NOC can use to provide situational awareness and establish a common operating picture, all without monitoring or tracking individuals’ comments or relying on the collection of PII, with very narrow exceptions, discussed below.

The NOC does not: 1) actively seek PII except for the narrow exceptions; 2) post any information on social media sites; 3) actively seek to connect with internal/external social media users; 4) accept internal/external personal users’ invitations to connect; or 5) interact on social media sites. The NOC is, however, permitted to establish user names (consistent with the criteria established in the communications and outreach PIAs) and passwords to form profiles and follow relevant government, media, and subject matter experts on social media sites as described in the June 2010 PIA; and to use search tools under established criteria and search terms that support situational awareness and establishing a common operating picture.

As part of the publication of the June 2010 PIA, the Privacy Office mandates Privacy Compliance Reviews every six months. After conducting the second Privacy Compliance Review, the Privacy Office determined that this PIA should be updated to allow for the collection and dissemination of PII in a very limited number of situations in order to respond to the evolving operational needs of the NOC. After January 2011, this PII on the following categories of individuals may be collected when it lends credibility to the report or facilitates coordination with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign governments, or international law enforcement partners:

  • U.S. and foreign individuals in extremis, i.e., in situations involving potential life or death circumstances;
  • Senior U.S. and foreign government officials who make public statements or provide public updates;
  • U.S. and foreign government spokespersons who make public statements or provide public updates;
  • U.S. and foreign private sector officials and spokespersons who make public statements or provide public updates;
  • Names of anchors, newscasters, or on-scene reporters who are known or identified as reporters in their posts or articles, or who use traditional and/or social media in real time to provide their audience situational awareness and information;
  • Current and former public officials who are victims of incidents or activities related to homeland security; and
  • Terrorists, drug cartel leaders, or other persons known to have been involved in major crimes of homeland security interest, (e.g., mass shooters such as those at Virginia Tech or Ft. Hood) who are killed or found dead.9

For this narrow category of individuals, DHS may only collect the full name, affiliation, position or title, and publicly-available user ID, when it lends credibility to the report. DHS determined that this information improves the efficacy and effectiveness of the social media monitoring initiative without an unwarranted invasion of privacy of individuals in each of these categories. For this narrow category of individuals the PII is only stored in the narrative report in which it is used, and is not tracked for any other reason. DHS published a System of Records Notice10 that describes the creation of these seven exceptions for the collection of PII and narrowly tailored, how much information can be collected, and how the information can be used. Furthermore, the Privacy Office is commencing its semi-annual Privacy Compliance Review in late February to ensure that the NOC continues to adhere to the privacy protections identified in the PIA.

Operational Use

There may be situations where particular programs within the Department or its components may need to access material on social media or individual profiles in support of authorized missions. Given the breadth of the Department’s mission, and the fact that access, collection, and use of social media and other publicly-available information is governed by specific legal authorities, rather than Department-wide standards, the Department has taken a different approach in embedding privacy protections into Department use of social media for operational purposes, with authority-based requirements implemented through policy and Management Directives. For example, components of DHS such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Protective Service, Federal Air Marshals Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret Service have the authority to engage in law enforcement activities which may include the use of online and Internet materials. Other DHS offices and components may be authorized to utilize social media for specific law enforcement purposes such as investigating fraud. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis also has some overt collection authorities for intelligence purposes which may include the use of online and Internet materials.

DHS has established objective criteria by which those investigatory components can access publicly-available information. DHS components cannot review individuals’ information unless they have appropriate underlying authority and supervisory approval. Moreover, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning and Office of Intelligence and Analysis have additional specific policies on the use of social media for operational purposes. One of DHS’ responsibilities is to confirm our work is being done under the appropriate legal framework for federal law enforcement activities. However, with increased access to individuals’ personal information posted on the Internet and social media sites, these DHS components have been reminded that they must also be conscious of privacy considerations.

At DHS, we work every day to strike a balance between our need to use open source Internet and social media information for all purposes, but particularly law enforcement and investigatory purposes to further our mission, while protecting First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights, and privacy.

In 1999, the Department of Justice issued guidelines for federal law enforcement agents that outline online investigative principles that are applicable, but do not explicitly reference, social media. In 2011, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued guidelines that outline how intelligence community professionals should use technology, including social media. Both guidelines address the following topics: obtaining information from publicly-available media under the same conditions that apply to obtaining information from other sources generally open to the public; passively observing and logging real-time electronic communications on media open to the public under the same circumstances in which these activities could be undertaken when attending a public meeting; and retaining the contents of a stored electronic message, such as online traffic, if that information would have been retained had it been written on paper. Moreover, federal law enforcement agents communicating online with witnesses, subjects, or victims must disclose their affiliation with law enforcement when DHS guidelines would require such disclosure if the communication were taking place in person or over the telephone — they may communicate online under a non-identifying name or fictitious identity if DHS guidelines and procedures would authorize such communications in the physical world.11 Finally, federal law enforcement agents may not access restricted online sources absent legal authority permitting entry into a private space. Until a Department-wide Management Directive on using social media for operational purposes is finalized, the Secretary has instructed all components to adhere to the DOJ or ODNI guidelines as appropriate.

In light of the varying authorities and responsibilities within the Department, instead of having a Privacy Impact Assessment with general standards (such as for communications and situational awareness purposes), the Department is developing a Management Directive for Privacy Protections in Operational Use of Social Media. The Management Directive will be enforceable throughout the Department, and will identify the authorities, restrictions, and privacy oversight related to use of social media for operational purposes. The Management Directive will also provide instructions on how to embed privacy protections into the operational use of social media and each investigation performed by Department personnel. The Privacy Office has already investigated one component’s use of social media for investigatory purposes; its conclusions are informing the Management Directive.

Consistent with the Department’s approach to embed privacy protections throughout the lifecycle of Department activities, the Privacy Office will conduct a Privacy Compliance Review or assessment of the Department’s adherence to the social media Management Directive approximately six months after the Directive is implemented.

Conclusion

In light of the scope and availability of information including PII found in social media venues, the Privacy Office intends to continue to monitor the Department’s use of social media in all three categories—communications and outreach, situational awareness, and operational use—to ensure privacy protections are built-in and followed.

Footnotes

1 President Barack Obama, Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government (January 21, 2009), available at https://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900010.pdf; OMB Memorandum M-10-06, Open Government Directive (December 8, 2009), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf.

2 See supra note 1.

 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-23.pdf

4 https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia-dhs_socialnetworkinginteractions.pdf

5 https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_dhswide_unidirectionalsocialmedia.pdf

6 The NOC and the Privacy Office developed three PIAs in the pilot stage of the NOC Media Monitoring Initiative: Haiti Social Media Disaster Monitoring Initiative, January 21, 2010, available at ttp://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ops_haiti.pdf; 2010 Winter Olympics Social Media Event Monitoring Initiative February 10, 2010, available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ops_2010winterolympics.pdf; and April 2010 BP Oil Spill Response Social Media Event Monitoring Initiative, April 29, 2010, available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ops_bpoilspill.pdf.

7 https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-privcomrev-ops-olympicsandhaiti.pdf. Three Privacy Compliance Reviews have been completed and published by the Privacy Office, available at: https://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/gc_1284657535855.shtm.

8 https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ops_publiclyavailablesocialmedia.pdf.

9 The most recent PIA update (authorizing these narrow PII categories collection) was finalized January 6, 2011, and is available at: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ops_publiclyavailablesocialmedia_update.pdf.

10 https://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2011/2011-2198.htm.

11 See, e.g., Online Investigative Principles for Federal Law Enforcement Agents (Department of Justice, 1999) and Civil Liberties and Privacy Guidance for Intelligence Community Professionals: Properly Obtaining and Using Publicly Available Information (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2011).


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #32 

(U//FOUO) Civil Disturbance and Criminal Tactics of Protest Extremists

January 2, 2012 in United States

This manual, which was attached to an email from the latest AntiSec release, has no listed author and little indications as to its source.  The introduction states that information in the document “was collected and interpreted by multiple agencies” and the manual is intended for use only by “public safety agencies”.  However, a 2003 article from a local newspaper in Colorado indicates that the manual was produced by an unknown U.S. Government agency and is used by Joint Terrorism Task Forces to teach local police about “criminal protest tactics”.  According to an email in the most recent AntiSec release, the manual is still being circulated today in relation to police confrontations with Occupy protests. For more information, see our accompanying article about the document and its history.

Civil Disturbance and Criminal Tactics of Protest Extremists

  • 14 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED TO PUBLIC SAFETY AGENCIES ONLY
  • July 2003

Download

 


__________________
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http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #33 

DHS Media Monitoring Desktop Reference Manual

February 24, 2012 in Department of Homeland Security

The following manual for the Department of Homeland Security’s Media Monitoring Capability was reportedly obtained by EPIC via a FOIA request. The manual has been slightly redacted by DHS to remove names and contact information and the URL of the Network Operations Center Media Monitoring Capability reporting website. This website has been listed in three of the four publicly available manuals as an example of a website monitored by DHS.

Department of Homeland Security National Operations Center Media Monitoring Capability Desktop Reference Binder

  • 39 pages
  • 2011

Download

1 Media Monitoring Capability Mission & Reporting Parameters:

1.1 MMC Mission

The MMC has three primary missions:

  • First – to continually update existing National Situation Summaries (NSS) and International Situation Summaries (ISS) with the most recent, relevant, and actionable open source media information
  • Second – to constantly monitor all available open source information with the goal of expeditiously alerting the NOC Watch Team and other key Department personnel of emergent situations
  • Third – to receive, process, and distribute media captured by DHS Situational Awareness Teams (DSAT) or other streaming media available to the NOC such as Northern Command’s (NORTHCOM) Full Motion Video (FMV) and via open sources

These three missions are accomplished by employing various tools, services, and procedures that are described in detail in this document. Expanded upon, these primary missions have three key components:

1.1.1 Leverage Operationally Relevant Data

Leveraging news stories, media reports and postings on social media sites concerning Homeland Security, Emergency Management, and National Health for operationally relevant data, information, analysis, and imagery is the first mission component. The traditional and social media teams review a story or posting from every direction and interest, utilizing thousands of reporters, sources, still/video cameramen, analysts, bloggers and ordinary individuals on scene. Traditional Media outlets provide unmatched insight into the depth and breadth of the situation, worsening issues, federal preparations, response activities, and critical timelines. At the same time, Social Media outlets provide instant feedback and alert capabilities to rapidly changing or newly occurring situations. The MMC works to summarize the extensive information from these resources to provide a well rounded operational picture for the Department of Homeland Security.

1.1.2 Support NOC in Identifying Relevant Operational Media

Supporting the NOC by ensuring they have a timely appreciation for evolving Homeland Security news stories and media reports of interest to the public and DHS/other federal agencies involved in preparations and response activities is the second key component. DHS and other federal agencies conducting joint operations may be affected by other evolving situations in that area. These situations may be related; have a cause and effect relationship; or be unrelated but have a detrimental effect. Through coordination with the NOC Duty Director (NDD), Senior Watch Officer (SWO) the MMC works to ensure the NOC Watch Team is aware of such stories and news events and has time to analyze any effect on operations.

Timely reporting of current information is an integral element in maintaining complete operational awareness by Homeland Security Personnel. The MMC understand it is vital that critical information is relayed to key Department decision makers in as expeditious a manner as possible.

1.1.3 Increase Situational Awareness of the DHS Secretary

Mitigating the likelihood that the Secretary and DHS Executive staffs are unaware of a breaking Homeland Security news story or media report is the third component. The Secretary and executive staff members are subject to press questions regarding domestic and international events and may or may not be informed of the most current media coverage. The MMC understands critical information requirements and monitors news coverage with the perspective of how the breaking story may be related to current and other important ongoing situations and DHS activities.

The on-duty MMC analyst alerts DHS personnel and related federal agencies of updated news stories through distributed Items of Interest (see section 3.9.6). Recognizing that local media coverage is potentially sensationalizing an incident, the MMC strives to comprehend the media’s message and identify sensitive situations that must be brought to the attention of the Secretary.


__________________
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Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #34 

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Introduction to Islam

January 1, 2012 in U.S. Army

TRADOC G2 INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM

  • 106 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • 2008

Download
 


__________________
Test your connection for leaks:
http://ip-check.info/?lang=en

Use TAILS
https://tails.boum.org/

How to boot from USB and other great stuff:
http://www.rmprepusb.com/

Open pdf and word files online instead of on your puter'
http://view.samurajdata.se/

USE the net more securely:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2014/04/help-support-little-known-privacy-tool-has-been-critical-journalists-reporting-nsa
https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
0
hannah

Registered:
Posts: 797
Reply with quote  #35 

(U//FOUO) DHS LulzSec Bulletin: Hacktivist Groups Target U.S. and Foreign Networks

July 8, 2011 in Department of Homeland Security

National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Bulletin

  • 6 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • June 30, 2011

Download

(U//FOUO) This Bulletin is being provided for your Executive Leadership, Operational Management, and Security Administrators situational awareness. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), through coordination with its partners and monitoring of multiple sources, is tracking reports that members of the hacktivist collectives ‘LulzSec’ and ‘Anonymous’ have combined their efforts and continue to perpetrate cyber attacks targeting U.S. and foreign networks. LulzSec Members have posted statements on the internet claiming the attacks, referred to as ‘Operation AntiSecurity’ (AntiSec), are ‘designed to demonstrate the weakness of general internet security’ and have allowed them to collect massive amounts of data.

(U) LulzSec is purported to be a group of former Anonymous members who typically use widely available and crude tools to hijack or deface web pages as a political statement. They also routinely post information regarding planned and ongoing activities on publicly available Internet Relay Chat (IRC) sessions and social networking sites like Twitter. Recent attacks by LulzSec and Anonymous have proven simple Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) are often successful, even against entities who have invested a significant amount of time and capital into designing and securing their information networks.

(U//FOUO) While LulzSec has generated a significant amount of media coverage and at least a moderate degree of financial impact to several commercial firms, it has primarily resulted in negative publicity for the entities whose networks were affected.

DETAILS

(U//FOUO) The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), continues to track reports that members of the hacktivist collectives ‘LulzSec’ and ‘Anonymous’ have combined their efforts to continue to perpetrate cyber attacks targeting foreign and U.S. networks. LulzSec Members have posted statements on the internet claiming the attacks, referred to as ‘Operation AntiSecurity’ (AntiSec), are designed to demonstrate the weakness of general internet security and have allowed them collect massive amounts of data. Commonly exfiltrated data include personal information such as usernames, password, real names, and email addresses, phone numbers, and anything else that resides in the targeted sites’ databases. LulzSec posts these lists and encourages others to “ravage the following list of emails and passwords” in order to compromise the users’ accounts on other web based applications.

(U) Hacktivists associated with Anonymous have typically been considered more of a nuisance than a real threat. They typically use crude tools such as the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC), Pyloris, or Botnets to perform simple DDoS attacks and SQL injection to hijack or deface web pages as a political statement. Communication between group members is usually through IRC chat channels, social networking sites, or other unsophisticated methods. For example, on one occasion, LulzSec set up a “hack request” phone line for people to call in targets to be attacked.

(U) However, in some cases, Anonymous members (or possibly sympathizers) used a combination of methods to hack email networks, Twitter accounts, and web pages. On several occasions, LulzSec and Anonymous members have tweeted statements such as “DDoS is of course our least powerful and most abundant ammunition. Government hacking is taking place right now behind the scenes. #AntiSec”, indicating at least some members are engaged in activities that go further than just being a nuisance. Regardless, recent attacks by LulzSec and Anonymous have proven simple TTPs are often enough to successfully target and compromise large entities that have invested a significant amount of time and capital into building secure networks and training their personnel. For example, the June 2011 LulzSec/Anonymous initiated AntiSec campaign resulted in the successful compromise of sensitive but unclassified law enforcement and intelligence data, including FBI IIRs, DHS alerts, and intelligence products that contained information about sensitive and high-profile Federal Government operations.

(U//FOUO) Information about possible identities for LulzSec members has been posted on publicly available internet sites by disgruntled members and rival hackers. Additionally, several members of LulzSec and Anonymous were arrested in the U.S. and abroad. LulzSec also claimed they have ended their hacking campaign and rejoined with Anonymous, while vowing to continue their attacks. Based on their previous behavior and recent statements on publicly available social media sites, the intensity of their attacks could continue or actually increase in the short term as a result of continued publicity and to show support for members who have been arrested.

(U//FOUO) It is often difficult to characterize whether threats of a cyber attack by members of or sympathizers to hacktivist groups like LulzSec and Anonymous are credible until they have occurred. Normally, the measure of success is based on whether the threat actually comes to fruition and if information is stolen or a network made un-available. However, recent media publicity highlighting ongoing cyber activity and the perception that obtaining access to sensitive information on government and private sector networks is easily accomplished seems to have encouraged LulzSec and Anonymous to continue their malicious activity.

(U//FOUO) The NCCIC, along with its components and partners will continue to monitor the full spectrum of information and sources available to it for indications of a cyber attack by LulzSec, Anonymous, or sympathetic groups and provide further information to Federal, State, local, Tribal, and Territorial (F/S/L/T/T) Departments and Agencies and CIKR partners as it becomes available. To date, the NCCIC has not received any reports of widespread or significant increases in scanning, probing, or attacks against F/S/L/T/T computer or telecommunications networks. Additionally, there have been no reports of widespread or significant increases in scanning, probing, or attacking of CIKR partner computer or telecommunications networks that can be associated with AntiSec. The NCCIC suggests F/S/L/T/T and CIKR partners develop a comprehensive mitigation plan that includes an External Affairs strategy, in case an attack occurs. Additionally, the US-CERT has unclassified indicators that can be shared with F/S/L/T/T and CIKR partners to identify malicious activity associated with previous attacks by Anonymous and the NCC Watch can assist with telecommunications issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS / WAY AHEAD

(U//FOUO) Some members of LulzSec have demonstrated moderately higher levels of skill and creativity that include using combinations of methods and techniques to target multiple networks. This does not take into account the possibility of a higher-level actor providing LulzSec or Anonymous more advanced capabilities. Therefore, it may be advisable to adjust monitoring of both internal and external resources for indications of a pending or ongoing attack on cyber or telecommunications networks.

(U) The NCCIC recommends that U.S., Federal/State/local/Tribal/Territorial Departments and Agencies, and private sector partners ensure they have processes in place to notify their leadership and network operators if their organization becomes a possible target by hacktivists or other malicious actors, and what notifications they are required or plan to make in the event of an attack.

(U) Should a cyber attack occur, ensure backup and recovery procedures are in place and enabled. Be prepared to execute a full spectrum defensive plan that includes contact information for external sources to draw on for assistance. Collect and centrally manage detailed aspects of the attack so you can provide accurate information to Operations, Security, and Law Enforcement personnel as necessary. Such a plan may also include materials identifying who to contact at your Internet service provider, possibly via alternate means, and at any time of day or night to minimize the duration and effect of a cyber attack. Similarly, have contact information readily available for public and private entities to draw on for assistance: the NCCIC, US-CERT, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, local FBI Field Office, applicable Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC), and Sector Specific Agency.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

(U) Anonymous – (used as a mass noun) is an Internet meme originating 2003 on the imageboard 4chan, representing the concept of many online community users simultaneously existing as an anarchic, digitized global brain. It is also generally considered to be a blanket term for members of certain Internet subcultures, a way to refer to the actions of people in an environment where their actual identities are not known.

(U) Lulz – often used to denote laughter at someone who is the victim of a prank, or a reason for performing an action. This variation is often used on the ‘Oh Internet’ wiki and ‘4chan’ image boards.

(U) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) – an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. Although the means to carry out, motives for, and targets of a DDoS attack may vary, it generally consists of the concerted efforts of person or persons to prevent an Internet site or service from functioning efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely.

(U) Hacktivist – a portmanteau of hack and activism.

(U) Internet Relay Chat (IRC) – a form of real-time Internet text messaging (chat) or synchronous conferencing. It is mainly designed for group communication in discussion forums, called channels, but also allows one-to-one communication via private message as well as chat and data transfer, including file sharing.

(U) Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) – an open source network attack application, written in C#. LOIC was initially developed by Praetox Technologies, but later it was released into the public domain.


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Reply with quote  #36 

(U//LES) LulzSec Release: FBI Kopbusters.com Warning

June 26, 2011 in Federal Bureau of Investigation

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

Kopbusters.com: Officer Safety

  • 6 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • February 24, 2009

Download

(U//LES) This Situational Intelligence Report (SIR) is forwarded to your organization for information and situational awareness. On 03 December 2008, the Odessa Police Department (OPD) in Odessa, Texas received a highly detailed anonymous letter from a local clergyman. The letter, purported to be written by a young woman in the Odessa, Texas area, gave numerous details regarding the interior, exterior and illegal activity within a residence located in Odessa, Texas.

(U//LES) In the letter, the anonymous woman reported that her abusive boyfriend was operating a marijuana grow with over 80 marijuana plants in the residence. The letter indicated he was about to harvest and remove the plants. The letter detailed which room in the house was being utilized and that it had aluminum foil over the windows. The letter noted that the boyfriend had a silver Nissan Versa with the license plates removed. The letter also stated the vehicle was usually parked near the house, which had tinfoil covering the windows, an air conditioner near the bedroom window and $19,000 in cash stuffed in the fireplace.

(U//LES) OPD initiated surveillance at the residence located in Odessa, Texas. It was determined that the address was a valid address and officers found the residence consistent with the details of the letter regarding the vehicles, AC unit, windows with aluminum foil and a chimney. Based on information found during the investigation, a search warrant for the residence was obtained.

(U//LES) When the search warrant was executed, officers found the front door unlocked and the house nearly empty. There were grow lights in the room as described in the letter but the plants were two miniature Christmas trees. No marijuana plants were found in the residence. On one wall there was a poster informing the officers that they had been set up and were part of a “Kopbusters’ Internet” reality show and a shirt with the words “Free Yolanda” on it. As the search progressed the officers discovered that several rooms in the interior of the house were wired for streaming video and sound.

(U//LES) It was later determined that Barry Cooper, CEO of Kopbusters, and a former narcotics investigator, arranged this ruse in an attempt to insinuate that the OPD officers were corrupt. Barry Cooper stated that he staged this fake drug house to shed light on 4th Amendment violations conducted by the OPD. Initially, Barry Cooper claimed that the OPD investigators lied in the affidavit, alleging that they indicated to the Judge that an unidentified informant made a narcotics purchase from the house. No mention of an informant was contained in the affidavit.

(U//LES) Pursuant to an interview with Barry Cooper, he did not admit to producing the letter but subsequently made a statement that Kopbusters sent the letter. Cooper claimed within six months he will set-up on the OPD investigators again and that he is setting up pranks in other communities as he is going to make a new reality TV show out of them.
ASSESSMENT

(U//LES) Barry Cooper operates a website: Never Get Busted.com were he sells self-produced videos titled “Never Get Busted Again,” “Never Get Raided” and a police training video on locating hidden compartments he made while still an interdiction officer. These videos show viewers how to “conceal their stash,” “avoid narcotics profiling” and “fool canines every time,” according to the website. Barry Cooper is a proponent for the legalization of marijuana and was a Libertarian candidate for U.S. Congress District 31 in Texas. Barry Cooper lives in Tyler, Texas and appears strongly motivated to prove his contention that marijuana should be decriminalized and enjoys the publicity generated by this ruse. He has stated an intention to operate again in Odessa, Texas and elsewhere. Barry Cooper and his associates at Kobusters.com have shown the technical ability to stage this type of action and the knowledge to hire “actors” to execute this type of ruse in order to further substantiate their false claims.

(U//LES) Based on available data and media coverage of this ruse, FBI El Paso currently assesses the actions of Barry Cooper and his associates at Kobbusters.com as low. The success of the assessment/disruption is dependent upon local law enforcement participating in the coordination to disrupt and dispute any claims filed on Barry Cooper and his associates at Kobbusters.com.

(U//LES) Should your agency have or collect intelligence regarding the captioned matter, please forward it to the El Paso Division FBI/Midland Resident Agency.


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"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #37 

(U//LES) LulzSec Release: New Jersey Fusion Center MS-13 Using Game Consoles to Communicate

June 25, 2011 in Intelligence Fusion Centers, New Jersey

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

MS-13 Using Gaming Consoles to Conduct Business

  • 2 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • September 21, 2010

Download

(U//FOUO) MS-13 members use features on gaming consoles to direct operational activities.

(U//FOUO) As of June 2010, MS-13 members in Los Angeles have directed operational activities of new MS-13 members in Birmingham, United Kingdom, using gaming consoles such as Sony Playstation and Microsoft Xbox 360. The MS-13 leaders appear to be taking advantage of the devices’ voice over internet protocol (VOIP), text chat, virtual world, and video teleconferencing features, which allow them to communicate with fellow gang members overseas.

(U//FOUO) MS-13 members may have used this communications tactic to order at least one murder – possibly part of a new member initiation – as well as the murder of a possible witness, by new gang members.

(U//LES) The NJ ROIC has previous reported on illicit activities facilitated by gaming consoles. The July 8, 2009, edition of the NJ Common Operating Picture reported that street, prison, and outlaw motorcycle gang members were increasingly using gaming consoles to communicate covertly, recruit members, conduct criminal activity, and minimize detection by law enforcement authorities.3 The May 3, 2006, edition of the Daily Bulletin reported that an adult male in New Jersey used Xbox to communicate with a minor female, lure her across state lines, and persuade her to perform sexual acts. A similar incident occurred in California.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #38 

(U//FOUO/LES) LulzSec Release: NYSIC Vehicle Concealment Smartbook 2009

June 25, 2011 in Intelligence Fusion Centers, New York

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

NEW YORK STATE INTELLIGENCE CENTER

  • 89 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • April 2009
  • 4.6 MB

Download


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #39 

(U//LES) LulzSec Release: FBI Botnet Owners Distribute Law Enforcement Honeypot IP List

June 25, 2011 in Arizona, Federal Bureau of Investigation

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

FBI Phoenix Division Cyber Crime Report

  • 10 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • April 29, 2011

Download

(U//LES) Botnet Owners Share Honeypot Internet Protocol Addresses in Attempt to Avoid Law Enforcement and Security Vendor Scrutiny

(U//LES) Between 23 February, 2011 and 15 March, 2011, Botnet owners posting on the website ryan1918.com shared internet protocol (IP) addresses they believed were associated with honeypots used by law enforcement and anti-virus, anti-malware, and security research vendors.

(U//LES) The Botnet owners warned the data collected by honeypots could be used by law enforcement agencies for criminal indictments. Botnet owners were further advised to be suspicious of blind “GET” requests and to use firewall rules in order to drop requests originating from the IP addresses and IP address ranges listed below.

(U//LES) The ryan1918.com website was identified in previous law enforcement reporting as the location of a collaboration forum for hackers and owners of botnets. The website allows hackers to claim credit for defacements, post hacking tools, and share hacking success stories.


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hannah

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Reply with quote  #40 

(U//FOUO) LulzSec Release: Arizona Fusion Center Counter-Surveillance Tactic Used at Demonstration

June 24, 2011 in Arizona, Intelligence Fusion Centers

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

False Reporting: Counter Surveillance Tactic Used at Demonstration

  • 2 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • February 3, 2009

Download

Scope:

The information contained in this bulletin identifies a tactic recently employed against an Arizona Department of Public Safety (AZ DPS) officer. The incident occurred at a scheduled demonstration by a known citizen action group to protest the traffic cameras on Arizona’s highways. This information is provided for situational awareness to assist law enforcement engaged in public event site security; and for those monitoring potential threats at public gatherings.

Situation:

On January 16, 2009 a later identified subject, claiming to be employed by a known internet based media outlet, approached plain clothes officer (1) in an unmarked vehicle. The officer was conducting a public safety site monitoring operation of a traffic camera demonstration from a remote position. The identified subject took photographs of plain clothes officer (1) and then left the remote location and proceeded to the site of the demonstration. The subject continued taking photographs of the remote monitoring position from the demonstration site. Another plain clothes officer (2) was dispatched to identify the subject. Upon plain clothes officer (2)’s arrival the subject began videotaping the officer, yelling as he approached the officer’s vehicle. As the officer drove away from the demonstration site the identified subject ran after the vehicle and continued to film the incident. After the officer moved his vehicle from the site to a nearby location, the identified subject called 911 and reported a hit and run incident and an aggravated assault. The local jurisdiction responded to the scene, investigated, and took a report.

The subject told police he felt the vehicle “boxed him in” and so he took pictures of the driver. The subject claimed the driver of the vehicle ran over his left foot and hit his knee as the vehicle pulled away. Viewing of the subject’s video revealed the vehicle did not strike the subject. The subject refused to let investigating officers download the video for further examination in the investigation. The subject stated he was a member of the media; therefore the video was a “working product.” However, the subject could not produce any media credentials when asked by investigators. Additionally, the subject refused to allow investigating officers to see or take photographs of his alleged injuries. Responding officers did not see any markings that indicated the subject’s feet or knees had been struck by a vehicle. Examination of the vehicle revealed no damage had occurred. The subject stated he believed the driver of the vehicle was a police officer. Later, that information was confirmed when the AZ DPS officer identified himself as a police officer to the subject and responding police officers upon arrival. After over an hour of interviewing the witnesses and investigating the information pertaining to the incident, the subject asked officers from the responding jurisdiction to rescind his statement and told officers he did not want the matter investigated any further.

ACTIC Analyst Comment: As reported above, the subject falsely reported the hit and run incident to local authorities and then refused to cooperate with the investigation. The subject now possesses photographs of the plain clothes officer and the unmarked vehicle. Further, due to the false report and ensuing on scene investigation, the subject has received confirmation that his confrontation was with an AZ DPS officer. Upon review of websites and blog chats for the demonstration, it was apparent the demonstrators were taking photographs of law enforcement personnel as they approached the demonstration. Several photographs of local police officers appear on the website to document the demonstration. Additionally, demonstrators are aware of the presence of law enforcement monitoring as confirmed in the attached photograph.

This is a potential Officer Safety concern for law enforcement.

The motivation behind the false report is unknown, however, the ACTIC would like to remind all officers and those involved with monitoring public safety events to be vigilant and aware of the tactics demonstrators may use to bait officers or disrupt protest monitoring during public safety operations.

In the recent past, citizen action groups and other single issue protest groups in Arizona have provoked and/or fabricated situations of duress when they are confronted by law enforcement. It is likely they do this to further demonstrate they are the “victim of unconstitutional infringements to their civil liberties.” This tactic allows these entities to leverage the media coverage associated with their confrontations with law enforcement and often allows them to simultaneously promote their cause. They may be attempting to create a situation in which they can make a civil claim to sue for money; or file criminal charges against law enforcement or another  government entity to discourage further actions against the group. Officers are reminded to rely on their training, department policies and experience when conducting operations to ensure public safety while monitoring the protest activities of these groups or responding to incidents at these types of events

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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #41 

(U//LES) LulzSec Release: EPIC Guide to Detecting Illicit Trafficking by Aircraft

June 25, 2011 in Intelligence Fusion Centers

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

A Police Officer’s Reference Guide to Detecting Illicit Trafficking by Aircraft

  • 2 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • October 2009

Download

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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #42 

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Intelligence Officer’s Handbook

December 12, 2011 in U.S. Army

TC 2-50.5: Intelligence Officer’s Handbook

  • 168 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • January 2010
  • 6.56 MB

Download

OVERVIEW

1-1. The intelligence warfighting function is one of six warfighting functions. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (FM 3-0).

1-2. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment. It includes tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations and is driven by the commander (FM 3-0). Intelligence is more than just collection; it is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. The intelligence warfighting function includes the following tasks:

• Support to force generation.
• Support to situational understanding.
• Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
• Provide intelligence support to targeting and information superiority.

INTELLIGENCE CATEGORIES

1-6. As discussed in FM 2-0, Army unit intelligence staffs produce and receive, directly or indirectly, six categories of intelligence support from the U.S. intelligence community. Intelligence categories are distinguishable primarily by their intelligence product purposes. The categories can overlap and the same intelligence can be used in each category. Intelligence organizations use specialized procedures to develop these categories. The following information describes each category and the responsible organization:

• Indications and warning (I&W). Analysis of time-sensitive information that could involve a threat to U.S. and multinational military forces, U.S. political or economic interests, or to U.S. citizens. While the G-2/S-2 produces I&W intelligence, every Soldier, such as the one conducting a presence patrol, contributes to the I&W through awareness of the CCIRs and by reporting related information.
• Current intelligence. The G-2/S-2 produces accurate reporting on the current threat situation— which becomes a portion of the common operational picture (COP)—projects the threat’s anticipated situation and the implication to friendly operations.
• General military intelligence (GMI). GMI focuses on the military capabilities of foreign countries, organizations, or on topics relating to Armed Forces capabilities, including threat characteristics (previously order of battle factors) and area or terrain intelligence. The G-2/S-2 develops initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products from various GMI databases, and then develops and maintains the unit’s GMI database on potential threat forces and areas of concern based on the commander’s guidance. This database supports the unit’s plan, preparation, execution, and assessment of operations.
• Target intelligence. The analysis of threat units, dispositions, facilities, and systems to identify and nominate specific assets or vulnerabilities for attack, reattack, or exploit.
• Scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI). The collection, evaluation, and interpretation of foreign engineering science and technology with warfare potential, including military systems, weapons, weapons systems, materiel, research and development, and production methods. The G-2/S-2 establishes instructions in standing operating procedures (SOPs), orders, and plans for handling and evacuating captured enemy material for S&TI exploitation.
• Counterintelligence (CI). Identifying and recommending countermeasures against threats by foreign intelligence services and the ISR activities of nonstate entities, such as organized crime, terrorist groups, and drug traffickers.

INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

1-7. Intelligence disciplines are categories of intelligence functions. There are nine major intelligence disciplines:

• All-source intelligence.
• CI.
• Human intelligence (HUMINT).
• Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).
• Imagery intelligence (IMINT).
• Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).
• Open-source intelligence (OSINT).
• Signals intelligence (SIGINT).
• Technical intelligence (TECHINT).


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https://www.torproject.org/download/download

http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #43 

(U//FOUO) LulzSec Release: MIAC Anarchist Movement Report

June 24, 2011 in Intelligence Fusion Centers, Missouri

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec.

Missouri Information Analysis Center

  • 5 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • November 28, 2008

Download

There are many different ideologies that an anarchist may follow. Although there may be a number of differences, they all contain the same central belief. Anarchism is the idea that government (the state) is unnecessary and harmful. Anarchy is society without government. Anarchists are people who desire to live in a society without ru-lers as their ancestors once did. The main belief is that the community in which they live be dependant only upon itself. People who believe in government (such as liberals, conservatives, socialists and fascists) are known as “statists”. Anarchism opposes all forms of hierarchical control.

The terms “anarchism” and “anarchy” are often confused in their meaning. When most people think Anarchist, they think of the chaotic Molotov cocktail throwing teenager (which grew out of the Anarcho-Punk persona) or ALF/ELF members (Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front – Eco-Anarchism, Green Anarchism, or Anarcho-Primitivism ideologies). Although there are a few direct action radical sub-groups not all believe in violence.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #44 

(U//FOUO/LES) LulzSec Release: Arizona Fusion Center Sovereign Citizens and Militia Information

June 24, 2011 in Arizona, Intelligence Fusion Centers

This document is part of a collection leaked by the anonymous hacker collective known as LulzSec. It is also worth noting that the ACTIC spells sovereign wrong in the title of the bulletin.

ARIZONA COUNTER-TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • August 19, 2008

Download

The Sovereign Citizens and Militia Movements have been in existence for a number of years and remain active throughout the US today. The Sovereign Citizen Movement began in the 1970’s when groups/individuals adopted right-wing anarchist ideologies originating from the theories of the group called the Posse Comitatus. The Militia Movement began to form not long after the 1993 Waco, Texas incident.

According to the FBI’s “The Militia and Sovereign Citizen Movement in America Today, dtd 3 May 2007”:

“Militias and sovereign citizens are right-wing, anti-government extremist who engage in acts of terrorism and violence to further their political or social goals and who are motivated by: a belief in their sovereign status, which rejects governmental authority such as federal and state judges, legislatures, and law enforcement personnel; an extremist anti-tax ideology; and an obsession with conspiracy theories.”

“Other extremist beliefs vary with the type of group or the orientation of individual offenders. Militias (organized groups that conduct paramilitary training) are particularly opposed to all forms of gun control. Anti-Semitic and racist beliefs are also common within the movement. Although not as strong during the time of the Sheriff’s Posse Comitatus (the forerunners of today’s militias and sovereign citizens) elements of the Christian Identity doctrine remain influential among some groups especially the Christ County –Kingdom of God militia and the Washington State Jural Society.”

Past actions conducted by these types of movement groups have had a significant impact on law enforcement and those who have government authority. These groups remain an area of concern for law enforcement. Both believe that most agencies of the government, specifically law enforcement are illegal entities that enforce and create illegal laws.

SOVEREIGNS

Sovereign citizens believe they have complete control over their property, which means they are not responsible for abiding by tax laws, regulations, ordinances and zoning restrictions. They do not consider themselves citizens of the US, but as non-resident aliens and the only court which has jurisdiction over them for any matter is “Common Law Court”. Typical tactics for Sovereign Citizens include frivolous/harassing lawsuits, bogus liens, fictitious financial instruments, phony arrest warrants, fictitious vehicle related documents to include license plates and driver’s license, the misuse of IRS forms and other “Common Law Court” documents. These tactics have been referred to as “Paper Terrorism” and “Paper Redemption.” The actions conducted by Sovereign Citizens are usually aimed at government/law enforcement officials in attempts to harass, intimidate, and become a nuisance to the individuals and/or the courts. Although the tactics listed above are non-violent and more commonly used by Sovereign Citizens, there have been instances over the years where they have also committed acts of violence against government/law enforcement officials.

MILITIAS

Militia movements believe the American people need armed forces to help defend themselves against the government, which has become a puppet of a social globalist’s conspiracy called the “New World Order.” Many of the Militia movements focus on the fear of gun confiscation by the government and the consequences of such actions would play out in their conspiracy theory. Recently, members of militia groups have been arrested and convicted for weapons, explosives and/or conspiracy charges.

ANALYSIS

Recent activity in Northern Arizona indicates there are individuals who appear to have beliefs very similar to those of the Sovereign Citizens Movement and/or Militia Movements ideologies. Federal land patents filings have reportedly increased in two of Arizona’s northern counties. Information has been reported that individuals filing land patent claims are stating/claiming the county officials (assessors, land use, sheriff’s deputies) have no authority over them. Additionally, individuals have sent papers in stating they do not have to pay taxes. At this time, the reporting supports the theory that the actions of these individuals are consistent with Sovereign Citizen and Militia ideologies. The following indicators (not all-inclusive) have been provided to assist law enforcement with identifying of individuals they may encounter during traffic stops or calls for service who may be involved in these movements and/or have similar ideologies. All law enforcement personnel are reminded to maintain heightened situational awareness when encountering subjects suspected of supporting Sovereign or Militia movements.

The individual(s) may:

• Have a fictitious/peculiar or NO license plates. The plates might claim to be from a non-existent entity like the Republic of Texas (any state), Washitaw Nation, Kingdom of Heaven and etc. They might include numerous variations on the themes of “sovereign citizen,” “sovereign american,” “Common Law,” “UCC1-207” (or other UCC themes; these refer to passages in the Uniform Commercial Code), “militia,” and biblical passages. The plates can range from homemade cardboard plates to stamped metal plates that look very legitimate.
• Have a fictitious or NO driver’s license and/or registration. They may claim they do not need the items on the basis that they are not driving a commercial vehicle. Many extremists claim that the laws requiring such documents apply only to vehicles used for commercial purposes and/or that driving is a right, not a privilege.
• Have peculiar bumper stickers or display strange car decorations. There are companies who market stickers to anti-government extremists and they are readily identifiable. Examples from one company based in St. Marys, Kansas, include: “And the Lord said (Luke 11:46, 52) ‘WOE to YOU LAWYERS’;” “Free the Slaves, Abolish IRS and the Federal Reserve. Other car decorations could include homemade placards, signs in windows or along tailgates and/or display “militia identification numbers”.
• Make strange statements (driver or passenger) and refuse to identify themselves. In response to a request for a license, registration, proof of insurance or other form of identification the individual might make a response with referencing the items as “contracts”. Any references to these documents as “contracts” should be a warning sign; so too should any statement to the effect that they are not required to possess them. If they self-identify themselves as “sovereign citizens,” “non-resident aliens,” “sovereigns,” “common law citizens,” “state citizens,” “freemen,” “constitutionalists,” or claim some other pseudo-legal status, they are providing police with valuable information about their nature. Any suggestion that the Constitution or the Bible gives them an absolute right to travel unregulated, or if they present the officer with a Bible as a driver’s license, can be considered a warning sign. Requests the officer to produce an arrest warrant can also be a sign.
• Hand the officer political literature or strangely threatening documents for him to read or sign. Anything that reads “Notice to Arresting Officer” or “Form CRIF 2PA95” or which purports to explain the law to the officer should be taken as a warning sign.
• Attempt to audiotape the conversation.
• Produce some sort of identification which seems to identify him or her as some sort of strange-sounding law enforcement officer, such as a “Special u.S. Marshal,” a “Constitution Ranger,” or agent with the “Civil Rights Task Force.”

As a cautionary note, Sovereign and Militia movement individual(s) (driver and passengers) have been known to be armed and/or have concealed weapons in their vehicles. Additionally, beware of the possibility they may have another individual in a vehicle following or nearby. Law enforcement officers are reminded to remain vigilant and to follow eir agencies procedures and protocols when dealing with these individuals. Report any such contacts to the ACTIC.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #45 

U.S. Air Force F-16A/B Flight Manual

June 22, 2011 in U.S. Air Force

This manual was originally published and made publicly available in November 2010 by an unknown person via Scribd.

USAF/EPAF SERIES AIRCRAFT F-16A/B FLIGHT MANUAL

  • 582 pages
  • Distribution authorized to Department of Defense (DOD) components only
  • August 15, 2003
  • 35.2 MB

Download
 


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http://www.theintelligencenews.com/


"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #46 

U.S. State Department Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database 2011

May 29, 2011 in Department of State

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

  • 383 pages
  • May 2011

Download

Every year, U.S. officials from agencies with anti-money laundering responsibilities meet to assess the money laundering situations in 200 jurisdictions. The review includes an assessment of the significance of financial transactions in the country‘s financial institutions involving proceeds of serious crime, steps taken or not taken to address financial crime and money laundering, each jurisdiction‘s vulnerability to money laundering, the conformance of its laws and policies to international standards, the effectiveness with which the government has acted, and the government‘s political will to take needed actions.

The 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, highlights the most significant steps countries and jurisdictions categorized as ―Major Money Laundering Countries‖ have taken to improve their anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regimes. The report provides a snapshot of the AML/CFT legal infrastructure of each country or jurisdiction and its capacity to share information and cooperate in international investigations. For each country where they have been completed, the write-up also provides a link to the most recent mutual evaluation performed by or on behalf of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or the FATF-style regional body to which the country or jurisdiction belongs. When applicable, relevant country reports also provide links to the Department of State‘s ―Country Reports on Terrorism‖ so the reader can learn more about issues specific to terrorism and terrorism financing. Providing these links will allow those interested readers to find detailed information on the country‘s AML/CFT capacity and the effectiveness of its programs.

In addition, the report contains details of United States Government efforts to provide technical assistance and training as well as information on the multilateral organizations we support, either monetarily and/or through participation in their programs. In 2010, USG personnel leveraged their expertise to share their experience and knowledge with over 100 countries. They worked independently and with other donor countries and organizations to provide training programs, mentoring and support for supervisory, law enforcement, prosecutorial, customs and financial intelligence unit personnel as well as private sector entities. We expect these efforts, over time, will build capacity in jurisdictions that are lacking, strengthen the overall level of global compliance with international standards and contribute to an increase in prosecutions and convictions of those who launder money or finance terrorists or terrorist acts.

Money laundering continues to be a serious global threat. Jurisdictions flooded with illicit funds are vulnerable to the breakdown of the rule of law, the corruption of public officials and destabilization of their economies. The development of new technologies and the possibility of linkages between illegal activities that generate considerable proceeds and the funding of terrorist groups only exacerbate the challenges faced by the financial, law enforcement, supervisory, legal and intelligence communities. The continued development of AML/CFT regimes to deter criminal activity and detect illicit proceeds is reflected in this report again this year. Political stability, democracy and free markets depend on solvent, stable, and honest financial, commercial, and trade systems. The Department of State‘s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs looks forward to continuing to work with our U.S. and international partners in furthering this important work and strengthening capacities globally to combat money laundering and the funding of terrorists and terrorism.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #47 

(U//FOUO) State Department Visa Cancellation Stamps Bulletin February 2003

May 20, 2011 in Department of State

United States Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs Fraud Prevention Programs

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • February 2003

Download

Consular Affairs has developed a highly penetrative security ink to be used exclusively for cancelling nonimmigrant visas. This unique formulation, designated security ink #297, is specially designed to penetrate TESLIN, the synthetic material used as the basis of visa foils issued since late 1993 until the recent introduction of the Lincoln Visa. The ink finally selected was chosen after extensive laboratory testing undertaken by both the U.S. Secret Service and INS/FDL.

Up to now, there existed no genuinely effective means for cancelling a visa permanently short of destructive methods that risked damaging the underlying passport page. To remedy this, CA commissioned the manufacture of two types of visa cancellation stamps in conjunction with the new security ink, and they are being distributed to visa issuing posts worldwide.

These stamps will be used to cancel previously issued visas, whether TESLIN or Lincoln MRVs, either submitted for revalidation (CANCELLED WITHOUT PREJUDICE) or detected as being forged, photo subbed, or being fraudulently misused (CANCELLED CANCELLED). The purpose of these cancellation stamps is to reduce the number of potentially recyclable visa foils being diverted to visa forgers and vendors of false documents. When applied to the face of a visa, this ink quickly penetrates through the material and cannot be removed or eradicated.

These products are being pouched to visa issuing posts in kits that will include several pre-filled cancellation stamps and a supply of replacement ink, accompanied by printed instructions for proper refilling and maintenance. As the instructions indicate, it is important that no other ordinary ink be used to refill these stamp devices, and that the specially labeled security ink is not used for purposes other than the permanent cancellation of U.S. visas. Further instructions pertaining to this project (VISA CANCELLATION STAMP PROJECT) will be communicated to posts via an upcoming ALDAC.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #48 

(U//LES) DHS Shopping Mall Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Report

May 9, 2011 in Department of Homeland Security

CHARACTERISTICS AND COMMON VULNERABILITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY: SHOPPING MALLS

  • 19 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • Sensitive Homeland Security Information
  • February 13, 2004

Download

Shopping malls are potential targets for terrorist attacks because of the ability to inflict casualties, cause economic damage, and instill fear. Furthermore, they are “soft targets” in that they are serve the general public, and the presence of a significant number of American citizens is assured at certain times of the day. Due to the nature of their functions, these facilities usually lack perimeter or access controls. Due to their accessibility, soft targets are more vulnerable, and virtually impossible to defend against terrorist attacks. Damage or destruction of a large mall could inflict mass casualties, primarily on site; shut down or degrade its operation, thus having a significant impact on the economic well-being of a large area; have widespread psychological impact; and cause the release of hazardous materials. Disruption of the facility without inflicting actual damage can result in severe financial losses and erode the confidence of customers in returning to the site. In addition, any significant terrorist attack at a large shopping complex, especially with numerous casualties, would have a cascading effect. Concern over safety and fear that an attack could occur elsewhere would cause shoppers to avoid malls nationwide, dealing a significant blow to the retail sector of the United States’ (U.S.) economy. Figure 1 shows potential objectives of terrorist attacks.

Specific terrorist threats of concern to large shopping mall include:
• Explosives (e.g., car bomb, suicide bomber),
• Arson (e.g., firebombing, using accelerants),
• Biological agents introduced into the facility (e.g., anthrax, botulism),
• Chemical agents introduced into the facility (e.g., chemical warfare agents, toxic
industrial chemicals),
• Hostage/barricade, and
• Automatic weapons attack (e.g., indiscriminate shooting of patrons, like
a Columbine-type incident).

Shopping malls are vulnerable to a number of natural events, such as tornados, hurricanes, and
earthquakes. Building codes and construction standards have been designed and adopted to
address these threats. There are also ongoing studies as to how to improve the ability of buildings
to withstand the impact of tornados, microbursts, and other wind-driven events. In many ways,
these are applicable to the potential structural impact of explosions caused by bombs.
Texas Tech University’s Wind Science and Engineering Research Center has studied the
construction of a variety of buildings, including large malls and the potential damage that
a tornado could cause to these structures as part of its Fujita Scale Enhancement Project. The
damage indicators developed during this activity are available online (see Useful Reference
Material at the end of this report).

The International Code Council (ICC) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to developing a
single set of comprehensive and coordinated national model construction codes. The founders of
the ICC were Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc., International
Conference of Building Officials, and Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc.
These nonprofit organizations had developed three separate sets of model codes used throughout
the U.S. In 1994, these groups combined to form the ICC and develop a single set of codes
without regional limitations. The ICC publishes a variety of references to building codes and
standards, including the International Building Code and state and local codes. It offers technical
publications that cover most topics associated with building structures. It also performs technical
evaluations of building plans and provides technical support to its members. The ICC home page
provides links to the organization’s publications and services.


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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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hannah

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Reply with quote  #49 

(U//LES) FBI Pre-Deployment Checklist for Cyber Investigations

November 20, 2012 in Federal Bureau of Investigation

The following document was obtained from the website of the Oklahoma Bankers Association.  The material is part of a collection of several documents provided to banks and financial institutions in the area by the local FBI Cyber Division office.

FBI Pre-deployment Checklist for Cyber Investigations

  • 4 pages
  • Law Enforcement Sensitive
  • October 2012

INVESTIGATIVE TOOLS

The following investigative tools are available during incident response:

Investigative Interviews (subject, victim, witness)

The FBI can conduct interviews to gather information and evidence for an investigation.

Evidence Collection (technical and physical)

The FBI has the ability to collect evidence. This includes the ability to obtain forensic images of computer systems. The FBI utilizes its Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) program for collecting digital evidence.

Electronic Surveillance (consent, court-ordered, etc.)

The FBI has the ability, with proper legal authority, to conduct electronic surveillance.

Investigative Analysis

Cyber FBI agents and analysts are trained to conduct technical analysis in the field. This includes e-mail header analysis, network traffic analysis, and intrusion analysis. The FBI has specific units at FBI Headquarters to assist with highly technical or specialized analytical requests.

Malware analysis

The FBI developed a system called the Binary Analysis, Characterization, and Storage System (BACSS) which is used to triage malware identified in FBI investigations. Through this system, the FBI has the ability to cross-correlate malware events. If malware requires further, in-depth analysis, the FBI has specific units at FBI Headquarters to assist with this specialized analytical request.

Cyber Action Team (CAT) Deployment

The mission of the CAT is to deploy globally at the direction of Cyber Executive Management, in order to bring in-depth cyber expertise, specialized investigative skills, and direct connectivity to those cyber initiatives, investigations, and emergencies deemed critical and significant. These incidents are aligned with the FBI’s national priorities, and are defined primarily as intrusions into government, military, and commercial systems that have a direct and adverse effect on the national information infrastructure.

Legal Attaché Support

The FBI has Legal Attachés or LEGATS throughout the world to support the FBI’s mission. These LEGATS foster strategic partnerships to local law enforcement, intelligence, and security services agencies to facilitate information exchange and exploring joint operational opportunities.

National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF)

The NCIJTF is the national focal point for the U.S. government for the coordination, integration, and sharing of information related to all domestic cyber threat investigations. The NCIJTF is an alliance of peer agencies with complementary missions to protect national cyber interests as well as the political, economic, and overall vitality of our nation. Assignees from participating agencies have access to a unique, comprehensive view of the nation’s cyber situation while working together in a collaborative environment in which they maintain the authorities and operational/investigative responsibilities of their represented agencies.

Access to Legal Process

The FBI has access to legal process which can authorize subpoenas, search warrants, indictments, arrests, etc. In addition to legal process, the FBI can work through consent to obtain information or evidence in support of the investigation.

Review Current Field Office Collections and Investigations

The FBI has 56 field offices working cyber investigations. The combined information from all field office investigations offers an in-depth view of a threat not readily available through other databases.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST

Prior to the FBI responding to a cyber incident, the items in the following checklist would greatly enhance the FBI’s ability to effectively further the investigation.

Network Inventory

Victims should provide as much information as possible regarding the inventory of computer systems and network components (i.e., workstations, servers, routers, switches, etc).

Software Inventory

Victims should provide as much information as possible regarding the inventory of software applications used in the organization (i.e., operating systems, application versions, proprietary applications).

Up-To-Date Network Topology Maps

Network topology maps should provide a current, functional understanding of the organization’s network.

Network- and Host-Based Incident Logs

These logs include, but are not limited to, web, proxy, IDS, VPN, DNS, database, remote access, and firewall logs.

Forensic Images of Compromised Hosts

If possible and your organization has the capability, obtain forensic images of identified compromised hosts. It is also recommended your organization maintains a log of activity for reference.

List of External and Internal IP Addresses

This list should include DNS, web server, proxies and workstations.

Physical Access Logs

These logs typically include video logs from security cameras, entry/exit access logs, keycard logs, and two-factor authentication logs.

Legal Banner and Computer Use Agreement

These legal items are essential to assure the data can legally be passed to the FBI.

Domain Infrastructure, Group Policy Hierarchy, and Access Control Details

These items can typically be provided by network/system administrators.

Related Material From the Archive:

  1. DHS Cyber Threat to the U.S.
  2. HBGary QinetiQ Cyber Attack Response Report
  3. HBGary DoD Cyber Warfare Support Work Statement
  4. HBGary DARPA Cyber Genome Technical Management Proposal
  5. DoD Develops Classified List of “Cyber Weapons”
  6. SPAWAR/USCYBERCOM Cyber Warfare, Exploitation & Information Dominance (CWEID) Lab Overview
  7. Cyber Storm III Begins With Participants From 12 Countries, 60 Private Companies
  8. Joint Public Health – Law Enforcement Investigations: Model Memorandum of Understand

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"The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money. It's run by little ones and zeroes......"



"There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information.... it's all about the information!"
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maynard

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Posts: 1,163
Reply with quote  #50 

U.S. Army Soldier’s Primer to Terrorism Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Complex Operational Environments

November 27, 2012 in U.S. Army

TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C3

  • 104 pages
  • August 2012
  • 8.9 MB

This Soldier’s primer describes terrorism TIP threats in an operational environment (OE) and the likely impacts on military operations in a U.S. combatant command area of responsibility (AOR). The intent is to improve situational awareness and operational understanding of current terrorism capabilities-limitations, and complement the deliberate and intuitive processes of-

- Military Risk Management
- Protection of Friendly Forces
- Mission Orders Conduct, and
- Adaptive Leader Decisionmaking.


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL ALLOWED DRUG FLOW
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

DEA Chief Robert Bonner said CIA Smuggled Drugs


L.A. DEA Agent Unraveled the CIA's Alleged Role in the Murder of Kiki Camarena
http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278


"There is no question in my mind that people affiliated with, on the payroll of, and carrying the credentials of,the CIA were involved in drug trafficking while involved in support of the contras."—Senator John Kerry (1996)


We live in a dirty and dangerous world ... There are some things the general public does not need to know and shouldn't. I believe democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows. -1988 speech by Washington Post owner Katharine Graham, CIA Headquarters
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